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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze U.S. security interests in
Latin America and examine the potential for a Latin American
nation, under a revised maritime strategy, to become both a naval
and a defense industrial partner of the United States.
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first examines the need
to revise the U.S. maritime strategy and makes a case for a greater
focus of that strategy on Latin America. The second part assesses the
relative strengths and weaknesses of Latin American national and
maritime capabilities. The third part examines the potential for
armaments cooperation between the United States and Brazil. The
thesis concludes that the potential for collaboration between the
United States and Brazil is limited because of political and economic
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The United States must chart a new strategic course as a result of the
momentous world events that led into the 1990s. Few could have predicted
the extraordinary changes that now confront the global community. A totally
new international arena has been conceived. The Soviet Union has
collapsed, many of the world's political boundaries have been redefined, and
the emergence of free trade areas in the Western Hemisphere and Europe
have redefined economic borders. A global economic recession also
influences the international community. Measured on a scale, these events
are comparable to those created by World Wars I and II.
In the dawn of this new era, political and economic interests, alone,
require that the United States conduct a thorough review of its security
interests, the status of its alliances and the posture of its military state of
readiness, both operational and technological. In an effort to undertake a
small part of this task, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze U.S. security
interests in Latin America and examine the potential for a Latin American
nation, under a revised maritime strategy, to become both a naval and a
defense industrial partner of the United States.
The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part examines the
need to revise the U.S. maritime strategy. The world political environment
has been continuously changing since the late 1980s, but the single most
significant political change has been the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Although revisions to the world's political landscape a The United States
must chart a new strategic course as a result of the momentous world events
that led into the 1990s. Few could have predicted the extraordinary changes
that now confront the global community. A totally new international arena
has been conceived. The Soviet Union has collapsed, many of the world's
political boundaries have been redefined, and the birth of the European
Community, as well as the emergence of free trade areas in the Western
Hemisphere, have redefined economic borders. A global economic recession
also impacts the international community. Measured on a scale, these events
are comparable to those created by World Wars I and n. In the dawn of this
new era, political and economic interests, alone, require that the United States
still unfolding, the predominant actor in Eastern Europe is now Russia.
Russia maintains the world's most capable military force, next to that of the
United States, so the U.S. must be prepared, worst case, to face this force.
However, the Cold War is dead. Therefore, in relative terms, other security
issues have risen in importance, and the U.S. has had to re-focus both its
priorities and its strategy to better confront these strategic interests, especially
in the Third World.
The identification of strategic regional interests and the articulation of a
grand strategy, within the framework of U.S. security objectives, makes a case
for a greater focus of the U.S. maritime strategy on Latin America. No longer
a backwater region, Latin America is a region that offers both threat and
opportunity. The United States must attempt to control the threats and
harness the opportunities. Latin American threats to U.S. security include
political instability, debt, drugs, insurgency, terrorism, illegal immigration,
and threats to the environment. Opportunities range from trade to military
security. These points suggest that the U.S. must better address its
relationship within the Western Hemisphere as the region becomes
increasingly important to the United States. Thus, the first part of this thesis
articulates the role of Latin America in a revised maritime strategy and the
rationale for both U.S. and Latin American interest in this endeavor. It is a
proposition of this thesis that both Latin America and the United States stand
to gain by increasing economic, commercial, military and political ties.
Therefore, in order to protect these interests, a joint effort by both Latin
America and the United States is required to maintain their mutual security.
In order to calculate the ability of Latin American navies to act as force
multipliers, relative strengths and weaknesses must be assessed. Therefore,
the second part of the thesis serves as a calculation of Latin American
national and maritime capabilities. A review of national power indicators
gauges the ability of each state in Latin America to support a naval
infrastructure. Compared by matrix, the essential elements of power of each
nation in Latin America are ranked against each other. The top-rated
countries include Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Another study ranks
their relative naval capabilities. In this case, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Peru were accorded top honors. In both cases, however, Brazil was ranked
first by a wide margin. In fact, along with India, Brazil is considered the most
capable maritime nation in the Third World. The outcome of the second part
of the thesis suggests that Brazil could probably best support a maritime
partnership with the United States in naval operations. Whether Brazil
could also support a cooperative defense research, development and /or
production venture with the United States is less clear.
The third part of this thesis examines the potential for armaments
cooperation between the United States and Brazil. Over the last decade, the
growth of indigenous arms industries, the internationalization of the arms
market, and the contraction of the U.S. defense budget have increased U.S.
interest in international armaments cooperation. Collaborative ventures are
considered attractive because, by pooling resources, there is the potential for
monetary savings, increased standardization of allied equipment and the
potential to produce a product superior to that which a single participant
might create. However, a high level of military, governmental and industrial
cooperation are often required for international armaments cooperation to be
successful. Indeed, an entire project can be placed in jeopardy over an
unresolved disagreement among participants. Largely confined to
transatlantic arrangements with Europe, there has been little U.S.
involvement in international armaments cooperation with other countries.
Therefore, the question exists whether the United States can successfully
collaborate with a Latin American nation.
A review of NATO experiences in international armaments cooperation
provides a number of lessons which suggest that such an arrangement can be
coordinated if the proper criteria are met. A case study of the Brazilian arms
industry illustrates that there is definitely a potential for collaboration
between the U.S. and Brazil, although such cooperation would probably be
limited to the lower tiers of arms production, such as in parts and
components. However, a number of problems, especially political and
economic ones, hinder the possibility of any U.S.-Brazilian armaments
cooperation. Indeed, many of these same problems limit the level of
Brazilian involvement in a revised U.S. maritime strategy.
II. REVISING THE U. S. MARITIME STRATEGY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the implications of a changing
world on the future security environment of the United States and the role of
Latin America in the U.S. maritime strategy. The objectives of this chapter
are threefold: first, to briefly review the U.S. maritime strategy within the
framework of the U.S. security objectives; next, to outline some of the threat
implications of a changing international environment and suggest an
alternative strategy to adapt to these new circumstances; and finally, to make
a case for a greater focus of the maritime strategy on Latin America.
A. STRATEGIC NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS
The national security strategy of the United States is designed to protect
and advance those values that the nation prizes through the support of its
political, economic, and security objectives worldwide. The primary national
interest is "the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation,
with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure." 1
The major attendant interests include a healthy U.S. economy; a stable and
secure world; and the growth of human freedom, democratic institutions,
and free market economies.
The United States has at its disposal diplomatic, informational, economic
and military elements of power. These elements are employed by the United
National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, (January, 1988), p. 1.
States to influence the behavior of other nations and entities to behave in a
manner compatible with the national interests of the United States. The
national military strategy, as an element of the national security strategy,
prescribes the manner in which military power will be developed and
employed to pursue the national objectives. U.S. defense strategy may be
summarized as follows: "to deter aggression and coercion against the United
States and its allies, friends, and vital interests. Should deterrence fail, to seek
the earliest termination of conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its
allies, and its national security objectives while seeking to limit the scope and
intensity of the conflict."2 To achieve these national security goals, the U.S.
national military strategy is founded upon the principles of deterrence,
forward defense, and alliance solidarity.
As the maritime component of the national military strategy, the United
States Navy has proven itself one of the most effective vehicles for securing
the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States,
whether in peacetime, crisis, or war. Although the U.S. Navy acts as only
one of a number of elements employed to meet the national security
objectives of the United States, it only stands to reason that as a maritime
nation the United States should place great reliance on its naval assets. Based
on the strategic duties of timely and sustained operations overseas, naval
tasking in support of the national military strategy provides a forward
deployed, flexible response to any situation. The critical mission of the Navy
is sea control. 3
2 Harry D. Train II, "Seapower and Projection Forces," in American Defense Annual: 1986-
87, ed. Joseph Kruzel, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), p. 122.
3Adm. Carlisle A.H. Trost, USN, "The Navy: Globally Committed," Defense 89.
May/June, 1989), p.17.
Sea control is required so the nation can have uninterrupted use of the
sea lanes to sustain ground and air forces deployed overseas for forward
defence, or for importing raw materials to maintain productivity of our
own or our allies' industrial bases. Another goal of sea control is to
prevent enemy use of the sea lanes to attack US or friendly territory or
sustain his overseas allies. A final goal is to provide secure operating
areas for power projection.4
1. The U.S. Maritime Strategy of the 1980s
In a special supplement to the January, 1986 issue of the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceeding s, Admiral James D. Watkins outlined the "Maritime
Strategy" to help think and plan for the global use of U.S. and allied naval
forces "from peacetime through global war to war termination."5 As an
unclassified document, Watkin's article represented the first public
dissemination of a strategy that was initially codified in as a secret document
in 1984. Cast neither as doctrine nor as a detailed war plan, the maritime
strategy was developed as a dynamic subset of the national strategy. It
provided a forum for naval strategic thinking - something which had been
notably absent in the previous decade - to create an evolving consensus of
thought for policy-making. 6
Watkins asserted that the chief characteristic of the modern era is a
permanent state of violent peace due to the volatility of the international
4Alva M. Bowen, Jr., "US Naval Strategy - Matching Means to Ends," Naval Forces. No. V,
(1984), p. 39.
5Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. Qanuary, 1989), p.4.
6John B. Hattendorf, "The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy: 1977 to 1987," Naval War
College Review. (Summer, 1988),p. 26. For an excellent overview, also see Michael A. Palmer,
Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade,
(Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1988).
environment. 7 Therefore, the major goal of the U.S. maritime strategy was
to promote international stability by supporting regional balances of power
and by controlling crises. However, because the Soviet Union of the mid-
1980s was recognized as the primary threat to the national interests of the
United States, the subject which received by far the most formal and detailed
treatment in the "Maritime Strategy" was the U.S. maritime response to the
Soviet Union.
The "Maritime Strategy" was based on three levels of naval operations
- peacetime steaming, crisis response, and war fighting - but the keystone of
the strategy was deterrence. Under this strategy, three phases were
envisioned. The first phase recognized the potential for a confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union and was marked by an effort
to deter escalation. In the second phase, the U.S. was to seize the initiative by
the deep forward deployment of both U.S. and allied maritime forces. It was
recognized that early pre-positioning and the rapid deployment of forces and
equipment by sealift was essential for a transition to global war in the event
deterrence failed. In acknowledgment of the threat to the European Central
Front by the former Soviet Union, the maritime strategy was gauged to
support the ground campaign in Europe by overcoming the challenges
presented by the Soviet Union's own naval forces. The U.S. sought to gain
the advantage by the containment of the Soviet fleet. Since the preponderant
number of the former Soviet Union's naval and air bases, equipment and
other military facilities were situated near the North Cape of Norway, in the
area of the Kola Peninsula, U.S. planning and maritime force concentration
7Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. (January, 1989),
p.5.
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was therefore geared towards the North Atlantic. The final phase of the U.S.
"Maritime Strategy" was a continuation of the previous ones, except it sought
for the aggressive termination of war, on terms favorable to the U.S. and its
allies, through the destruction of the Soviet fleet. Placing great emphasis
upon inter-service cooperation and allied support it was, ultimately, a
coalition strategy.
According to Colin Gray, the U.S. maritime strategy introduced an
unacceptable element of risk into the Soviet calculus of war. He believed that
the incorporation of U.S. and NATO maritime forces, in a protracted global
context, would have denied the former Soviet Union a plausible opportunity
for victory because the conduct of such a war would have been "on terms
maximally disadvantageous to the continental empire of the Soviet Union."8
However, it was believed that if the former Soviet Union had been forced to
concentrate on a single theater war, especially if it was fought at a
conventional level, that they could have won such a conflict.9 Therefore, the
maritime component of U.S. national strategy established a "balancing"
deterrent that a conventionally-strengthened NATO land force could not
create alone. 10
8 Colin S. Gray, "Maritime Strategy: Europe and the World Beyond," in Naval Forces.
Vol. IX, No. V, (1988), p. 40.
9 For an excellent overview and educated Western speculation on the subject of the evolution
of Soviet military theory and perceptions of nuclear and conventional warfare see John G.
Hines, Phillip A. Petersen, and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000:
Implications for NATO," in The Washington Quarterly. (Fall 1986), pp. 117-137. Also see,
Phillip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater
Strategy," in Orbis. Volume 27, No. 3 (Fall, 1983), pp. 695-739.
10Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the World Beyond," p. 40. Gray's case is complemented
by Linton R. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime
Strategy," International Security. (Fall 1986), pp. 58-88, which outlines the deterrent role of
the U.S. Navy within the context of the current maritime strategy.
Greatly simplified, the U.S. maritime strategy of the 1980s asserted that
by carrying the war to the Soviet Union and neutralizing their naval fleet,
U.S. maritime forces would contribute to the NATO effort on the Central
Front by removing the Soviet threat to U.S. and allied sea lines of
communications (SLOCs) and force the Soviet Union to face yet another
front. Accepted as a statement of purpose, the "Maritime Strategy" provided a
guideline for policy. However, billed as a strategy for "today's forces, today's
capabilities, and today's threat,"11 the face of the threat of the 1980s has
changed and requires a reassessment of the maritime strategy.
a. The Former Soviet Union: A Diminished Threat
The U.S. maritime strategy of the 1980s placed proper strategic
emphasis on the Soviet Union because over the previous four decades the
Soviet Union had been the primary adversary of the United States. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, their status is different today. Deterring the
forces of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, remains a primary
challenge to the U.S. Navy since "no other nation poses a military threat to
the United States and its allies even remotely comparable to that posed by the
[former] Soviet Union." 12 In a certain sense, the former Soviet Union had
been the perfect foe since they provided the United States a tangible and
relatively predictable threat axis. However, external perceptions of the image
of the former Soviet Union as the bogeyman have all but disappeared, perhaps
with major strategic implications for the United States.
1 Catkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. (January, 1989),
p.4.
12Frank C. Carlucci, "Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY
1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-94 Defense Programs, January 9, 1989," (Washington, D.C.:
G.P.O., 1989), p. 12.
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Despite the change in the status of the former Soviet Union, there
remains many unanswered questions. As recently as 1988, the Soviet
military realized that the Soviet Union needed the benefits of economic
reconstruction if it were to meet the requirements of competition with the
West. 13 Arms control provided an avenue for limiting the fields of
competition to which the Soviets needed to divert resources, in a fiscally-
constrained environment, and helped to "reinforce proclivities within
Western elites and publics to perceive the Soviet Union as less of a military
threat than in the past."14
The "magic" of glasnost helped to create a strong movement for
disarmament in both Europe and in the United States. Eugene V. Rostow
may have been correct in warning that the Soviets believed "...that a nearly
mystical faith in arms control has become the opiate of Western opinion in
general and American opinion in particular."15 In 1987, the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed, thereby eliminating an entire
class of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in the 300 to 3,400 mile
range. To establish a new level of "reasonable sufficiency," the Strategic
Arms Reduction Talks (START), Conventional Forces Europe (CFE), and the
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) conferences were slated
to bring further reductions.
13Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock, III, "A "New" Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins
and Implications," Strategic Review. (Summer 1988), p. 20.
14Petersen and Trulock, "A "New" Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 20.
15Eugene V. Rostow, "Why the Soviets Want an Arms Control Agreement and Why They
Want it Now," Commentary. Vol. 83, No. 2, (February, 1987) pp. 19-26, as cited by Mary
Tedeschi Eberstadt in, "Obituary for an Agenda," The National Interest. (Summer, 1988), p. 28.
11
The U.S. Navy initially managed to eschew involvement in arms
control negotiations because the initial CFE talks on the "Atlantic to the
Urals" zone excluded naval forces. However, the U.S. Navy was bound to
undergo the paring knife in follow-on naval arms control negotiations tabled
by the Soviet Union. During a visit to the United States, in July 1988, for
example, Marshal Akromeyev, then senior military officer of the Soviet
Union, made the point of telling Admiral Trost: "You! You're the problem!
You and your Navy are the problem! You're too strong. You've got to get rid
of your cruise missiles. You've got to get rid of some of those carriers.'"16
The Soviet Union began to force the issue by unilaterally relegating a number
of their warships and submarines to the scrap pile, making it very difficult for
the United States to justify a continued requirement for the size and capability
of the U.S. Navy. 17 However, as a land power, the Soviet Union depended
primarily upon its internal lines of communications and, despite a massive
expansion of the Soviet navy in the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets still placed
primary reliance on their rocket and ground forces. On the other hand, as an
insular power, the United States has traditionally relied primarily upon the
open seas to fulfill its national interests. Thus, the cutting of naval forces was
to strike at the heart of U.S. power, but would represent more of a symbolic
gesture on the part of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Soviet Union
has only served to reinforce the issue of naval cuts.
The U.S. potential for sea control and power projection could be
greatly hampered under naval arms control agreements. It must not be
16Admiral C.A.H. Trost, U.S. Navy, "American Security Interests and the U.S. Navy," in
Naval War College Review. Vol. XLII, No. 2, Sequence 326 (Spring 1989), p. 11.
1interview, Commander Bruce McKenzie, USN, OP-603, Pentagon, 18 July 1989.
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forgotten that the building of naval forces is much more time-consuming and
capital intensive than in most other defense industries. The early retirement
of surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and the transfer of combatants to the
reserves, decreases the size and capability of deployed battle groups. Naval
force reductions beyond the currently planned schedule will have a
significant impact on future deployment schedules.
Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, for example, has explicitly stated
that a six-month away/one year home naval deployment policy will not be
violated. However, ex-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman made the same
statement in 1986, and then broke it in 1987, due to the Terry Waite hostage
crisis. Stepped-up commitments in the Mediterranean required the extension
of the Kennedy battle group to supplement the Nimitz. Obviously, if the U.S.
Navy already incurs difficulty meeting its current operational commitments,
it will surely become even more difficult to meet them with a smaller force
structure. 18 Each reduction in U.S. aircraft carriers will require a reappraisal
of U.S. naval strategy.
b. Identifying Other Threats to U.S. Security Interests
Although it is prudent to match forces and capabilities with one's
strongest potential adversary, it does not necessitate that one focus completely
on that threat, especially if it may be considered an "extreme" contingency.
Security arrangements have made the North Atlantic a relatively stable place
18The minimum number of naval assets necessary to carry-out current mission requirements
varies somewhat according to the source. Even the same source may extend different numbers.
For example, Admiral Trost cited "14" deployable carrier battle groups as the minimum
essential assets required to support our national military strategy in "The Navy: Globally
Committed," Defense 89 (May /June), p. 16, but Trost then cites "15" active, deployable carriers
as the minimum requirement in "American Security Interests and the U.S. Navy," Naval War
College Review. (Spring 89), p. 15.
13
so that the likelihood of actual conflict, nuclear or conventional, in this
region is low. While war is possible within Europe, especially within the
newly independent nations that are groping to establish new governments, as
evidenced by the civil war in Yugoslavia, it is unlikely that one of the former
republics of the Soviet Union would begin a war on the Central Front against
a NATO nation. Instead, judging by the fact that since World War II almost
all armed conflicts have occurred in the Third World, future conflict will
likely continue to break out in these other regions. Therefore, while the
European theater cannot be neglected, U.S. defense planners should place
increased emphasis on the more likely, non-apocalyptic scenarios.
The start of most future regional conflicts will probably not involve
either the United States nor the First World countries, but the danger
inherent in any Third World crisis is that conflict may adversely impact the
national interests of these nations. Indeed, the incidence of U.S.
involvement in Third World disputes may increase simply because of
expanding U.S. economic interests into these different regions of the world.
In the worst case, it is not implausible to imagine scenarios in which two
warring states - perhaps North and South Korea - would cause the United
States and the countries allied to North Korea to confront each other over
their overlapping interests in that region. More likely, conflict in the Third
World will not result in a major global confrontation, but it may still provoke
the involvement of other nations outside of the direct dispute. Therefore,
deterrence of conflict or control of crisis escalation can be crucial in ensuring
that the impact on U.S. and allied interests will be mitigated.
Still, the threat posed by other countries and non-state entities to
the rest of the world is growing. No longer the bi-polar world of the 1950's,
14
an evolving multi-polar world includes the rise of "middle power" states
whose economic capabilities and military potential may become increasingly
competitive with the United States in the next century. An increase in the
potential magnitude for violence world-wide is cause for serious concern.
This threat includes the proliferation of highly sophisticated missiles,
chemical and biological weapons, tactical aircraft, submarines, and even
nuclear weapons in many regions of the Third World. Granted, many Third
World nations may have difficulty absorbing the hi-tech weapons systems
that they purchase, hindering the maintenance and employment of these
armaments, but that is not and will not be the case for every purchaser in the
future. The growing number of Third World countries operating low to
mid-technology indigenous armaments industries, for example, suggests an
improving ability to manufacture weapons to their desired specifications and
needs. It may be only a period of time before they can break into successively
higher levels of sophistication and lethality.
From a maritime standpoint, it has been recognized for some time
that Third World naval capabilities have been increasing - spurred by the
threat of regional conflict. As one analyst notes, despite shortcomings, "the
Third World navies in general possess sufficient capabilities to intimidate,
harass, or, for a short time, interrupt Western seaborne transportation."19 A
case in point are conventional submarines. With over 40 navies world-wide
operating submarines, many analysts believe that subs will become a
mainstay of defense for Third World coastal nations. Diesel-electric
submarines are difficult to locate when submerged, and are very competent
19Milan Vego, "The Potential Influence of Third World Navies on Ocean Shipping," Naval
Institute Proceedings: Naval Rpvjpw 1981. (May 1981), p. 97.
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operating quietly in shallow waters, such as those found at the mouth of
harbors, enclosed waterways and passages, and on continental shelves.20
Now, third-generation diesel-electric submarine designs, such as the
TR-1700 built by Thyssen Nordseewerke (TNSW) in West Germany and sold
to countries such as Argentina, are vastly superior to the older conventional
submarines in service and possess operational characteristics closer to those of
nuclear submarines. It is understood that the TR-1700 is capable of
maintaining a submerged speed of twenty-five knots for one and a half hours
while prosecuting a target, and of remaining submerged for as long as 70
days. 21 Furthermore, new improvements such as the Italian-designed
toroidal-enclosed cycle system, could increase the capabilities of the diesel
submarine while making them more affordable. Operating without a
requirement for surfacing every 20 hours, the toroidal-hull submarine stores
exhaust within the hull for extended underwater travel, perhaps up to 2000
nautical miles before surfacing. Perhaps most importantly, toroidal-hull subs
are touted as simple to run, are reportedly easier to build than steel plate
submarines, and have a projected cost of only $40 million a copy - a bargain
when compared to the price of a modern nuclear submarine.22
Although Third World capabilities are small in comparison to the
might of the superpowers, the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated
weapons poses a multitude of new threat axes to the United States.
20The reasons for conventional sub advantages in shallow water and the difficulty
associated with locating them is succintly described by U. Ljungdahl, "Submarines and ASW in
Coastal Waters," Naval Forces. Vol. VIII, No. 1,(1987), pp. 82-88.
21 Keith E. Wixler, "Argentina's Geopolitics and Her Revolutionary Diesel-Electric
Submarines," Naval War College Review. Vol. XLII, No. 1, Seq. 325, (Winter, 1989), p. 94.
22Danielle Pletka, "Subs Surfacing All over the Globe," Insight. (June 5, 1989), pp. 34-36.
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Obviously, state-sponsored and non-governmental organized terrorism using
weapons in an indiscriminate manner pose serious problems. The U.S. strike
on Libya in 1986 illustrated how easily the United States could be drawn into
conflict by a Third World nation even when vital interests were not
necessarily at stake. However, even in the case of more "responsible" states
whose new weapons will only be used for self-defense, their enhanced
capabilities still raise the threshold of intensity at which a conflict might be
fought. Ironically, as the United States and the republics of the former
Soviet Union progress in negotiations and agreements for arms control,
thereby decreasing or limiting their relative capabilities, the relative capability
and threat posed to world peace from these other axes grows.
U.S. decision makers have traditionally accorded very low priority
to Third World conflicts and have not allocated nearly enough resources to
properly address these issues. 23 Since regional conflicts in the future may
well include the use of sophisticated conventional and other chemical,
biological, and nuclear-fielded weapons, perhaps even with some launched by
ballistic missile,24 it would certainly be a misnomer to consider that all Third
World conflicts will be "low-intensity." Thus, in a dynamic and ever-
changing world, the United States must adapt to meet new challenges.
Establishing and sustaining a credible deterrence against the former republics
of the Soviet Union, remaining prepared for the failure of deterrence, and
carrying out contingency operations in the Third World is a complex and
23Jacques Gansler, Affording Defense. (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusettes Institute of
Technology Press, 1989), pp. 32-33.
24James Tomashoff and Lewis A. Dunn, "Some Implications of a Changing Third World
Military Environment," p. 26. Paper prepared for the SAIC (Science Applications
International Corporation - McLean, VA) Conference on the Changing Dimensions of the Third
World Military Environment, (20 lune 1989).
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increasingly expensive task. Therefore, perhaps the accomplishment of this
mission might best be measured by how well the desired goals match
available resources.
B. ARTICULATING A GRAND STRATEGY
Strategically, the United States analyzes the world in subsets, or regions.
Within each region, the United States is committed to the objectives that will
promote the national interest. However, setting priorities among the regions
is extremely important because of force structure limitations. It is clear that if
rational limits to policy objectives are not established, it is doubtful that many
of the original objectives would be realized. This is especially critical in a
fiscally-constrained environment, as reflected by the growing federal deficit of
the United States. In addition, a gradual decline in the U.S. gross national
product, relative to other economies in the world - such as Japan's, increases
the impression that internal and external constraints on the U.S. economy are
affecting the ability of the United States to support its expanding global
security interests. As Robert Komer notes, "a perceived gap is emerging
between U.S. interests and U.S. power."25 However, even if resources were
not a factor, Geoffrey Till cautions that "...an over-concentration on means
rather than ends could easily distort conclusions in peacetime and lead to
misconceived practice in war."26 Hence it is of preeminent importance that
the ends of American foreign policy be reconciled with the means. In short,
25Robert Komer, "U.S. Defense Strategy," in American Defense Annual: 1986-1987. ed.
Joseph Kruzel, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986), p.22.
26Geoffrey Till and others, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age. Second Edition, (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1984), p. 224.
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the agenda of the maritime strategy in developing regional priorities should
be derived from a global net assessment, a grand strategy.
A grand strategy is a political-military, means-end chain.. .A grand
strategy must identify likely threats to the state's security and it must
devise political, economic, military, and other remedies for these threats. 27
A logical first step in the development of a grand strategy is the
identification of regional strategic interests to the state (ends). The next step is
the ranking of current and anticipated threats to these interests. A third step
is a realistic appraisal of U.S. and allied economic and industrial strength,
military capability, resource constraints or other limitation (means). And
finally, in the fourth step, a credible strategy may be woven which
acknowledges and accounts for the discrepancies between the ends and means
so that the threats may be neutralized.
The existence of a well-articulated, contemporary grand strategy enables
the development of more effective planning and a more efficient use of
resources. 28 On the other hand, differences in perceptions over geostrategic
priorities can affect the consensus required for a rational and coherent
foreign-security policy. Since the ability of the West to bring selective force to
bear to stop aggression at points distant from the U.S. has declined since the
1950s, compared to that of many potentially hostile and increasingly powerful
27 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France. Britain, and Germany between
the Wars. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13 as cited in Michael C. Desch, "The
Keys that Lock up the World: Identifying American interests in the Periphery," International
Sfioni^, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Summer 1989), p. 88.
28
"A grand strategy is an integral part of a hierarchy that also includes foreign policy,
strategy, and tactics. " Desch, "The Keys that Lock up the World: Identifying American
interests in the Periphery," p. 88.
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Third World nations, U.S. reliance on its allies has increased.29
Unfortunately, as the U.S. need for strong allies worldwide is increasing,30 the
inclination of alliance members to respond on behalf of the United States
may be decreasing. Ashley Tellis states that the European allies of the United
States, for example, have generally believed that Soviet activity in the
Caribbean, despite U.S. attempts to stipulate as otherwise, are an exclusive
policy concern of the United States. 31 This type of attitude was reinforced by
the course of events in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The
"lack of an articulated grand strategy...."32 prevents the United States from
making an effective case why alliance support is still important and necessary.
Thus it follows that a national maritime strategy derived from an articulated
grand strategy will be most efficient in accomplishing assigned national
security objectives.
1. Identifying Strategic Regional Interests
The identification and rank ordering of U.S. strategic regional interests,
especially in peripheral areas, are key questions. Michael Desch distinguishes
between two competing schools of thought. One school, the Neo-
internationalists, regard the international system as a zero-sum game and
recommend an activist foreign policy for the United States. They perceive
strategic U.S. interests throughout the world and believe that even peripheral
areas in the Third World affect the global balance of power. The other school,
29Stephen D. Prowse, "The Ikle-Wohlstetter Report: What the Report Says," The
National Interest. (Summer, 1988), p. 12.
30Komer, "U.S. Defense Strategy," p. 22.
31 Ashley J. Tellis, 'The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance," Naval
Forces. Vol. VII, No. IV (1986), p. 54.
32Tellis, "The Soviet Navy, Central America and the Atlantic Alliance," Naval Forces.
p. 54.
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the Neo-realists, do not necessarily see the international system as zero-sum,
although they do regard security as the most important objective of state
behavior. In contrast to the Neo-internationalists, the Neo-realists do not
accord much importance to the Third World, concluding that since few Third
World areas directly affect the balance between great powers, involvement
should be eschewed.33
Desch identifies flaws in both of these arguments. He asserts that the
Neo-internationalists are overly expansive and make no distinction between
vital and peripheral areas. On the other hand, while the Neo-realists may be
more objective, their argument draws too sharp a distinction by neglecting
the importance of certain peripheral areas. Instead, Desch suggests that the
United States, as a great power,34 must recognize the importance of areas of
both intrinsic and extrinsic value35 in developing a grand strategy, but avoid
the allocation of limited national defense resources beyond these areas.
Because of their significant internal resources, Desch recognizes three
geographic regions of intrinsic importance to the United States: Western
33Desch, "The Keys that Lock up the World," pp. 90-92.
34A great power can pursue security and other ends by manipulating the world balance of
power, while an ordinary power can only use its limited resources to defend itself ox pursue
other ends. Desch, "The Keys that Lock up the World," p. 97.
35Four strategic interests of a great power: 1) Defense of the homeland 2) Protection
of interests outside the homeland in areas of "intrinsic" value because of their "large, cohesive,
and well-educated populations, strong economies, healthy industrial bases, essential natural
resources, high level of technological sophistication, or large standing military forces," which
can therefore directly contribute to the strength of the homeland. Areas with intrinsic value
are the most significant elements in the global balance of power. 3) Protection of interests in
areas outside the homeland of little intrinsic value, but which have "extrinsic" value because
they contribute to the defense of the homeland or other areas of intrinsic value with regard to
their geographic proximity, current level of military technology, and strategy. 4) Residual
Category: strategic security investment should be ignored since only very marginal and
diminishing returns can be expected in these areas. Desch,"The Keys that Lock up the
World,"pp.97-98 and p. 107.
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Europe, the Persian Gulf, and Northeast Asia. According to Desch, few areas
in the Third World, except for the Persian Gulf, have much intrinsic value.
The Persian Gulf has intrinsic value because Western Europe and Japan
depend on its oil. However, oil is the exception because "no other resource is
as critical or amenable to cartel control."36 On the other hand, Desch cites
the Caribbean and Central America, the Indian Ocean littoral, and a base in
the Western Pacific as regions of extrinsic value. Finally, he considers places
such as southern Africa as regions to be ignored.37
By segregating existing perceptions of areas of vital interest to the
United States into two camps, Desch has greatly simplified the actual diversity
of opinion in the debate. 38 Nevertheless, the intrinsic-extrinsic concepts
Desch has outlined are valuable tools for organizing the regional security
priorities of the United States. Most analysts would generally agree with
Desch's assessment of both the regions of primary, or intrinsic, value and
those of extrinsic value to U.S. strategic security. However, this author
contends that U.S. regional priorities are shifting with current global political,
military and economic events, and that certain other peripheral regions,
especially South America, will take on increasingly greater strategic value
than they have commanded heretofore. The reason for this can be summed
as: a) the threat presented by the former Soviet Union has diminished; b) the
number of other potential threat axes is increasing significantly with the
global proliferation of arms, insurgencies, and terrorism; and c) developing
36Desch, "The Keys that Lock up the World," p. 92.
37Desch, "The Keys that Lock up the World," pp. 111-120.
38 A broader-based summary of alternative perspectives on U.S. strategic interests is
provided by Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand
Strategy," International Security, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Summer 1989).
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and other developed nations, alike, are becoming increasingly competitive
with the United States in the global marketplace, a fact which will have long-
range implications for U.S. security.
2. Latin America: Threat and Opportunity
Changes in the geopolitical significance of regions, such as in patterns
of trade and regional balances of power, are just two of the reasons why it is
important that the United States constantly reassess its security goals and
requirements within each hemisphere. Notwithstanding the former Soviet
Union, the foreign policy of the United States has generally focused greatest
attention on those regions of the world that may be considered "hotspots."
Very infrequently has the U.S. "security optic" gazed within its own
hemisphere.
Using the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program as an example, over the last
thirty years, Southeast Asia and the Middle East have consistently absorbed
the majority of U.S. military and economic assistance, while Latin America
and Africa have vied for only a nominal percentage of the total yearly U.S.
security assistance budget. 39 At the beginning of this decade, roughly 60
percent, or $8.1 billion, was military and military-related assistance. "Of the
overall amount, 72 percent of economic aid and 92 percent of military
assistance..." was reserved for a handful of countries "...who benefit from an
entrenched system of political logrolling on Capitol Hill and preferential
treatment by the U.S. foreign policy establishment." 40 Earmarked by
39Paul L. Ferrari, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Raul L. Madrid, U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and
Contractors. (Washington, DC: Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc. (IRRC), 1987), p.
4.
40John M. Goshko, "Vying for Slivers of the Foreign Aid Pie," The Washington Post
National Weekly Edition." (11-17 June, 1990), p. 6.
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Congress, two-thirds of all U.S. aid was received by Israel, Egypt, Pakistan,
Turkey, and the Philippines. 41 On the other hand, military assistance to
Latin America has generally averaged about two percent of the total U.S.
military assistance pie - a level deemed appropriate by American policy-
makers to assist the defense needs of specific Latin nations for the symbolic
support of anti-communist regimes. Since 1981, the level of U.S. military
assistance to Latin American has increased, although most of this aid has
gone to El Salvador - a response to insurgency in Central America.42 In 1991,
a $375 million aid request for El Salvador left only a small trickle of money
for the rest of the Western Hemisphere.43
The relatively scant attention the United States has paid Latin America
in the past may be due to primarily two reasons: First, the Western
Hemisphere has traditionally been considered the backyard of the United
States; and second, Latin America has never been perceived as a particularly
conflict-oriented region, either from external aggression or internal
subversion. Today, however, Latin America is decreasingly isolated from
world events and the relative importance of Latin America to U.S. security
interests has increased dramatically.
As U.S. security requirements have increased in Latin America, U.S.
influence in this hemisphere has decreased. Indeed, as Robert L. Scheina has
noted, "U.S. naval dominance in Latin America began to diminish in the late
41John M. Goshko, "A Brave New World And a Tired Old System For Funding It," The
Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (11-17 June, 1990), p. 7.
42Richard F. Grimmett, "An Overview of United States Military Assistance Programs,"
CRS Report for Congress (88-282 F), (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 29 March
1988), p. 8.
43Goshko, "Vying for Slivers of the Foreign Aid Pie," The Washington Post National
Weekly Edition. (11-17 June, 1990), p. 6.
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1960s, a trend that accelerated in the next decade as North American political
influence in the area waned."44 Perhaps reaching its nadir in the post-
Falklands era, the fall of U.S. influence in Latin America is largely the result
of Latin American nations asserting their independent foreign policies, but it
also stems from U.S. neglect and poorly-handled relations in the region. 45
The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, for example, was perceived by many
Latin Americans as typical of U.S. heavy-handedness in its relations with
Latin America. The fact that Manuel Noriega's ouster was pleasing to many
still does not obviate concerns that American gun-boat diplomacy may be
used again. However, if the Cold War is truly at end, then perhaps the
United States, save some new calamity, should become increasingly cognizant
and more capable of focusing time and money on resolving its problems
within the Western Hemisphere.
a. Threats To U.S. Security Interests in Latin America
U.S. security interests in Latin America are multiple. Most recently,
the issues of greatest concern have included democracy, debt, drugs,
insurgency, terrorism, migration, and the environment. In the past, the
United States has needed only a minimum military presence to protect U.S.
interests on its southern flank. The collective security system established
under the Rio Treaty and the Organization of American States Charter
provided an additional insurance policy to unite the nations of the Western
Hemisphere against outside powers and against indigenous Latin American
revolutionary movements. However, a new approach may now be necessary.
44Robert L. Scheina, LatiD Amprira: A Naval History 1810-1987 , (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 171.
45The decline of U.S. influence in Latin America is specifically discussed in the next
chapter.
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Indeed, cross-national problems, such as those listed above, require
cooperative international effort if they are to be effectively resolved. The
procedures for inter-American security cooperation have been applied
inconsistently. The Inter-American Working Group for the World Peace
Foundation points out that the OAS was virtually irrelevant in the crisis that
gripped Central America in the 1980s. Furthermore, they also claim that
collective security, through the Rio Treaty, has been vitiated by U.S.
intervention in this Hemisphere.46 Vitiation may be too strong a concept
since the Rio Pact is neither extinct nor incapacitated. A clear and present
danger to the Hemisphere would certainly evoke a regional response.
(1) Democracy. On the positive side, the transition to democracy for
many Latin American nations is a trend that promotes greater cooperation, or
at least less conflict, by virtue of the increased political homogeneity of the
region. Paraphrasing an old cliche, "Democratic governments do not fight
other democratic governments." However, this point manifests a disturbing
paradox. While there is an enhanced readiness for collective action in Latin
America, today, especially to combat the increasing and more complex threats
to Hemispheric security, the atrophy of existing collective procedures makes
implementation of cooperative action more difficult.47
The most overt threat to U.S. security in the Western
Hemisphere had previously been the presence of the former Soviet Union.
Within ten months of Castro's revolution, in 1958, a Soviet-Cuban
rapprochement heralded the beginning of a new era. Although the Sino-
46Statement of an Inter-American Working Group, "Collective Security in the Americas:
New Directions," A World Peace Foundation Project, Qune, 1988), pp. 1-2.
47Pointed out by the Inter-American Working Group in "Collective Security in the
Americas: New Directions," p. 1.
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Soviet split of the late 1960s broke the myth of a monolithic communist state,
containment of communism remained at the heart of U.S. foreign policy.
Certainly, as a result of the former Soviet Union's "success" in Cuba, Soviet
overtures in Latin America continued to be regarded with extreme concern by
the United States. Instability in Latin America was often attributed to the
former Soviet Union, either through the direct funding of insurgent groups
or through the use of proxies. This perception is not without merit, even
though poverty and other problems may more often be the actual root of
instability. 48 It has been documented, as evidenced in Grenada, that
revolution and subversion were spread from Cuba into both Central America
and the Caribbean, thereby helping to destabilize the region by increasing
conflict within and between neighboring countries. 49 The Soviet Union
helped bankroll the Sandinistas to power in Nicaragua, who then helped
guerrillas in a civil war against the right-wing government in El Salvador.50
As late as August 1988, Soviet military aid to Nicaragua was more than twice
the amount of aid provided by the United States to all of Central America. By
October 1988, the total value of Soviet-bloc war material shipped to Nicaragua
had reached $2.7 billion.51
48An insightful discussion on instability and security in Latin America, especially
regarding the perceptions of U.S. policy-makers and the process by which a response to a
perceived threat is derived, is provided by Lars Schoultz in National Security and United
States Policy Toward Latin America. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
49A compilation of confiscated documents and analysis on the events that lead to the
Cuban /Soviet backed coup in Grenada, resulting in the subsequent invasion by U.S. forces in
1983, is provided by Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, eds., Grenada and Soviet/Cuban
Policy: Internal Crisis anH U.S./OECS Tntprvpntion. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
50See Michael Radu, "Eastern Europe and Latin America," in The USSR and Latin America:
A Developing Rplarionship. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, ed., (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989),
for an interesting analysis of the use of its Eastern Bloc satellites as proxies to help pay for
arms and aid to Nicaragua without direct Soviet involvement.
51 Report of the Secretary of Defense, Frank C Carlucci, to the Congress on the FY 199Q/FY
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The former Soviet Union had also had a presence in Peru,
operating a military mission that had trained and assisted the Peruvian
military since 1969. Almost one-half of the equipment operated by the
Peruvian Army and Air Force had been received from the former Soviet
Union. 52 This is a quite considerable sum, considering that between 1976 and
1980, over a billion dollars was spent on Soviet offensive weapons alone.53
The former Soviet Union tried to expand its influence in Latin America
through both military aid and presence. Indeed, by the end of 1988 there were
more Soviet military advisors in Latin America and Africa than the United
States had throughout the world.54
Today, Soviet aid to Latin America is gone. With the demise of
the Soviet Union, countries such as Cuba have a limited capability to back
further revolution in Latin America.55 The Peruvians still use Soviet-made
equipment, but the Peruvians had only sought to diversify their source of
military supplies away from the United States. They were not influenced by
the Soviets to make political change and had no wish to become reliant upon
them as suppliers. 56
So, what does all this suggest? In the near term, the United
1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-94 Defense Programs. January 17, 1989, (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 26.
52Report of the Delegation to Latin America of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives: 100th Congress, 1st Session, April 1987, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1987), p. 8.
53Government document, "The U.S. Position on Peru," in Inter-American Economic Affairs.
Vol. 39, No. 2, (Autumn, 1985), Washington, DC: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1985, p. 86.
54Carlucci, FY 1990. p. 30.
55See Carmelo Mesa-Lago and Fernando Gil, "Soviet Economic Relations with Cuba," in
The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, ed., (Boston,
MA: Unwin Hyman, Inc., 1989), pp. 183-222.
56Erik N. Anderson, "Arms and Influence: The Soviet Union in Peru," paper presented at
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., May, 1989.
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States will expend less energy worrying about foreign subversive
involvement in Latin America. Based on the collapse of the Warsaw Pact
and the Soviet Union, East European presence in Latin America will more
than likely be an effort to renew foreign trade agreements initiated by the
Soviet Union during the 1980s, including a Soviet-Argentinean fishing
agreement in 1986, the signing of a Soviet-Peruvian commercial fishing and
debt reduction agreement, and the signing of a cultural and economic
cooperation agreement with Brazil and Uruguay in 1987.
TABLE 1
SOVIET TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA
Country Imports from USSR
(in millions of rubles)
Exports to USSR
(in millions of rubles)
1979 1985 1986 1979 1985 1986
Argentina 24.8 63.0 533 288.7 1229.9 192.4
Brazil 19.9 70.2 303 160.0 380.0 236.5
Colombia 9.0 52 4.9 3.0 212 0.0
Cuba 2113.2 3877.4 3802.3 2136.0 2140.1 3800.2
Mexico 0.7 42 43 4.1 16.1 7.6
Nicaragua * 212.9 276.4 » 02 7.7
Panama 103 7.1 105 02 M **
Peru 2.8 113 92 9.9 108.5 75.2
Uruguay 1.6 335 43 11.7 32.4 20.6
Vneshniaia Torgovlia, 3(1979 supplement), and 3(1987 supplement)
* No data available
** No measurable trade
SOURCE: Robert K. Evanson, "Soviet Trade Relations with Latin America," in The USSR and
Latin America: A Developing Relationship. Eusebio Mujal-Leon, ed., (Boston, MA: Unwin
Hyman, Inc., p. 234.
In the long term, it is conceivable that one of republics of the
former Soviet Union, most probably Russia, could again pose a threat to the
United States by its direct and/or indirect actions in Latin America.
However, the extent of such involvement in the Third World, and especially
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in Latin America, will be difficult to determine until after the radical changes
affecting the former Soviet empire have been stabilized and the subsequent
political-military boundaries fully define a new balance of power. In the
interim, other countries, such as China, may pose a threat to the region.
(2) Debt. Other problems in the region pose mounting security
threats to the United States. One of them is the quagmire of international
debt. It might be said that if poverty creates instability, debt-aggravated
economic stagnation helps to fuel the fire. Add inflation to this problem and
a recipe for disaster is created. Without pursuing the question of the origin of
the debt crisis, for which no single entity or person is to blame - but also from
which few of the "players" can be completely absolved - the more important
question inquires into its resolution. It will require financial adjustments
that redirect and improve the flow of capital back into debtor nations and/or
the economic reconstruction of indebted nations. The magnitude of such
requirements dictate that the problems of those nations most heavily
indebted might only be resolved through the implementation of plans that
have international and national backing and compliance by both
governmental and non-governmental entities. The most prominent
program instituted to date, the Baker Plan, has been castigated by many as a
treadmill on which debtor nations remain on hold, a precarious balance from
which their situation does not deteriorate, but neither does it improve.57
Indeed, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
5
'See Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Latin American Debt Problem: Anatomy and Solutions," in
Debt and Democracy in Latin America. Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 7-22. This essay, along with the other essays in this book,
provides a concise overview of many of the political-economic dilemmas that relate to debt in
Latin America.
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Development (UNCTAD) stated that although the Baker Plan helped to avoid
an international banking crisis and increased their provisions against losses
from problem-country loans, in other respects the record has been more of a
failure.
TABLE 2
DEBT BURDEN OF HIGHLY INDEBTED COUNTRIES


















Argentina 49.4 42.4 8.5 5.9 1592 -1.2
Bolivia 4.6 1.2 0.1 0.04 407 -5.2
Brazil 114.5 84.2 21.9 15.1 70 1.1
Chile 20.5 17.1 6.4 4.2 1666 -2.2
Colombia 15.1 7.5 2.0 1.5 517 0.2
Costa Rica 45 2.3 0.4 0.2 354 -1.4
Ecuador 9.0 6.3 n.a. n.a. 892 -2.2
Iv. Coast 9.1 5.5 0.4 0.3 892 -4.3
Jamaica 3.8 6.6 0.2 0.2 1583 -1.4
Mexico 105.0 90.5 24.0 13.8 1313 -2.7
Morocco 27.0 5.5 0.8 0.7 1205 0.8
Nigeria 27.0 14.9 0.9 0.7 274 -6.5
Peru 16.7 8.9 1.2 0.7 827 -0.2
Philippine 29.0 17.6 5.0 3.6 527 -1.0
Uruguay 3.8 3.0 0.9 0.7 1267 -2.4
Venezuela 33.9 33.7 16.4 6.2 1904 -4.6
Yugoslavia 21.8 15.2 2.0 1.3 936 -0.5
World Bank, World Debt Tables 1987-88; Salomon Brothers, Inc.; and Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council, Country Exposure Lending Survey dune 1987).
SOURCE: Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Latin American Debt Problem: Anatomy and Solutions," in
Debt and Democracy in Latin America. Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman, eds., (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1989), p. 12.
Developing countries' debt burden has remained high and growth remains
sluggish. In fact, more countries are now in arrears than when the debt crisis
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broke in 1982, and per capita real income is well below 1980 levels. 58 The
onus for resolution to the problems of indebted countries should not lie only
on the backs of foreign investors and creditors, but out of three possible
solutions - a continuation of the present strategy, a big increase in new
lending, and debt relief - UNCTAD concludes that debt relief is the only way
to revive growth and reduce debt.59
Critics of such a policy may point to Chile as a model example of
a country pulling itself up by its own bootstraps, with little external help, and
suggest that others, such as Peru, should do the same. To make such a
comparison, however, is faulty. "One is tempted to draw the conclusion that
Latin America's heavily-indebted countries can revive their economies even
as they service their debts if, like Chile, they adopt "correct" market-oriented
policies. The fact is, however, that the course pursued by Chile is not an
option for the region's other major debtors - Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Venezuela or Peru."60 The reason, of course, is that civilian government can
only turn up austerity measures so far before democratic politics requires
compromise. On the other hand, Chile's authoritarian regime could impose
economic policy by fiat, a point which even Hernan Buichi, Chile's former
Finance Minister, has conceded.61
Without satisfactory resolution and burden-sharing, debt
servicing becomes a negative-sum game which can foster violent
58
"A debtor's dream," The Economist. (10 September, 1988), p. 81.
59
"A debtor's dream," The Economist. (10 September 1988), p. 81.
60Peter Hakim and Richard Feinberg, "Latin American debt: The lessons from Chile and
Peru," The Financial Times. (30 November, 1988), p. 21.
61 Roger Cohen, "Chile's Finance Chief Teaches a Dictatorship about Free Markets," The
Wall Street Journal. (28 September, 1988), p. A-l.
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repercussions. Indeed, the debt-related problem of hyper inflation undercuts
living standards and can disengage an economy from a productive cycle. As
Eliana A. Cardoso says, "High inflation in Latin America poses a threat to the
infant democracies there. It erodes the purchasing power of wages, creates an
intense feeling of insecurity, and undermines popular support for
constitutional governments."62 Hyper-inflation also has the social impact of
further widening the gap between rich and poor since its effect is regressive -
low and fixed income people are affected the worst. Thus, in nations which
have great inequity in their distribution of income, such as in Brazil, hyper-
inflation compounds this problem and makes stabilization programs
extremely unpopular and politically difficult to enforce.
Ultimately, hyper-inflation is a curse to long-term growth since
it tends to breed "corto-plazismo," or short-term planning. Capital flight
increases as local and international investors grow more skeptical, while
speculation and the black market thrive. Without capital investment, an
essential building block of all economies, future potential for sustained
growth is undermined. So, even while an economy may roar ahead in the
short-term, fueled by inflation, prospects for the future dim once the presses
have stopped but the economic engines only cough.
There can be no denial that sound economic policy is a
requirement. Peru's economic undoing, for example, was not its suspension
of debt payments, but "the government's failure to put the resources thus
obtained to productive use."63 But since the burden of debt-servicing can
62 Eliana A. Cardoso, "Hyperinflation in Latin America," Challenge. (January-February
1989), p. 11.
63Hakim and Feinberg, "Latin American debt," Thp Financial Times. (30 November, 1988),
p. 21.
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weigh down a government's ability to jump start its sputtering economy,
each problem (debt and inflation) can lend to the other in an ever-deepening
spiral. Henry Kaufman observed that "the restrictiveness of debt cannot be
denied. If the debt blockage is not eased, economic growth globally will
continue at only a slow pace, risking a major worldwide business setback."64
Obviously, the Baker Plan was inspired by this recognition, but it may not be
enough to release debtor nations from this cycle. Aside from the implications
of recession, which are onerous enough, it is critical for U.S. policy-makers to
realize that continued efforts to avert financial chaos are especially important
in Latin America. Debt relief may help stem other threats to U.S. security
from the region - including political instability, migration, terrorism, and
continued growth in profitable cash crops (such as the coca plant) - which are
often intensified by economic woes.
(3) Terrorism. As of the beginning of the 1990s there were 27 active
insurgent groups in nine Latin American countries.65 The motivation of
these groups varies from group to group, country to country, although
dissatisfaction with the established elite and/or political-economic
disaffection is often the root cause. Whether one calls them terrorists,
revolutionaries or freedom fighters depends on how one sides with their
64Henry Kaufmann, "The Risks in the World Economic Order," public lecture, New York
University, February 24, 1987, as cited by Rudiger Dornbush, "The Latin American Debt
Problem: Anatomy and Solutions," in Debt and Democracy in Latin America, p. 12.
65United States Military Posture FY 1989. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 28.
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causes, but the end result is generally political violence - ranging in intensity
from intermittent fracas to civil war.
A cursory glance at insurgency in Latin America over the last
four decades, alone, provides a perspective on the extent to which civil strife,
political instability, and military power-brokering has been endemic to the
region. In the late 1950s, the Batista regime was overthrown by Fidel Castro
in the Cuban Revolution. Castro's coup exemplified the capability of a well-
coordinated and motivated insurgency to attack established forces through
guerrilla tactics and assume complete control of government. While no
other insurgency in Latin America has since duplicated this feat, save the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the potential for success was established.
Despite the ill-fated attempt by Che Guevarra to export
revolution to Bolivia, the 1960s and the 1970s witnessed an intense period of
political violence in the Southern Cone countries of South America. The
civil disruption caused by independent guerrilla action in urban areas of
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay were compelling enough to cause the
calling of states of siege and an all-out crackdown by government forces.
Perhaps the best documented event of this era was the "dirty war" in
Argentina, in which the military ruthlessly stamped out civil disobedience
and ruled by junta in the name of state security. The ensuing strife between
the different factions in Argentine society shook the country to its core and
resulted in the deaths and "disappearances" of thousands of citizens. The
Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army, the dominant guerrilla
groups in Argentina, were decimated by the mid-1970s, but, by this time,
many citizens probably feared the military and right-wing death squads more.
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In Uruguay, the Tupamaros were liquidated by the Uruguayan
army, which seized power in 1972, smashing the political parties and trade
unions along with the guerrillas. In Brazil and Bolivia, guerrilla movements
were less powerful than in Argentina and Uruguay, but they resulted in
political agitation and violence, nevertheless. In Chile, a unique situation
arose wherein a popular uprising occurred in defense of the elected regime of
President Salvador Allende. It has been estimated that 30,000 people lost their
lives resisting the overthrow of this regime by the military in 1973.66
In the 1980s, terrorism was much less evident in the Southern
Cone nations than it had been previously, a tribute to the eradication process
implemented by the state security and military within each of these nations.
On the other hand, guerrilla action was rampant in Central America and in
the northern part of South America. Nicaragua, El Salvador, Colombia, and
Peru have stood out most prominently.67 It is still too early to tell if the
fledgling democracy in Nicaragua will take strong enough root to discourage
further Contra resistance. A tenuous cease fire is in effect and a process of
repatriating exiled forces is being attempted. In El Salvador, skirmishes
between government forces and rebels continue a decade of violence in this
small country. Leftist guerrillas operate out of the highlands, but have made
concerted efforts to push into the capital of San Salvador. The latest large
offensive occurred in November, 1989. Although a new offensive has not
been signaled in 1990, rebel attacks against specific targets, such as power
66Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World. (New
York, N.Y.: Basic Books, Inc., 1987), p. 72.
67A solid recantation of the people and events that played in the Nicaraguan Revolution is
provided by Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. (New York, N.Y.:
Vintage Books, 1986).
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stations, have continued. In a recent attack on San Salvador, five military
troops were killed in the ensuing firefight. The retaliation was in response to
what a rebel message protested was "the total immunity of the armed forces
who violate human rights."68 Much like the "dirty war" in Argentina, right-
wing death squads in El Salvador have made "brutality" a term which may
apply to either side. Indeed, El Salvador President Alfredo Cristiani has
already admitted that government forces were responsible for the deaths of
six Jesuit priests at the Central American University in November, 1989.
In Peru, the Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso, is a movement
spawned by Abimael Guzman, formerly a philosophy professor at the
University of Ayacucho. After Marx, Lenin, and Mao, Guzman is known as
the "fourth sword of world communism" by his followers. However, since
Guzman denounced the former Soviet Union and China as imperialist states,
calling Gorbachev and Deng infidels to the cause of communism, Guzman
effectively ostracized his movement from outside help. Despite the lack of
foreign funding, Sendero Luminoso has still managed to wage an effective
guerrilla war against a country that has been ill-equipped, either economically
or militarily, to counter the movement. Instead, financing is provided by
extorting drug traffickers that buy local coca leaf and by confiscating private
property.69 With between 5,000 to 7,000 combatants, mostly in their teens and
twenties, a decade of fighting government forces has claimed the lives of over
22,000 Peruvians.70
68 Associated Press, "Salvadoran rebels attack capital; 5 die," Thp Virginian-Pilot. (3
May, 1990), p. A-13.
69Editorial, "Fighting 'Shining Path,'" Thp Virginian-Pilot. (26 April, 1990), p. A-14.
70Tina Rosenberg, "To the Victor Will Go the Spoiled in Peru," Thp Washington Post
National WppIcIv Edition. (30 April-6 May, 1990), p. 23.
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Although Guzman was recently caught by the authorities,
Sendero Luminoso is still actively engaged in terrorism. Working from their
base in Ayacucho, Sendero Luminoso has expanded their forays from the
countryside into Lima, although their stronghold remains the high country
of Peru. Using sabotage and assassination to terrorize the masses, targets
seem indiscriminate, except in one category - targets represent the modern
establishment. When Sendero enters a village, the guerrillas will often force
the locals to commit illegal acts - such as theft. "The strategy seems to be to
provoke as much repression as possible from the police and army, which in
turn wins over more Senderistas."71 It is Sendero Luminoso's goal, in a post-
revolutionary state, to turn power over to the lower classes of Peru and that a
single party will retain absolute control. Their ideal state would be similar to
that of the counter-revolutionary period of Maoist China.
This short overview of insurgency in Latin America has
neglected to mention the names and efforts of scores of other politically-
motivated groups, indigenous to the region, that have used terrorism as a
means to gain recognition. The point of this review of guerrilla action,
however, is to note that terrorism is a symptom of political instability, not the
cause. "Terrorism is the product of social dislocation."72 Terrorist
organizations are generally the brainchild of disaffected intelligentsia.
Rubenstein notes that the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism
has little to do with the frequency and intensity of terrorist acts as compared
to the traditions and social conditions of the native intelligentsia. He states:
71 Rosenberg, "To the Victor Will Go the Spoiled in Peru," The Washington Post National
Weekly Ed iHon. (30 April-6 May, 1990) p. 23.
72Rubenstein, Alchemists of Revolution, p. 108.
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Whether young intellectuals will be driven by hope and desperation to
undertake independent military adventures depends upon numerous
factors, the most important of which are the extent to which the
intelligentsia is integrated into the society, the availability of social-
management careers, apparent opportunities for meaningful political
change, and the presence or absence of local constituencies for terrorism
both inside the intelligentsia and out.73
So, the less politically, socially, or economically-disaffected the intelligentsia,
and/or those peoples they attempt to recruit, the less likely that insurgency
will either arise or gain a foothold in that country. Furthermore, the more
stable a country, the less likely that vigilante groups, or right-wing death
squads, will feel the need to represent elements of the ruling elite, military, or
an authoritarian regime.
Colombia is one Latin American example of a nation close to
chaos. Rebel elements in Colombia have gained such a stronghold that the
normal processes of law and government have been subverted. In Colombia,
however, the problem of insurgency has been compounded by another
element - narcotics. In a liaison of convenience, political insurgents and drug
traffickers have been known to work together to the benefit of their respective
causes. While often only temporary, this symbiotic relationship has had
violent repercussions. Judges, journalists, and presidential candidates have
all been targets for kidnappings and assassination. Since the problem of
insurgency in neighboring countries has already been addressed as a security
73Rubenstein, Alrhpmists of Rpvolution. p. 85.
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threat, rather than focus on a Colombian guerrilla group, such as the M-19,
this is a good juncture to focus on the drugs, as a security threat, instead.
(4) Drugs. Indeed, while political insurgency may symbolize the
fracture of a society, in one sense, drug abuse symbolizes another form of
societal decay. There is considerable consternation in the United States,
therefore, over the impact of an expanded drug trade on the fabric of societies
in the Western Hemisphere. 74 A report by the Regional Conflict Working
Group states, "trafficking imperils the very survival of democracy in friendly
nations, such as Colombia and Panama, heavily involved in production and
smuggling of illegal drugs or in the related movements of money."75 Ergo, if
trafficking threatens the national security of Latin American countries, then it
also threatens the national security of the United States.
Latin America is the source of all cocaine, four-fifths of all
marijuana, and one-third of all heroin consumed in the United States.76 Of
these three, and of all other illegal drugs that are flooding the world market,
today, cocaine is spreading the fastest. 77 A May, 1990 report released by the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee estimates that about 2.2 million Americans,
74Although it is relevant to note that the rising consumption of illicit drugs in the United
States may be as much a problem of demand as one of supply, demand is a domestic problem
that will not be discussed since it is not within the purview of this paper. Instead, the
emphasis will be on supply.
75Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict," Qune,
1988), p. 15.
76 Statistics provided by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer's Committee, as
compiled by Eric Paulsen in "Latin American Narcotics Trafficking," a research paper
presented to students in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Spring Quarter, 1989.
77Peter T. White, "An Ancient Indian Herb Turns Deadly: Coca," National Geographic.
Vol. 175, No. 1, (January, 1989), p. 35.
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or approximately one percent of U.S. citizens, are "hard core" cocaine
addicts.78
Although Peru and Bolivia are the major source countries79 of
coca (60 percent and 22 percent, respectively), the leaf from whence cocaine is
derived, it is in Colombia that the Medellin and Cali cartels reside. These
cartels have built the largest narcotics trafficking network in the Western
Hemisphere, and have helped to make Colombia the major producer and
conduit for U.S.-bound cocaine. Indeed, cocaine has become a principal
source of foreign exchange for Colombia.80
Congressional testimony cites the worth of the illegal drug trade
as high as $500 billion. 81 Even if this estimate is grossly high, it indicates the
magnitude of the profits that can be garnered in narcotics. Colombia, Peru,
and Bolivia have been variously described as becoming "narco-dependent."
Drugs have become such a key facet of their economies that reversal of this
trend may be very difficult. Since peasant farmers in Latin America generally
eke out a meager existence, for example, those who grow and harvest coca are
not easily persuaded to institute crop substitution programs. No other cash
crop is yet as lucrative as the coca leaf. Middlemen who help haul the leaf,
78Hard-core is defined as someone who uses cocaine once a week or more. Knight-Ridder
News Service, "1% of U.S. addicted to cocaine, report estimates," The Virginian-Pilot, (11
May, 1990), p. A-6.
79Source countries are those that are the major producers of illegal narcotics, as opposed to
those countries which serve as bases for the transhipment of narcotics and the laundering of
illicit revenues.
80White, "An Ancient Indian Herb Turns Deadly: Coca," National Geographic. (January,
1989), p. 25.
81 U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988," United States Statutes at Large,
Public Law 100-690, 100th Congress, 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1988), sec. 10-4102. As cited by Charley L. Diaz, "DoD Plays in the Drug War," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings Naval Review. (May, 1990), p. 76.
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process the cocaine, and transport the product stand to gain substantially
more. Participation in trafficking can enrich them far greater and faster than
they could ever hope by hawking wares on city streets. However, those
people that really cash in are those individuals who run the networks,
themselves, men like Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the Ochoa brothers, and Carlos
Lehder Rivas.
The wealth amassed by the criminal cartels enables them to
afford to buy arms, munitions, and even political allies. Indeed, these cartels
"constitute an international underworld so extensive, wealthy and powerful
that it can literally buy governments and destabilize entire societies."82 The
Medellin cartel, for example, has reportedly placed a bounty of the equivalent
to $4,000 for the murder of each regular policeman.83 In another example,
two Colombians were taken into custody after trying to buy Stinger missiles
for use against aircraft carrying Colombian officials. An FBI agent testified
that the men, who both claim links to the Medellin cartel, had already agreed
upon a $1 million down payment from cocaine profits in exchange for 120
Stingers, 50 automatic rifles, and a plane to transport the weapons to
Colombia. 84 As Colombian President Virgilio Barco stated, in a speech at the
national police academy, drug traffickers are trying to "wipe out an entire
institutional government of democratic tradition, of civil and moral
values." 85
82Regional Conflict Working Group, "Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict,"
Oune, 1988), p. 64.
83Associated Press, "22 people reportedly injured by car-bomb blast in Colombia," The
Virginian-Pilot. (18 May, 1990), p. A-12.
84Associated Press, "2 Colombians held in missile plot," The Virginian-Pilot. (8 May,
1990), p. A-5.
85Associated Press, "22 people reportedly injured by car-bomb blast in Colombia," The
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In summary, the syndication of drug-running, the cooperation
between narco-traffickers and guerrillas, and the use of strong arm tactics
threaten the basis of civil democratic authority in the Western Hemisphere.
What is happening in Colombia is not an isolated event. Certainly, the
United States is not such an island that it may be considered free of risk.
Powerful forces are at work. U.S. customs Service agents, for example,
recently discovered an elaborate tunnel built under the Mexican border,
within sight of the official U.S.-Mexican cross station, used as a conduit for
the international transport of cocaine to an Arizona warehouse. The
million-dollar passage is described as " 'something out of a James Bond
movie,' replete with electric lighting, concrete reinforcements, and a
hydraulic system that raised a game-room floor in a Mexico hide-out to
provide entry to the secret crossing."86 Customs believes that there are other
such tunnels at other points along the U.S. border.
The topics of concern regarding security that have been discussed
thus far in this section (namely democracy, debt, drugs, and insurgency), all
have one thing in common - in Latin America they have each seen a
resurgence in the 1990's. It is ironic, however, that as the flame of
authoritarianism has been doused and that of democracy rekindled, that
those very subversive and /or deleterious elements which were previously
suppressed now threaten the continued existence of fragile new
governments. The 1990's will be the decade that proves either the
consolidation, or the demise, of the hard won political battles that have
Virginian-Pilot. (18 May, 1990), p. A-12.
86 Los Angeles Times News Service, "U.S. agents find drug-smuggling tunnel," Jhs.
Virginian-Pilot and rhP I.Pdger-Star. (19 May, 1990), p. A-8.
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consumed Latin American nations since the end of the age of militarism and
the "twilight of the tyrants" in Latin America was prematurely forecast by
John J. Johnson, Tad Szulc, and other academics in the early 1960's. The
fundamental economic, political, and social problems facing these new
regimes are profound and will require a much more patient and conservative
approach - albeit open and democratic - than perhaps was advocated thirty
years ago, during a more idealistic era, as symbolized by the U.S. Alliance for
Progress.
b. Other Rising Security Concerns
There is an intrinsic inter-relationship between the dynamic factors
that comprise a body politic within each nation. In Latin America, few
nations - save perhaps Costa Rica - have maintained a stable, as well as
progressive, socio-political system. In the past, rising pressures always seem
to rupture hopes of stabilizing at a satisfactory equilibrium. Described in
geopolitical terms, this cause and effect relationship ascribes to problems
realized on an intra-regional basis.
(1) Geopolitics. Latin American military leaders and their civilian
associates take geopolitics quite seriously, especially in the Southern Cone
nations. Since South American geopolitical writings tend to stress
"competition," it is not surprising that they focus on potential sources of
conflict. Broken into categories, regional strife may arise from disputes over
borders, territory, resources and /or inter-state migration. The politics of
ideology and influences on the regional balance of power are another basis for
intra-state friction. Avoiding a long discourse on the historical roots of
geopolitics in Latin America and their relationship to intra-regional problems
of contemporary Central and South America and in the Caribbean, suffice it
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to say that in the typology of conflict in Latin America there is both an
overlap between the above-mentioned categories and a "clustering" of these
catalysts for conflict within each sub-region of Latin America. Throughout
the region, the root cause of most conflicts has been associated with both
territorial and border disputes. Territorial conflicts involve opposing claims
on a geographical area. National claims also extend to territories over the
sea. Closely associated with territorial conflict, border conflicts arise over
disputed ground on a common border. As competition for resources, such as
known and potential food, mineral, and energy sources, that are extant on
land or in the sea /sea bed become increasingly more keen in the near future,
so will the drive to secure territorial claims.
Conflict associated with the battle over allies attracted to
differing governmental systems, or ideology, are relatively new in Latin
America. Ideologically-oriented conflict has largely been confined to the
Central American/Caribbean sub-region. On the other hand, contention for
the controlling interest, or hegemony, in the regional and sub-regional
geopolitical balance of power has long been a source of tension. More
recently, a decrease in U.S. influence within the region has induced some
readjustments in the local balances of power. Finally, due to problems of
internal political and economic disorder, interstate conflict, and population
expansion, the movement of exiles and refugees across borders may be cause
for international disputes.87
87For greater elaboration on typology and definitions see Jack Child, "Interstate Relations
in Latin America: Peaceful or Conflictual?," International Journal. XLIII (Summer, 1988), pp.
379-380. Also see Wolf Grabendorff, "Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for
Conflict in Latin America," in Journal of Interameriran Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 24, No.
3, (August, 1982), p. 267.
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Since the topic of "democracy" has already been discussed, and a
following chapter will deal with the role of the United States in Latin
America and changes in the balance of power, this narrows the focus down to
problems associated with "lebensraum" - territory, resources, and migration.
As potential catalysts of conflict in Latin America these problems represent a
real threat to U.S. security for the following reasons: territorial war in Latin
America might prompt U.S. involvement - and while the Panama and
Grenada invasions were relatively simple, the proliferation of missiles and
other weapons systems elsewhere in the region makes future involvement
more risky; the availability and state of natural resources are both an
economic and environmental concern of global proportions; and the non-
controlled influx of large numbers of fleeing refugees or illegal migrants into
the U.S., Mexico, or other allied nation can be deleterious to both the U.S.
economy and society, or that of an ally.
(a) Territorial Disputes. While the root cause of disputes over
borders in Latin America lies mainly in the poor survey techniques and
incorrectly drawn maps of the first European explorers almost five hundred
years ago, geopolitical boundaries remain a contentious issue, especially in
South America, today. Competition for resources has only placed greater
focus on territorial ownership, including attempts to extend and control
greater maritime space, rights to the underlying seabed, as well as claims to
the Antarctic. Of course, an interest in assuming greater regional influence
and amassing greater national prestige is another factor. One must not
underestimate the extent to which national passions can be aroused by the
issue of territorial sovereignty in Latin American nations. Latinos have a
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long corporate memory of injustices, or perceived injustices, to their
respective countries, and hence rivalries can be intense and quickly rekindled.
The Bolivia-Chile-Peru dispute, for example, originated out
of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) when Chile defeated a Bolivian-Peruvian
coalition for control of the Atacama Desert, a 600-mile stretch of nitrate-
abundant coastline originally shared by all three countries. Chile annexed
and /or occupied this region, thereby increasing its territory by a fourth and
attaining a new status as a regional power. Peru suffered a fall from its
previous position of prominence, and Bolivia was left landlocked. Although
Peru was finally able to arrive at a settlement with Chile in 1929, which
returned the Tacna province to Peru and ceded Arica province to Chile, the
loss of an access to the sea has remained a constant source of frustration for
Bolivia.88 Blaming many of their economic woes on the absence of a sea port,
Bolivia has made many attempts to reconcile this situation with Chile.
Between 1975-1978, Bolivia negotiated for the right to a "corridor" extending
to the sea, but negotiations were broken off when Bolivia was unable to draw
a mutually beneficial agreement that would require the concurrence of both
Chile and Peru. Another Bolivian attempt to secure an agreement on a
corridor failed in 1987.89 Continually seeking support for its claims, Bolivia
has gained Argentine backing against Chile in return for Bolivian support of
Argentine endeavors, such as in both the Beagle Channel and
Malvinas/Falklands disputes.
88Ernest Rossi and Jack C. Piano, eds., The Latin American Political Dictionary. (Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, Inc., 1980), pp. 50-51.
89Howard T. Pittman, "Harmony or Discord: The Impact of Democratization on Geopolitics
and Conflict in the Southern Cone," in Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds., Geopolitics of the
Southern Cone and Antarctica. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988), p. 33.
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(b) Resource Disputes. The Falklands War is the most
newsworthy conflict of recent note. Geopolitically significant because of their
strategic location near the "choke-point" of the South Atlantic and their
location relative to Antarctica, both Argentina and Britain have had claims to
these Hawaiian-sized islands that date back to the colonial era. The British
have maintained actual control of the islands since they wrested them from
Argentine settlers in 1833. However, it was not until Juan Peron, during a
global climate of de-colonialism, chose the islands as a potential rallying point
for a "greater Argentina" that Argentine interest in this territory was
reactivated. To settle the dispute, a series of Anglo-Argentine talks was
initiated by a United Nations resolution. Negotiations proceeded slowly
towards the eventual transfer of sovereignty of the islands to Argentina.
During the 1970s, oil, fish, krill, and other resources were
determined to be in abundance in or about the Falklands. Interest in the
islands heightened between both claimant nations. In 1976, a shooting
incident on the islands between Argentine and British citizens exacerbated
tensions. In the wake of a new military junta in command of government in
Argentina, tensions were again elevated by aggressive Argentine demands
and yellow journalism for the return of the Falklands. The eventual
Argentine invasion of the islands and the short war that ensued between
Britain and Argentina, lasting from April to June of 1982, ended in a rather
humiliating defeat for Argentina. Not only did the defeat represent the
ultimate failure of the Argentine military government, but it left the territory
of the Falklands in even firmer British control and made the islands an
emotional and national point of contention for Great Britain, too.
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As an essential element of the Argentine geopolitical concept
of the tri-continental view, the loss of the Falklands has meant a serious
weakening of this Argentine claim and a concomitant strengthening of the
British claims in the Antarctic. 90 The Argentineans also suspect that the
Chileans were in collusion with the British during both the Falklands War
and in the Beagle Channel dispute. Far from resolved, the Argentines
perhaps feel an even stronger desire to reclaim the Falklands in order to
redeem their pride by restoring their "rightful" domain. Indeed, in 1984,
President Alfonsin stated that the Malvinas are, were, and will be
Argentine." 91 This claim has been restated by Argentina's President Carlos
Menem.
Closely associated with the dispute over the Falklands, the
Beagle Channel Islands have been a bone of contention between Argentina
and Chile ever since the independence of these two nations from Spain
because of their relationship to territorial sovereignty and maritime control
of the South Atlantic. The problem originally stems from competing claims
to Patagonia and a vague mountainous border. An 1881 treaty gave Patagonia
to Argentina, divided Tierra del Fuego between the two countries, and created
a Chilean-Argentine border based on the "highest peaks" of the southern
Andes. The British were given the power of arbitration over further details
90The Argentine tri-continetal view perceives their territorial domain as make up of the
three Pampas - the mainland, Antarctica (White Pampas), and the South Atlantic islands
running in an arc from the Tierra del Fuego archipelago to the Antarctic Peninsula (Wet
Pampas) - that are all inter-connected by the South Atlantic Sea. See Jack Child, Antarctica
and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988),
pp. 77-80.
91Howard T. Pittman, "Harmony or Discord: The Impact of Democratization on Geopolitics
and Conflict in the Southern Cone," in Philip Kelly and Jack Child, eds., Geopolitics of the
Southern Cone and Antarctica. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988), p. 33.
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of sovereignty in 1902. Unfortunately, ownership of the Beagle Channel
Islands was not clearly defined, which has resulted in a continuous rivalry
over this land. The important factor, however, has not been the islands or
the channel, which had been under Chilean administration for almost a
century, so much as the boundary from whence the Argentine-Chilean sea
was delineated. This line, when projected from its base over the sea, had
implications over potential resources, Antarctic claims, and national
maritime space - which is now considered sovereign territory in the Southern
Cone.
To settle the dispute, an international arbitration board was
convened in 1971. After six years, the board finally decided to award Chile
with the Beagle Channel Islands, establishing a boundary in the channel
itself. Argentina refused to accept this decision, and began staging a rapid
buildup of troops and arms on its border with Chile in 1978. Only a papal
proposal which sought to limit Chile's influence into the traditional
Argentine jurisdiction by re-negotiating the eastern-most boundary of Chile,
and thereby creating a demilitarized zone, helped to defuse the situation
before it escalated into combat. It also led to the Treaty of Peace and
Friendship, signed on 19 October, 1984.
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship confirmed the 1977
arbitration in favor of Chilean ownership of the Beagle Channel Islands, but
it also sets strict navigational criteria, with passage rights for both Chile and
Argentina; it also sets the Cape Horn meridian as the Pacific-Atlantic divisor,
and it prevents the Chileans from projecting their territorial boundaries into
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the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, this treaty ties into, but does not resolve,
overlapping claims by the two nations in Antarctica.92
The Antarctic Treaty of 1961 froze claims to Antarctica in a
thirty-year moratorium. This treaty is up for review in 1991 if signatories to
the treaty request that the case be reopened. However, the Southern Cone
signatories may prefer that the status quo of the treaty be maintained.
International interest in Antarctica has certainly increased in recent decades,
and new claims have been introduced. As a result, review of the Antarctic
Treaty could jeopardize those claims staked out by the original signatories.93
Obviously, the South Atlantic and South Pacific maritime
regions are enormously important geopolitically to the Southern Cone
nations. The food, mineral, and energy resources that are harbored in the
seabed and in the water represent a potential source of national strength and
development. Additionally, the strategic location of the southern-most
region as a "choke-point" represents a focus for national security. Since
interest in this area is not relegated solely to South American nations, as is
manifested by other recent international claims to Antarctica, some see this as
a catalyst for future conflict, too.
(2) Migration. Rather than describe further examples of geopolitical
squabbles in the region, two increasingly important subjects need be
discussed, if only briefly - migration and the environment. Migration is the
movement of a people from one country, place, or locality to another.
92Pittman, "Harmony or Discord," Kelly and Child, Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and
Antarctica, p. 38.
93Two of the best sources of information on Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty, and the
history of claims and claimants are offered by Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent:
Antarctica in a Resource Age, (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1985); and by Jack
Child's, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum.
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Poverty, unemployment, war and repression have all been catalysts for
migration. Increasingly, however, rapid population growth is to blame.
Notwithstanding the many positive contributions to society that immigrants
have to offer, uncontrolled mass migration has its negative consequences.
The mass movement of exiles, refugees, and illegal immigrants across
national borders can cause increased competition for food, housing, and jobs
in the host area. In turn, this can increase political tensions, increase crime,
provoke civil strife and even cause outright rebellion. It is small wonder that
a worldwide increase in the movement of people to more prosperous regions
is arousing concern within the developed world.
Doors are beginning to close on immigrants. Applications to
Europe, the United States and Canada, the traditional asylum-granting
regions have risen from 25,000 in 1973 to 600,000 in 1990.94 Since so many
immigrants seek "refugee" status in order to legitimize their stay in a new
country, it is becoming very difficult to discern which applicants are fleeing
persecution and which are fleeing poverty. In order to safeguard the
possibility of asylum for political refugees, host governments are increasing
their restrictions on applicants and forcible repatriation is becoming more
frequent.
In 1989, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 93 out
of every 100 persons added to the world's population were added in
developing countries.95 The population explosion is greater in Latin America
than in any other region of the world. El Salvador, for instance, is ranked
94New York Times News Service, "Uprooted: Nations resist mass movement of poor
refugees," The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star. (12 August, 1990), p. A-18.
95As cited by Barbara Vobejda, "The Overpopulation Scare Has Gotten Lost in the Crowd,"
The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (9-15 July, 1990), p. 31.
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among the most densely populated countries in the world. Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela
have all had annual growth rates exceeding 3 percent.96 Estimates indicate
that Brazil will double its population by the year 2020.97 Considering that out
of Brazil's current population of 145 million over a third are under 15,
problems like unemployment, underemployment, and economic inequity
must surely be exacerbated as they enter the workforce.98 It is unfortunate
that such high population density also contributes to disease, illiteracy,
poverty, and frustration - conditions which promote revolutionary upheaval
rather than economic growth.
It is true that large areas of Latin America remain thinly
populated, but the inhospitability of desert, mountain, and jungle across
much of these regions make them ill-suited for settlement. Hence, desirable
areas are growing crowded. Urban centers, providing the lure of
employment, sanitation, and health services are attracting growing numbers
of rural migrants. In turn, the swelling numbers aggravate economic and
political tensions - provoking others to emigrate. The United States acts as a
magnet for many, with Latins migrating to the U.S. primarily from Mexico,
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean. A large number of the migrants who
attempt to gain illegal entry into the United States are apprehended and
deported. Since 1981, for example, the United States has only allowed six of
96Ernest Rossi and jack C. Piano, The Latin American Political Dictionary. (Santa Barbara,
CA.: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1980), p. 2.
97Paul R. Erlich and Anne H. Erlich, "Population, Plenty, and Poverty," National
Geographic. Vol. 174, No. 6, (December, 1988), p. 918.
^8Paul R. Erlich and Anne H. Erlich, "Population, Plenty, and Poverty," National
Geographic. Vol. 174, No. 6, (December, 1988), p. 935.
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the 22,000 Haitians that the U.S. Coast Guard has intercepted to proceed to
port." Still, many others are able to pass through the net.
The long U.S.-Mexican border serves as a primary conduit into
the United States. In Mexico, high unemployment, combined with a growing
pool of under-employed laborers, is a fact of life. It is estimated that one
million new job seekers join the Mexican labor force each year.100 Prospects
for regular work are so slim that it is a driving force behind many of those
Mexicans who venture to the north. Interesting to note, Mexico has also had
to contend with immigrants on its southern border. Fleeing war and
repression in Central America, many of these refugees have been interned in
camps along Mexico's border. Whether the final destination of these
immigrants is Mexico or the United States remains a good question. In any
case, regardless from whence they came, the United States has become a
haven for many Latin Americans.
Preliminary returns from the 1990 census reflect that the U.S.
population is growing in leaps and bounds along the coasts, while the states
of mid-America are on the wane. The Southwest has seen some of the
greatest gains. The initial count shows that, since 1980, the population of
California has increased by 23.7%, Arizona's by 33%, New Mexico's by 14.4%,
Texas' by 18.2%, Colorado's by 13.2%, Utah's by 17.1% and Nevada's by 49.1%.
For any number of reasons, people are moving from the middle of the U.S.
toward the coasts, but it is overwhelmingly significant that approximately
"Roger P. Winter, Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, as quoted from New York
Times News Service and cited in "Uprooted: Nations resist mass movement of poor refugees,"
The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star. (12 August, 1990), p. A-18.
100 Lawrence E. Harrison, "Not So Fast: A Free Trade Area with Mexico may sound great,
but would it really work?," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (16-22 July, 1990),
p. 25.
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40% of the nation's growth can be attributed to immigration. 101 Latinos
figure in at a high number. Percentages have yet to be published, but
estimates indicate that at the current rate of immigration Hispanic-Americans
will soon outnumber the population of Afro-Americans in the U.S. As a
result, the United States must now contend with the political, economic, and
social consequences of Latinization in the U.S.
The dramatic influx of Hispanics into the United States over the
last decade represents latent political power. The nation's political agenda
will be increasingly influenced by Hispanic Americans as they gain greater
representation in state legislatures and in Congress. Hispanics in California
and Texas already have the potential to determine the outcome of elections,
due to their numbers, alone. 102 Still, voter turnout remains low. Latinos
often eschew socialization outside of their own ethnic communities.
Hispanic immigrants must integrate into the main-stream of U.S. society if
they are to fulfill their potential as U.S. citizens. It is important for another
reason, as Walter Dean Burnham, a political scientist at the University of
Texas, points out "Demography is destiny."103
At the current rate of accession, the United States has been
unable to adequately absorb all its new Latin American immigrants. While
immigrants have traditionally served as a fountain of youth, helping the
United States stay at the forefront of world trade, commerce, and science,
101
It must be noted that this data is preliminary and subject to change. Barbara Vobejda,
"A Shift of Humanity That's Straight From the Heart," Thp Washington Post National
Weekly Edition. (10-16 September, 1990), p. 12.
1Q2Thomas B. Edsall, in "As California Goes, So Goes the Presidency," Thp Washington
Post National WppIcIv Edition. (10-16 September, 1990), p. 13.
103As cited by Edsall, in "As California Goes, So Goes the Presidency," The Washington
Post National Weekly Edition. (10-16 September, 1990), p. 13.
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many Hispanic immigrants who arrive in the United States, today, are poor
and uneducated. Unable to read or write in English, they are functionally
illiterate, making their transition into U.S. society difficult. Brownsville,
Texas, provides one example. With over 2000 new students added to the
school roster every year, the Brownsville public school system is unable to
keep up with the flood of immigrants crossing over the border from Mexico.
New bilingual teachers must be hired. Social workers are needed to work
with impoverished students. And as Alejandro Perez, supervisor of
admissions, says "It's almost a new school coming in per year. We're
building all the time."104 As a result, costs for education, welfare, solid waste
disposal, and crime prevention are all escalating. Other cities in the U.S. are
witnessing similar problems as they grow increasingly urban and populous.
To reduce stress on its urban centers, the United States must slow the human
tide crossing its borders. Perhaps then may the U.S. more adequately
assimilate new immigrants, too, thereby enabling more Hispanics the
opportunity to fulfill their potential as U.S. citizens.
(3) The Environment. The population explosion in Latin America
is also severely stressing the environment. It is not the density, or numbers,
alone, which is the problem. More importantly, it is how people use, or
interact, with their environment. Witness the United States, with only 5
percent of the world's population the United States still ranks as one of the
major consumers of energy and producers of pollutants in the world. By and
large, Latin American nations, are wrestling with their environment simply
to provide more living room for their swelling numbers. In the case of
104 As cited by Vobejda, in The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (10-16
September, 1990), p. 12.
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Brazil, the long-term potential wealth of the Amazon is being exploited as a
short-term safety valve for its exploding population. Since the 1970s, the once
undisturbed biomass of the tropical rain forest has been plundered for timber,
mining, hydro-electricity, and huge agricultural projects. Peasants escaping
from overcrowded cities are torching the forest to create subsistence farms.
Certainly the Amazon is large, with about 1.3 billion acres of forest, but slash
and burn tactics used by the peasants to conquer the Amazon is carving up
the forest at a phenomenal rate. According to Brazilian scientists, 20 million
acres of virgin forest in Brazil's Amazon basin is being burned every year. 105
As the ecosystem of the Amazon is destroyed, the existence of the natural
inhabitants of the forest is endangered. Considering that about 20 percent of
all bird species on earth live in the Amazon forest, their extinction, alone,
would be a tremendous loss. 106 Include the countless number of other species
that may perish, both flora and fauna, and the untold consequences to the
intricate web of life in the Amazon takes on even greater significance. In all
probability, it is a loss for mankind in other ways, too. Undiscovered cures for
many of man's diseases, for example, may well be lost in smoke.
In Latin America, environmental damages are by no means
relegated to Brazil alone. In the Ohio-sized area of Guatemala's forested
Peten region is found one of the richest repositories of plant and animal life
in all of Central America. Peasants also use the land to eke out an existence
by subsistence farming. It is logging, though, which provides Guatemala
with one of its largest export commodities. As a result, 100,000 acres of this
105As cited by Melinda Beck, "Chronicle of a Death Foretold," Newsweek. (9 January,
1989),p. 62.
106 Betsy Carpenter, "Faces in the forest," U.S. News fc World Report. (4 June, 1990), p. 64.
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jungle are cut and burned yearly. At the present rate of devastation, this
pristine rain forest will be defunct in 30 years. 107 Looking elsewhere, Costa
Rica has razed large portions of its forests to provide pasture land for raising
beef cattle. The immediate consequence of this policy has been a serious
erosion of the land and a large loss of topsoil in Costa Rica. Providing a little
trivia, it has been estimated that 55 square feet of grazing land is required to
produce 1/4 pound of beef. In 1989, the United States imported about 138
million pounds of beef from Central America - much of it raised on land
reclaimed from tropical rain forests. 108 Other examples abound, but the point
is made.
Loss of wildlife and natural preserves aside, the dismantling of
Latin American tropical forests has another side-effect. Each acre of burned
forest releases about 50 tons of carbon into the atmosphere. Of greenhouse
gasses, classified as carbon-dioxide, methane, and chlorofluorocarbons,
twenty-four times more gas is released through a burning forest as through
fuel combustion. 109 A new study conducted by the Washington-based World
Resources Institute illustrates the consequences. The study concludes that
developing countries contribute almost as much in greenhouse gasses as do
the industrialized nations. Under the old index, in order, the U.S., the
U.S.S.R., China, Japan, and West Germany were the top five villains in the
production of greenhouse gasses, with total contributions of 22%, 18%, 11%,
4%, and 3%, respectively. Under the revised index, the United States and the
107 Carpenter, U.S. News fc World Report. (4 June, 1990), p. 63.
108William F. Allman, "Rediscovering Planet Earth," U.S. News & World Report. (31
October, 1988), p. 68.
109 Betsy Carpenter, "Greenhouse redesign," U.S. News & World Report. (18 June, 1990), p.
47.
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Soviet Union still top the list with contributions of 18% and 12%, but Brazil,
China, and India have now replaced China, Japan, and West Germany with
contributions of 11%, 7%, and 4%, respectively. 110 Revised calculations
include all three greenhouse gas emissions as opposed to the old index, which
included fossil-fuel combustion and cement manufacture, only.
Evidence is building that without better conservation of
resources that dire consequences may occur. Possible by-products of
continued deforestation, fossil-fuel vehicles, and industrialization include
both the erosion of the ozone layer and world-wide changes in weather
patterns. What does this mean in relation to the security requirements of the
United States? An unprecedented buildup of greenhouse gases may lead to a
global warming pattern. One result would probably be a rise in average ocean
temperatures, such as in the Gulf of Mexico. The likelihood is that
hurricanes would then be stronger, plaguing shipping and coastal areas of the
United States in future years. 111 Flood levels could change, water supplies
could dry up, and forest fires might occur in greater abundance. Such
climatic changes could affect agriculture by creating droughts, perhaps of such
magnitude that the traditional breadbasket region of the U.S. would become a
great dust bowl. This might require that the United States import the
majority of its foodstuffs. Farfetched? Perhaps, but the likelihood that such
cataclysmic events might actually occur is enough to warrant international
concern and action.
If scientific predictions hold true, it may well be that the
110 Carpenter, I J.S. Npws & World Report. (18 June, 1990), p. 47.
111 Stephen H. Schneider, "Cooling It," World Monitor: The Christian Science Monitor
Monthly. Quly, 1990), p. 36.
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repercussions of such acts as deforestation may prove to be of greater long-
term consequence to the security of the United States than that of all other
threats posed by Latin America. However, the environment is a volatile
subject for two significant reasons. First, scientists disagree on the long-term
inter-active effect of different pollutants on the environment and the ability
of nature to counter it. Is global warming really a trend and what is the cause
and effect truly going to be? In the United States, public concern for the
environment "is being shaped by the blurring of scientific and economic facts
under the impact of political opinion, media miscommunication, and a
debate among battling scientists themselves."112 Without consensus,
application of policy is subverted. Second, sovereign nations sometimes will
not, or cannot, comply with directives mandated by environmentalists.
Developing countries generally look upon the developed world's new-found
concern with the environment as somewhat hypocritical, since the lion's
share of pollution and energy consumption still lies with the industrialized
north. Furthermore, even when developing countries see merit in
conservation and pollution control, environmental concerns may still
receive a low priority in the face of short-term requirements to feed, clothe,
and house poverty-stricken citizens. So, although there is a definite link
between population growth, pollution, and resource depletion, before
emissions can be slowed and contaminants controlled world-wide, the United
States and other industrialized nations must take the lead in reducing their
own pollutants. Consensus must then be reached with developing nations.
Invariably, some scheme must be devised which will help manage and
112 Schneider, World Monitor: The Christian Science Monitor Monthly. (July, 1990), p. 30.
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finance conservation programs in impoverished countries.
Progress was made at the 16th annual economic summit of the
industrialized nations in Houston, Texas. With discussions far less centered
on traditional economic issues than on how the participating nations could
adapt themselves to a world no longer dominated by East-West tensions, the
G-7 nations set 1992 as the target date to complete negotiations on a
framework for limiting or stabilizing emissions of gases that contribute to
global warming. By 1992, they also hope to complete a "global forest
convention." Already, the G-7 nations have agreed to work with the new
government of Brazil to protect its tropical rain forests. 113 Such international
recognition of environmental problems is a very positive step. However,
stronger consensus must still be reached by developed and developing
nations, alike, over both problems and solutions before any real global
environmental advances can be made.
c. Opportunities To Improve U.S. Security
Despite all the different threats to U.S. security that Latin America
may pose, it is important to recognize that many opportunities for bilateral
and multi-lateral cooperation exist which can favorably enhance the security
needs of both the United States and Latin American countries. Up to this
point, the key focus of this chapter has been on the threats to U.S. security
from Latin America because they are the specific factors to which the United
States must match military, economic, and other resources. As the previous
section made patently obvious, Latin America is a region that the United
States should neither ignore nor neglect. However, rather than focus solely
113 Hobart Rowen and Dan Balz, "Taking the Middle Road Toward a New World Economy,"
The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (16-22 July, 1990), p. 22.
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on the negative factors that force U.S. involvement in the region, it is just as
relevant to consider the potential bonanza for U.S. security interests that
could lie in a more positive relationship with any, or all, nations of Latin
America.
In terms of U.S. security, the specific value of different regions of
the world varies. As was previously noted, some areas have greater intrinsic
value because they have large, cohesive, and well-educated populations,
strong economies, healthy industrial bases, essential natural resources, high
level of technological sophistication, or large standing military forces which
can directly contribute to the strength of the U.S.. Other areas may have less
overall value, but because they contribute to the defense of the United States,
or other areas of intrinsic value, through geographic proximity, military
technology, and/or strategy, they have extrinsic value. 114 No longer a
backwater region, the United States must recognize the importance of Latin
America to U.S. security concerns and how it is growing in value.
(1) Non-fuel Minerals. In 1980, for example, the industrial
countries consumed at least 80 percent of the non fuel minerals used in the
world. 115 While the import dependence of the United States on non fuel
minerals is still relatively small, it is increasingly reliant on foreign sources of
supply for metals. The U.S. was once nearly self-sufficient. U.S. allies, such as
Japan and the European Economic Community, have much smaller mineral
reserves than the United States and a higher mineral import dependence.
The area comprising the former Soviet Union, on the other hand, is nearly
114 Michael C. Desch, "The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests
in the Periphery," International Security. Vol. 14, No. 1, (Summer, 1989), p. 100.
115Raymond F. Mikesell, Nonfuel Minerals: Foreign Dependence and National Security.
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1987), p. 20.
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self-sufficient in important minerals, with the notable exceptions of bauxite
and cobalt. 116 As economic and population growth rates expand into the
next century, the U.S. and its allies may find themselves vulnerable to an
increasing dependence on mineral imports as domestic consumption
increases. It is hoped that since the United States has a fairly well-diversified
supply of mineral imports, and since substitute materials and new
technologies may become available in the future, that U.S. access to strategic
minerals will not be easily disrupted. Latin America now supplies the United
States with about 30 mineral raw materials, including such strategic minerals
as bauxite, columbium, manganese, and tantalum. 117 If these lines of supply
within the Western Hemisphere remain open and available, the possibility of
such a disruption are certainly lessened.
(2) Oil. A shift in trade patterns is another phenomena which
makes Latin America more important to the United States. One example is
oil. During the 1980s, the United States was the world's second largest
producer of oil. However, U.S. oil production has been falling by about 5% a
year. In addition, because of high U.S. oil consumption, additional oil
imports were and have been required to satisfy demand. The United States
now imports more than half of the oil it uses.118 To compensate for this
additional demand during the 1970s, the U.S. was largely dependent on oil
from the Middle East. Today, the pattern of this dependency has shifted. The
United States now receives significantly more oil from the Western
116 Mikesell, Nonfuel Minerals, p. 30.
117Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America.
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 156.
118
"Oil Brief: The Stuff of Wars," in Thp Economist. (12-18 January, 1981), p. 67.
63
Hemisphere than she receives from the Middle East. Oil from Mexico, for
example, has increased to almost 25 percent of U.S. import, whereas oil
imported from Saudi Arabia has dropped to only 2.6 percent. 119
While crude oil flow patterns have changed, the vulnerability
associated with a reliance on oil importation has not. Only a handful of
nations produce oil, and the conflict-ridden Middle East is a mainstay
producer. Many U.S. allies are heavily dependent upon oil from the region.
While the erection of pipelines from Middle Eastern oil fields to destinations
on the Mediterranean Sea and other points to the south is an attempt to
reduce the possibility of disruption and to circumvent sole reliance on
Persian Gulf shipping, the 1990 Gulf War illustrated the fragility of these
pipelines. The export pipelines leading out of Iraq, for example, were quickly
shut down. Tankers had to be escorted out of the Gulf and were then
required to navigate traditional routes, such as around Cape Horn, to travel to
Europe and other destinations. In a protracted war, Latin Americans could
offer respite through their own oil production.
(3) Trade Routes. Speaking of trade routes, Latin America is
important economically for a number of reasons, but especially because the
continent stands astride several busy shipping lanes. Former U.S. Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, stated in an address that "If we
were to name the five most vital strategic choke points along our trade
routes, most of us would pick the Persian Gulf first and the Cape of Good
119Statement of John F. Lehman, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, in the hearings before the
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives: 99th Congress, 1st Session (June 24, September 5, 6, and 10,
1985). The 600-Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy. (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1986) p. 276.
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Hope, off South Africa, second. Third, fourth, and fifth, in whatever order
you want to put them, would be the Caribbean, the Panama Canal, and Cape
Horn, off South America. Three of the top five, then, are in this
hemisphere." 120 The loss of control of a choke point affects U.S. control of the
seas everywhere. Friendly ties help to keep the sea lines of communication
open and improve trade relations.
(4) Free Trade Area. One example of a way to promote even greater
U.S. interaction with Latin America is the development of a Free Trade Area
(FTA). Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari strongly believes that an
FTA between the U.S. and Mexico might not only create jobs in Mexico, but in
the United States, as well. Additionally, it could also help stanch the flow of
illegal immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. Is this realistic? Considering that
Mexico has the eleventh largest market economy in the world, that it is the
third largest trading partner of the United States, and that in 1987 it had a
gross domestic product of over $175 billion, it is certainly within the realm of
possibility. 121
A serious shortcoming is that, with respect to trade, the U.S. is
much more important to Mexico than vice versa. In 1989, two-way trade
between the United States and Mexico totalled $52 billion, but the United
States accounted for 60 percent of Mexican trade, while Mexico only accounted
for 6 percent of U.S. trade. By comparison, two-way trade with Canada and
Japan, the number 1 and 2 trading partners of the United States, totalled $167
120 Admiral Carlisle A. Trost, USN, in an address entitled "Strategic Imperatives in Latin
America," to The Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, CA, on 22 July 1988.
121 Abraham F. Lowental, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America.
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 69.
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billion and $138 billion, respectively. 122 However, strong impetus by the Bush
Administration makes such an association likely, which when combined
with Canada will make it the largest common market in the world. While
some problems cause concern, such as the low Mexican wages in relation to
U.S. and Canadian wages, many analysts believe the abolition of trade barriers
will be a boon for the United States. Since trade is the driving force of our
economy, as barriers come down U.S. exports will increase. Since every 7
percent rise in exports adds 1 percent to the GNP, this translates into billions
of dollars in revenue and hundreds of thousands of new jobs. 123 In addition
to improving the U.S. economy, by integrating Mexico into the Western
trading system, Mexico's wage rates can be raised up and other social and
environmental problems can be more directly addressed. One byproduct of
this action is that poverty and the spread of radical revolutions might be
halted. The continued enjoyment of a stable and secure southern border
allows the United States to maintain the perspective of an island nation
rather than that of a garrison.
Although farther afoot, the North American free-trade
agreement may set the structural framework for wider hemispheric free-trade
arrangements. Brazil is another country with whom a special trade
agreement could be an asset. With a 1987 gross domestic product of about
$280 billion, Brazil ranked the seventh largest market economy in the
122 Lawrence E. Harrison, "Not So Fast: A Free Trade Area with Mexico may sound great,
but would it really work?," The Washington Post National Weekly Edition. (16-22 July, 1990),
p. 25.
123Warren T. Brookes, "The Economy: How U.S. Will Benefit From Free Trade With
Mexico," The San Francisco Chronicle. (14 May, 1991), p. B-3.
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world. 124 While Brazil does not have the proximity to the United States that
Mexico does, she has borders with every other South American country,
except Ecuador. Opening the door to Brazil could further open the other
markets in South America, especially if a regional free trade agreement is
ever reached between the South America countries.
Although many other examples can be cited, it can be stated that
the U.S. stands to gain by increasing economic, financial, political, and
military interaction with its Latin American neighbors. Within the last few
decades, the stature of the United States has diminished in Latin American
eyes, largely due to benign neglect. The U.S. government can shore-up its
faltering image through the application of a more consistent and coherent
policy within the region. Recognizing that there is disparity in the relative
scales of economy between the United States and Latin American nations, an
emphasis on the equal status of these nations as sovereign states, rather than
as subordinates, would go far in promoting feelings of mutual respect and
would help strengthen the U.S. relationship with each Latin American state.
Simply put, the greater the feeling of mutual respect, the greater the
possibility of positive interaction. With increased interaction, whether it be
commercial, diplomatic, or military, it is hoped that the ability of the United
States to influence events in Latin America will improve, thereby helping to
mitigate the potential threats to U.S. security and open new doors of
opportunity that will enhance U.S. interests.
124 Lowenthai, Partners in Conflict, p. 105.
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C. MARITIME STRATEGY SOUTH OF THE TROPIC OF CANCER
Another method used to promote stronger ties, if not regional integration,
is through a strong military relationship. A formal structure of alliances,
treaties, and agreements already provides the United States with such global
coalitions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 binds participating Latin
American countries into a regional security alliance with the United States,
but faith in the inter-American security system has waned, partly as a result of
past U.S. unilateral military decisions in Latin America and because of the
non-involvement of the United States in the 1982 Falklands War.
Recognizing that Latin America is predominantly a maritime theater, the
U.S. Navy has been developing bilateral, navy-to-navy, initiatives in South
America. With the objective of improving U.S. - Latin American relations
and expanding cooperation, current naval initiatives are now also geared to
restoring faith in the inter-American security system. These bilateral
programs are specifically aimed at increasing Latin American understanding
of the U.S. maritime strategy and how it integrates into and supports other
bilateral or alliance agreements that have been signed. 125
The U.S. Navy is seeking a much more active and involved role between
the U.S. and Latin navies, especially in those key countries where more
extensive cooperative arrangements may be developed. It is hoped that
shortfalls in capabilities, inter-operability, and standardization can be
125 Interview at the Pentagon with CAPT Pat Roth and CDR Jack Ahart, OP-613, Western
Hemisphere Branch, Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division, 17 July 1989.
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overcome so that each navy can contribute the maximum to mutual areas of
interest, such as the security of the sea lines of communication in the
Western Hemisphere and the deterrence of conflict in the region. Through
the bilateral program, the Navy hopes to ensure that the importance of the
maritime mission is articulated; that allied capabilities and constraints are
factored into the development of the U.S. maritime strategy; that all aspects of
the U.S. maritime strategy are understood and supported by allied partners;
and, of course, that these relations will improve cooperation and mutual
understanding.
UNITAS (Latin for unity) is a long-standing U.S.-Latin American exercise
that is an integral part of the navy-to-navy program. An annual exercise that
has been held since 1957, Unitas is one of the world's largest multi-national
naval operations. This exercise joins ships, aircraft and naval ground forces
of the U.S. fleet with a select number of South American navies. As an
example, four ships from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet were deployed for six
months, in 1991, to operate with the forces of nine South American navies in
UNITAS XXXII. During the course of this deployment, the U.S. ships
circumnavigated South America, transiting both the Straits of Magellan and
the Panama Canal, and made numerous port calls along the way. 126 The
extent to how well-received UNITAS is in Latin America is reflected in the
high budget allocations that participants reserve for the exercise. It has been
estimated that some countries use up to 60-70% of their annual naval budgets
for this event. 127
126
"A Common Bond: Unitas Links the Americas," AllHands. (April 1992), p. 29.
127Interview with CAPT Roth and CDR Ahart, Pentagon, 17 July 1989.
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1. The Role of South America in the Maritime Strategy
If it is to be successful, Latin America must be an involved and active
partner in the U.S. maritime strategy. Citing the Contadora initiative and the
Arias plan as an indication of Latin American willingness to take
responsibility to solve security crises, an Inter-American Working Group
stated, "No longer is Latin America resigned to letting the U.S. define threats
to Hemispheric security and to acquiescing in U.S. policies to cope with
them." 128 In other words, the joint effort of both the United States and Latin
America are required to maintain their mutual security.
In many cases, U.S. leadership will be indispensable. However, it may
very well be that U.S. forces are subordinated to a combined regional
commander. In any case, mutual support between allies must be constantly
enhanced and the predominant attitude must be one that recognizes the
essential equality of all partners. A combined doctrine requires planning,
training and exercising to promote teamwork. 129 One of the major purposes
of UNITAS, for example, is to smooth the coordination between U.S. and
Latin American forces by working to enhance the inter-operability of
equipment, techniques, and procedures. Ultimately, as a natural aspect of
coalition warfare, geography and the unique capabilities of the various
national forces available should be exploited to the advantage of the U.S. and
its Latin American partners.
Consider the defense of shipping in the Western Hemisphere. As
global trade increases, the protection of merchant shipping grows in
128Statement of an Inter-American Working Group, "Collective Security in the Americas:
New Directions," a World Peace Foundation Project, 0une 1988), p. 3.
129 Based on Toint Publication 1: loint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. "Molding the Joint
Fighting Force," in Defense 92. (March/April 1992), p. 28.
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importance. The U.S. commitment to naval control of shipping was readily
apparent during the 1990 Gulf War when U.S. naval vessels were specifically
designated for escorting oil tankers and other merchant vessels in and out of
the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz. This U.S. commitment will
certainly not waver if other supply lines are threatened, too. However,
because of the increasing capabilities of the Latin American navies in the
control of shipping the United States has been able to reduce its naval
manpower commitments in the Southern Hemisphere. Based on the NATO
doctrine of naval shipping control, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
established the South Atlantic Maritime Area Command (CAMAS). With
interest and concern in the defense of merchant shipping growing, this
organization has helped to standardize shipping control procedures in the
Western Hemisphere. 130 By using shared areas of responsibility during a war,
it is possible that Brazil, for example, could pick-up convoy escort duties in
the Atlantic Narrows, that region between Brazil and western Africa, to help
the U.S. maintain control of allied shipping.
Some scoff at the naval capabilities of Third World nations, but the
capacity for coastal protection, sea denial, and even limited power projection
of a select number of these nations, especially in South America, is surprising.
Furthermore, these capabilities are improving, whether by direct purchase or
by forms of cooperative and indigenous production of naval vessels and
armament systems. In addition, while these assets are not generally as
sophisticated as those of the United States, some are; and others are quite
130CDR Jeane H. Stetson, USNR, "Defense of Shipping in the Western Hemisphere: A
Second Look," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLV, No. 2, Seq. 338, (Spring 1992), p.108.
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capable of performing their respective missions above a threshold at which
they would be considered credible and effective in any navy.
The 1982 South Atlantic War between Great Britain and Argentina
provides a relatively recent example of the potential effectiveness of
submarines operated by a Third World nation. After the H.M.S. Conqueror
torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, the Argentines
were forced to recall all surface ships to port. Employing inferior sonar
equipment against the British nuclear submarine force, the Argentines
simply were unable to adequately prosecute their targets. However, the San
Luis, an Argentine Type 209 submarine, succeeded in making two separate
attacks against British surface ships by penetrating the British escort screen
and firing by using sonar. Reportedly, the San Luis also launched a torpedo
against one of the British nuclear submarines. Although the San Luis missed
its targets, this engagement proved that a conventional submarine was
capable of penetrating the defenses of a superior force, attack, and then evade
an intensive 20-hour ASW search by the British. 131 The British might have
sustained heavier losses, and even been repelled, if they had confronted a
slightly larger and more modern sub force, such as the one the Argentines are
now currently building.
The point of this example is that simple dismissal of current and future
naval capabilities of South American countries is not justified. Great Britain
and Argentina are now in a process of reconciliation,132 but the result of their
antagonism suggests that if a Latin nation's navy is strong enough to exert a
131 Wixler, "Argentina's Geopolitics and Her Revolutionary Diesel-Electric Submarines,"
p.99-100.
132peter Truell, "U.S. Is Attempting to Nudge Argentina and Britain Toward a
Reconciliation," The Wall Street Toumal. 28 August, 1987, p. A-6.
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viable threat to a nation with the naval force the size of Great Britain's that it
would certainly be advantageous if it could be harnessed on behalf of U.S. and
allied objectives. Nicholas Spykman observed that, "...the effect of force is in
inverse proportion to the distance from its source."133 Thus, it makes sense
that the United States try to take advantage of those assets which might act as
force multipliers for the U.S. in areas distant from the United States.
2. Latin America: Support the Maritime Strategy?
Why should Latin American nations contribute to the U.S. maritime
strategy? Perhaps Admiral Trost best answered that question when he stated
in an address:
With some of the longest shorelines in the world and a network of
great rivers, Latin America is a maritime theater in three dimensions:
internal, coastal, and overseas. As ours does, their national life depends
on free access to waterways. In this way we share a common outlook. As a
result, we feel that much can be done on a navy-to-navy basis to help
improve their security. 134
When one considers that about half of Latin American exports travel through
inter-American waters, 135 this fact alone is a significant impetus for Latin
American involvement in a hemispheric maritime defense strategy.
In addition, most Latin American nations are just as interested as the
United States in eradicating other threats to Latin American security, whether
they be internal or external threats. By supporting the U.S. maritime strategy,
133 Nicholas John Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and
The Balance of Power. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), pp. 165, 393-394, 448 as cited by
Desch in "Keys that Lock Up the World," p. 99.
134 Trost, "Strategic Imperatives in Latin America,address to the Commonwealth Club of
San Francisco, (22 July 1988), p. 8.
135 Stetson, "Defense of Shipping in the Western Hemisphere," Naval War College
Review, p. 109.
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the possibility of receiving greater access to economic, financial, and/or
military assistance or cooperation from the United States increases. Certainly,
it would provide an avenue for greater dialogue. It might also open the doors
for other mutually beneficial programs.
One area of potential conflict, however, lies in the control of ocean
resources, such as fish stocks, exploitable hydrocarbons and manganese
nodules. Beginning in the 1960s, Latin American interest in ocean-bed rights,
preferential fishing zones, and territorial seas grew, as it did in other parts of
the world. Gathering momentum, the "national enclosure" movement was
largely supported by Third-World states while most of the major maritime
nations, including the United States, supported the traditional freedom-of-
the-seas law. Expansive ocean zone claims in Latin America have therefore
been a source of discord between the U.S. and Latin America.
As a result of the 1973 United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), however, state coastal jurisdictional authority was expanded
in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty. While the degree of
national control varies according to the type of zone, the broad trend is now
toward greater regulation of ocean space through law. Extended zones
include the territorial sea (which extends out to 12 nautical miles), the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (which extends from the territorial sea out to
200 nautical miles), and the continental shelf (which can extend beyond 200
nautical miles). With qualification, many of the maritime powers have
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belatedly accepted the "New Law of the Sea" as they realize its compatibility
with their own resource interests. 136
The United States now accepts the UNCLOS treaty, in principle,
although the military rights of foreign states within the EEZ still remains a
source of contention. 137 As a result, new opportunities for cooperation in
exploiting offshore resources have arisen, especially in Latin America.
However, since resources still remain a potential source of conflict, especially
regional conflict, some guarantee against aggression would be welcomed.
According to the Inter-American Working Group, the best guarantee against a
unilateral intervention is by the use of a collective initiative. 138 By putting
teeth back into the inter-American security system, through a revised
maritime strategy, local and hemispheric security would be improved and the
potential for intra-regional conflict in Latin America would be reduced.
Still, as a continent of extremes, harboring countries with vastly
different indigenous resources, economic and military capabilities, and
political heritages, there can be no reasonable expectation that any particular
country in Latin America could, should, or would contribute to the maritime
strategy to the same extent as another. By the same token, just as any one
West European country is not expected to contribute to NATO to the same
magnitude as the United States, neither should any one Latin American
country be expected to contribute to the maritime strategy to the same extent
as the United States. However, any contribution to the objectives of the
136 Michael A. Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies, (New York, NY: St. Martin's
Press, 1987), pgs. 8-9.
137 Morris, Expanding Third-World Navies, p. 176.
138Statement of an Inter-American Working Group, "Collective Security in the Americas:
New Directions," 0une 1988), p. 7.
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maritime strategy, even if only symbolic, may help deter conflict by
strengthening alliance solidarity.
It is important that the United States refrain from second-guessing
what the requirements for Latin American navies should be. As CNO,
Admiral Trost was very studious in not publicly defining what other Latin
American countries should or should not do, especially since the goal of the
evolving U.S. - Latin American naval relationship is meant to be mutually
supportive, not coercive. 139 However, it is also just as important to realize
the limitations that each country may have, whether economic, technical, or
otherwise, and to tailor tasking commensurate with their abilities and desires.
A definition of roles is important if the relative strengths of each
nation participant is to be realized. To avoid treading on political toes, the
individual desires of each Latin American country is referenced through the
dialogue developed out of the navy-to-navy bilateral discussions. The focus
on bilateralism helps to eliminate some of the more sticky political problems
that often arise out of multilateral discussions. Indeed, U.S. - Latin American
multilateral discussions have often proven to be less productive. This forum
also emphasizes the naval relationship. By concentrating on discussions at
this level, it is more likely that a constructive dialogue on the U.S. maritime
strategy can be developed than by government-to-government discussion.
Since the agenda of federal administrations tends to change more frequently
than does that of naval leadership, the navy-to-navy focus also helps to create
greater continuity.
139 Interview, OP-613, 17 July 1989.
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It is hoped that when key countries are recognized for their individual
assets that more extensive cooperative arrangements may be realized. First,
however, is the requirement to analyze relative strengths and capabilities.
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III. LATIN AMERICAN POWER AND MARITIME CAPABILITIES
When considering the strategic balance of power, the United States must
continually strive to identify those countries sympathetic to its goals as well
as those strong enough to be helpful. It must calculate the capabilities and
intentions of both enemies and allies. Therefore, assessing the extent to
which Latin American nations can effectively cooperate with the United
States is an important question. However, each nation must be assessed
individually since the diverse natures and sizes of the different nations that
comprise Latin America are indicative of differences in capabilities of these
states. It can be stated that the higher the capability of a nation the higher
becomes the potential for either cooperation or competition with the United
States. One hopes that this capability can be harnessed into cooperation.
Therefore, those Latin American nations which can best compete in the
international arena might best serve the interests of a revised maritime
strategy. Furthermore, within the same hemisphere, these same nations may
prove to be a prime U.S. source for cooperative ventures, such as the co-
production of naval armaments. With this in mind, the intent of the
following discourse is to flesh out those Latin American nations which have
the greatest national power, the most potent naval capabilities and which
hold the best potential promise for effective arms cooperation.
Perhaps the simplest method of illustrating Latin American power is on a
cross-comparison basis. For ease of comparison, a matrix of like variables can
be used to help illustrate relative capabilities. However, a very large number
of variables factor into answering the bottom-line question of capability. In
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addition, variables are subject to interpretation in the assignment of values,
or weighting, and are therefore sometimes difficult to quantify.
Furthermore, values are dated by the time frame in which the database was
collected. In other words, a matrix can only provide a snapshot perspective.
Since so many possible variables might comprise such a matrix, it is
simpler to select those main elements of power upon which scholars
generally agree as the basic building-blocks with which one might assess the
relative strength of a state. By choosing a select few variables that relate to
power, a mix of strategic, military, economic, and political factors, one can
then illustrate relative capabilities in a tabulated format. Although such a
matrix would only be a quick study in national power, it would contain the
main elements which factor into the calculus of the ability of a state to wage
war. For our purposes, it would also hint at the respective abilities of Latin
American nations to sustain an effective naval force.
A. NATIONAL POWER TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA
Ray S. Cline, former Director of Intelligence and Research for the U.S.
Department of State (1969-1973) and former Deputy Director of Intelligence for
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), stated that national power is
"determined in part by the military forces and the military establishment of a
country but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of
frontiers, the populations, the raw material resources, the economic structure,
the technological development, the financial strength, the ethnic mix, the
social cohesiveness, the stability of political processes and decision making
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and finally, the intangible quality usually described as national spirit."140 To
help quantify geopolitical strengths and weaknesses on a scale, Cline
developed a formula to measure power:
Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W)
Each character in the formula is defined as follows:
Pp = perceived power
C = critical mass: population + territory
E = economic capability
M = military capability
S = strategic purpose
W = will to pursue national strategy
By deriving and factoring the coefficients, the power base of each Latin
American nation can be distilled to a single value. A cross-comparison of
these values can then be accomplished. The following is a summary of
Cline's findings.
Critical mass, the first factor in Cline's formula, is a combination of
population and territory. Population is used as the first approximation of the
strength of a nation. Those nations with populations in excess of 50 million
are generally considered world powers, although nations with populations in
excess of 15 million, according to Cline, are often considered influential.
However, since the validity of this assumption is mitigated by nations with
high populations but low per capita incomes, scores are reduced by 50% for
those nations with populations in excess of 500 million but with less than
$500 per capita GNP. As a baseline, based on population alone, the United
States is given a power rating value of 50 (See Table 3).
140Ray S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s. (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1980), p. 16.
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TABLE 3





1. China (PRC) 1,014 25
4. United States 219 50
6. Brazil 123 30
11. Mexico 67 17
29. Argentina 26 6
30. Colombia 26 6
39. Peru 17 4
SOURCE: Ray Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1980s, p. 37. Although world
population figures have expanded, relative rankings (for the criteria of this table) remain the same in
Latin America. Based on the 1990 census, only Venezuela would be added to the table.
The next factor for critical mass is land area (see Table 4). Generally, the
larger the territory the greater the available raw resources and arable land.
Considerations such as large desert areas or tundra reduce the available area
for cultivation, thereby reducing the possible maximum score for territory.
On the other hand, a bonus value (10 points) is added to those states which
occupy crucial strategic locations on or near critical sea lanes or ocean choke-
points and are perceived capable of exercising some capability to exercise









1. USSR 8,600 50
4. United States 3,600 50
5. Brazil 3,300 50
8. Argentina* 1,100 25
13. Mexico 764 10
19. Peru 496 7
25. Colombia 440 5
26. Bolivia 424 5
31. Venezuela 352 5
36. Chile* 286 15
52. Paraguay 157 5
65. Ecuador 106 5
77. Guyana 83 5
81. Uruguay 72 5
85. Nicaragua 57 5
86. Surinam 55 5
92. Panama* 29 10
SOURCE: Ray Cline, World Power Tend and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s, pgs. 41-43.
The addition of the values for population and territory provides a new
rank list for the initial factor of critical mass. Countries with territories
greater than 500,000 square miles and populations of more than 15 million
were included in this list (see Table 5). While it is only a crude indicator, a








1. USSR 50 50 100
2. U. S. 50 50 100
3. Brazil 30 50 80
10. Argentina 6 25 31
16. Mexico 17 10 27
36. Peru 4 7 11
37. Colombia 6 5 11
SOURCE: Rav Cline. World Power Trends and U.S. :oreign Policy for the 1980s, p.46.
Adding economic strength to our perspective helps to refine the crude
indicator of critical mass. One reason why the economic capacity of a nation
is important is because it serves as an indication of that nation's potential
ability to support its military during a conflict and still maintain a high level
of economic activity. Measurement of economic strength is difficult, though,
since so many indicators can play into the total, that is the summation, of an
economy. In addition, what may be considered an indication of economic
strength under certain conditions may prove to be the opposite under a
different set of conditions. To narrow the scope of this task, a range of
indicators was selected which stress the ability of one nation to exert influence
upon others.
The first measurement of economic capability is a nation's Gross National
Product (GNP). However, any special strengths or weaknesses of an economy
are not readily apparent when cloaked in the aggregate number known as
GNP. Therefore, factors used to modify this measure are grouped under the
following categories: energy, critical minerals, industrial strength, food
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production and foreign trade. A base score was awarded for the GNP of each
country. If an economy had specific strengths additional points were
awarded, for a maximum of 20 units, in each of the five categories. Specific









IS.ARABIA 10 — ~ — 10
7 VENEZUEL. 3 — ~ ~ 3
19 MEXICO 1 — ~ — 1
25 ARGENTIN ~ — ~ 1 1
36 U.S.
-8 2 -2 4 -4
SOURCE: Ray Cline. World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 67.
TABLE 7
CRITICAL NON FUEL MINERALS ASSESSMENT
RANK/
COUNTRY
IRON ORE COPPER BAUXITE CHRO-
MITE
URANIUM TOTAL
1AUSTRAL 8 — 3 ~ — 11
3 BRAZIL 6 -1 — ~ — 5
6 CHILE — 3 — — — 3
14 PERU — 1 — — — 1
16 SURINA — — 1 ~ — 1
20
VENEZUE
1 — — — — 1
26 U.S.
-3 -1 -3 -2 3 -6






STEEL ALUMINUM CEMENT TOTAL
1.U.S.S.R 10 1 5 16
2. U.S. 8 5 3 16
10. BRAZIL 1 ~ 1 2
16. MEXICO — ~ 1 1
SOURCE: Ray Cline. World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 76.
TABLE 9







l.U.S. 25.4 51.5 2.3 79.2 20
3. ARGENTIN 5.6 8.8 0.2 14.6 4
16. PERU
- 0.9 - 0.9 NEGLIGIBLE - 1.4
17. CUBA
- 0.8 - 0.4 - 0.2 - 1.4
18. MEXICO NEGLIGIBLE - 1.5 NEGLIGIBLE 1.5
20. VENEZUEL
- 0.7 • 1.0 NEGLIGIBLE • 1.7
21. BRAZIL
- 3.3 1.2 0.3 • 1.8
SOURCE: Rav Cline. World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 79.
TABLE 10
WORLD TRENDS (BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
RANK/
COUNTRY
EXPORTS IMPORTS TOTAL TRADE POWER
WEIGHT
l.U.S. 143.7 183.r 326.8 20
21. BRAZIL 12.7 15.0 27.7 2
29. VENEZUELA 9.1 8.7 17.8 1






















1U.S. 100 -4 -6 16 20 20 146
12BRAZI 6 ~ 5 2 ~ 2 15
22ARGEN 2 1 -- ~ 4 - 7
23VENEZ
UELA
1 3 1 ~ ~ 1 6
28MEXI
CO
3 1 ~ 1 — — 5
37 CHILE 1 ~ 3 ~ — ~ 4
48 PERU 1 ~ 1 — — ~ 2
58COLOM 1 ~ ~ — ~ ~ 1
62SURINA — ~ 1 ~ ~ — 1
SOURCE: Rav Cline. World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 83-85.
TABLE 12
CONSOLIDATED RANK LIST







1. UNITED STATES 100 146 246
4. BRAZIL 80 15 95
14. ARGENTINA 31 7 38
16. MEXICO 27 5 32
33. CHILE 15 4 19
44. PERU 11 2 13
46. COLOMBIA 11 1 12
47. VENEZUELA 5 6 11
64. SURINAME 5 1 6
72. JAMAICA — 1 1
SOURCE: Ray Cline, World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, pgs 87-89.
Expanding Cline's formula to include military capability as an element of
national power (Pp = C + E + M), weighting is based upon the combined
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factors of nuclear (100 possible points) and conventional (100 possible points)
capabilities, for a maximum possible score of 200 power points. Although the
values accorded both nuclear and conventional weapons capability are highly
subjective, perceptions of military might are an important aspect of
international relations and are extremely influential in regional balances of
power.
Few nations retain the ability to bring nuclear weapons to bear upon their
neighbors, but it is considered that the deterrent effect of having such a
capability exerts a political pressure of such a magnitude sufficient that it need
be rated on a separate scale from conventional weapons. Although a
discussion on the politics and nature of nuclear weapons is beyond the scope
of this chapter, it should be noted that the risks associated with the use of
nuclear weapons and the level of warfare at which their actual use might be
considered can also be regarded as limiting factors. Nevertheless, the
perception of power associated with ownership of a credible nuclear weapons
capability is greatly enhanced over perceptions of power associated solely with
conventional forces.
On the other hand, a more flexible and tangible role is played by non-
nuclear conventional forces. Most of the world's nation's support some form
of an armed force. Although few of these nations have forces with power
projection capabilities, self-defense or domestic control being their primary
purpose, many do retain a relatively high level of capability. Comparisons,
however, can be difficult since estimating military power can be extremely
subjective.
In Latin America, only Brazil and Argentina have mustered an effort at
joining the nuclear club. Since their capability is still largely relegated to the
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research stage, no comparisons shall be attempted in this arena. More
appropriately, an evaluation of conventional combat capabilities can be made
by comparing four elements of strength: manpower quality; weapon
effectiveness; infrastructure and logistic support; and organizational quality.
Comparisons in each category can be very subjective since it is difficult to
weight such intangibles as experience or level of readiness and training. In
addition, obtaining accurate information on foreign forces can also be
difficult. In any case, a relative scale of capability can still be established. The
following table is based on Cline's figures:
TABLE 13
NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY FORCES



































i.u.s.s.R. 4335 0.7 0.9 1 0.7 0.5 0.7 3,035
UNITED STATES AND NATO
i us. 2,068 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1,861
LATIN AMERICA
1. BRAZIL 274 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 110
2. CUBA 159 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 64
3. ARGEN 133 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 53
4
MEXICO
97 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 39
SOURCE: Ray Cline, World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p.125-128.
Strategic reach adds to a nation's combat capabilities. A function of
geographic position and a nation's capacity for power projection, strategic
reach acts as a multiplier in computing military power. Therefore, Cline used
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conversion factors to convert the values associated with combat capability
into that of total conventional military capability. Negligible reach was
indicated by a multiplier of 0.01; limited reach was indicated by a multiplier of
0.02, while the reach of the United States was indicated by a multiplier of 0.05.
Additionally, a maximum of 10 bonus points were added to those nations
which devoted greater than 8 percent of their GNP to military expenditures
(scale of effort).
TABLE 14





















1 U.S.S.R. 3,035 0.03 91 100 6 197
2. U. S. 1,861 0.05 93 95 — 188
25. BRAZIL 110 0.02 3 — — 3
31. CUBA 64 0.03 2 — — 2
32.ARGENT 53 0.03 2 — — 2
45. MEXICO 39 0.01 — —















l.U.S. 100 146 188 434
4. BRAZIL 80 15 3 98
14. ARGENTINA 31 7 2 40
21. MEXICO 27 5 — 32
35. CHILE 15 4 — 19
51. PERU 11 2 — 13
52. COLOMBIA 11 1 — 12
53. VENEZUELA 5 6 — 11
67. SURINAME 5 1 — 6
74. CUBA — — 2 2
75. JAMAICA — 1 — 1
SOURCE: RAY Cline, World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 138-139.
Based upon the most concrete elements of power, Table 15 provides a
rough guide to the level of influence, or leverage, which the listed nations
exert in the international arena. The table does not, however, take into
account some of the very important intangibles which can shape and affect a
state's ability to reach and effectively use its potential capabilities. Therefore,
there are two additional elements of power which Cline considers critical
factors in his formula; they are the elements of national strategy and national
will. National strategy (S) is defined as the process of political decision-
making which establishes the goals and objectives of a state to advance its
national interest in the international environment. National will (W) is that
degree of resolve with which a state's citizens can be mobilized to support the
defense and foreign policy decisions of their government. National will is
then "the foundation upon which national strategy is formulated and carried
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through to success."141 If a coherent national strategy is lacking or if there is
little organized national political will to carry out a strategy, a nation's ability
to effectively use its resources can be seriously hampered in the international
arena.
Measurement of national strategy and national will is highly subjective.
However, an accurate assessment of these two elements can help more clearly
depict a nation's true power base than can an assessment of the tangible
elements alone. The interesting fact is that the addition of these two
elements (S + W) can significantly alter the sum total of the other elements (C
+ E + M) when used as a multiplier (C + E + M) x (S + W). For example, since
a maximum of 2 points may be assigned (1 point for national strategy and 1
point for national will), if a nation were to receive the maximum number of
points for these two intangible elements its originally assessed score would be
doubled. A combined score of 1 point would not change the original
assessment, and an index of less than 1 would reduce it. Only nations with
clear-cut strategic plans for exercising power or expanding its level of
influence, combined with a socially, psychologically and politically cohesive
citizenry, could expect to maximize its base of power. Those nation's with a
less cohesive or confused strategic policy and a feeble national will may have
of an impact on the regional or international balance of power.
The fabric of national will is generally based upon the degree of cultural
integration of a nation's people and their feeling of belonging to that nation;
the effective strength of national leadership; and the perception of relevance
of national strategy to national interests by a nation's people. Of these aspects,
141 Cline, World Power Trends and U .S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s, p. 143.
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research shows that cultural uniformity and national territoriality are the
most significant factors affecting nationalism and the process of national
integration. 142 Homogeneity in language, religion and ethnicity often
contributes to national integration, whereas cultural diversity can make
integration more difficult. The greater a sense of historical identity with a
state and the less that a territory is divided by tribal or regional issues, the
greater the loyalty that a people will feel towards that state. Geographical
contiguity and the state of a nation's communication and transportation
systems can also affect national integration.
To account for these variables within the element of national will, Cline
allocated values based on relative importance as follows143 :
1. Level of national integration
a. Cultural integration 25%
b. Territorial integration 8%
2. Strength of national leadership
a. Governmental policy capability 17%
b. Level of social discipline 17%
3. Relevance of strategy to national interest 33%
The total of 100% still equates to a maximum rating of 1 while the norm is
0.5. As previously noted, the addition of the scores for national strategy and
national will can dramatically affect an assessment of national power when
used as a multiplier in the formula Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W). This is
illustrated in the following consolidated rank list.
142 Cline. World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s, p. 167.
143 Cline. World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s, p. 171.
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TABLE 16












l.U.S.S.R. 382 0.7 0.5 1.2 458
2. U.S. 434 0.3 0.4 0.7 304
3. BRAZIL 98 0.6 0.8 1.4 137
22ARGENTIN
A
40 0.5 0.3 0.8 32
23 CHILE 19 0.6 0.7 1.3 25
28. MEXICO 32 0.3 0.4 0.7 22
45 PERU 13 0.5 0.5 1.0 13
48 COLOMBIA 12 0.5 0.5 1.0 12
55VENEZUEL
A
11 0.4 0.4 0.8 9
68 SURINAME 6 0.3 0.3 0.6 4
70. CUBA 2 0.7 0.5 1.2 2
75. JAMAICA 1 0.4 0.5 0.9 1
SOURCE: Ray Cline, World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980S, p. 173-174.
As a result of factoring in the elements of national strategy and national will,
despite changes in overall ratings, only the relative rankings of Chile and
Mexico are changed within the Latin American region. When compared
against all other nations, relative rankings traded up and down. In any case,
clearly Brazil was assessed as the preeminent power within Latin America.
When compared against powers outside the region, Brazil again ranked very
high, especially when the more intangible factors of national strategy and
national will were considered.
Now, a decade after World Power Trends and Foreign Policy for the 1980s
was published, significant changes in world population, international
political boundaries, national economies, military capabilities, governments,
and even political sentiment within every region of the world would surely
revise the picture presented by Cline if he were to conduct another
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assessment of world power trends today. Since our focus is on Latin
America, however, a revised consolidated rank list that compares all nations
of the world is not required. Only the relative ranking of nations within the
Western Hemisphere need be emphasized. Such a reassessment would show
that while significant change had indeed occurred within the region, a
realignment in the balance of power had not.
B. RANKING LATIN AMERICAN NAVIES
Having identified those Latin American nations which currently possess
the greatest national power, what level of naval capability do these nations
maintain and which of these is the most potent? This question is largely
answered by Michael Morris, a professor of political science at Clemson
University, who wrote a book entitled Expansion of Third-World Navies .
His work documents the expansion of Third-World naval forces, the roles of
these forces and their impact on the regional and international balance of
power. A cross-regional comparison of maritime capabilities completes his
analysis. Published in 1987, the book is an independent study which, in
the process of researching the national power base of navies, corroborates
many of Cline's findings.
Morris ranked Third-World navies within the structure of a hierarchy.
Divided into six categories, or groups, each category represents a different
level of naval capability. The higher the category in which a navy was
ranked, the more ambitious a role that that navy was considered capable of
assuming, especially in terms of sea-keeping and geographic reach.
Initial classification within a category was based solely upon quantitative
criteria relating to weapons, systems and platforms of each navy. These
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rankings were then refined by qualitative criteria such as age and modernity.
A high rank could be merited only when both quantitative and qualitative
criteria were impressive.
In a third stage of classification, factors related to naval power were taken
into consideration, including tonnage, naval aviation, marines, separate coast
guard organizations and domestic production of naval weaponry. Generally
speaking, such criteria are often non-existent in the lower-ranked navies.
Since the correlation between original naval rank and supplementary criteria
tended to be strong, reclassification was the exception at this stage. 144
In a fourth stage of classification, national power-base indicators were used
to judge the ability of each nation to sustain an effective fleet. The stronger a
nation's infrastructure, the greater its ability to acquire, manage and maintain
a more sophisticated and competent navy. National power indicators also
help detect whether a navy is robust or declining in power.
Listed in ascending order of capability, the six ranks of naval classification
are described in Table 17.
144 Michael A. Morris, Fxpansion of Third-World Navies. (New York, NY: St. Martin's
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In his hierarchy, Morris ranked 104 Third-World navies. Out of this total
number, he ranked 62 of them as token navies, while only 3 merited
classification in the top rank. Within each of the six rank classifications there
is also disparity in capability, with some rising to the top of their category, on
the verge of being reclassified to the next rank, while others find themselves
near the bottom of the category in which they have been classified. Expansion
or contraction of budgetary commitments, number, type, age and
diversification in weapons, systems and platforms, all act as indicators to the
hierarchical ordering within a rank.
Still, each rank is distinct. Although there may be an overlap in
capabilities between ranks, such as an emphasis on territorial defense between
Rank 3 and Rank 4 navies which vary only in degree of capability, the
threshold between each rank is substantial. In other words, aspiration to a
higher rank would require a nation's political and financial commitment to
acquire and maintain a more powerful, hence more expensive, navy. Those
nations with grand aspirations but tight purse strings are unlikely to succeed
in expanding the infrastructure, obtaining the equipment, and providing the
training that is necessary to achieve the status of a higher rank navy. In
addition, because of the increasing costs of warships, lead time for procuring
ships and equipment, as well as the heavy costs associated with long-term
maintenance, the threshold between ranks grows exponentially. So, while
the commitment necessary to cross the threshold between a Rank 1 and Rank
2 navy is substantial, it is no where near as intense as the sustained
commitment necessary to cross the threshold between a Rank 5 and Rank 6
navy.
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Using 1978 dollars and exchange rates and data obtained from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), typical annual
expenditures for Rank 6 navies is $250-$500 million; Rank 5 navies is $150-
$250+ million; Rank 4 navies is $70-$200 million; Rank 3 navies is $11-$100
million; Rank 2 navies is at least $10 million; and Rank 1 navies is several
million dollars, at most. 145 With costs like these, Third-World nations who
are expanding their navies are normally candidates only for the next rank. In
fact, spending has generally been fairly stable, with nations maintaining a
commitment to their navies at a level which allows them to retain their
current ranking. Few navies are allowed to decline to the extent that they
drop in rank. 146
A significant problem that must be faced by many Third-World navies,
especially those in Latin America, is the aging of their fleets. Often bought
second-hand after World War II, these vessels are becoming increasingly
difficult to maintain and repair. The cost to import, license, or otherwise
build new warships and submarines is increasingly costly and time-
consuming. Plans to refurbish, buy, or build replacements are at the mercy of
budgetary constraints and domestic and foreign political concerns.
In Latin America, new appropriations were generally curtailed in the latter
part of the 1980s because of fiscal and economic instability. As a result, they
have had to make do with some equipment that is overdue for replacement.
One example is the Brazilian light aircraft carrier, Minas Gerais. A British
Colossus class carrier that was first placed into service in 1945, it was
purchased from Great Britain in 1956 and refitted in 1960. Plans to purchase
145 Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies, p. 82.
146 Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies, p. 51.
98
one or two small carriers to replace this vessel were canceled in 1985 and a
refit was postponed in 1989. 147 When I visited Rio de Janeiro aboard the
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in the Fall of 1990, the Minas
Gerais, which had been laid-up in port, put out to sea for one day as a
showing of the flag. However, it is doubtful that she could have supported
any real or extended operations.
As seen from the previous table, Rank 1, or token, navies are very weak.
They may possess a few small coastal craft and have little other than a formal
organizational structure. Rank 2, or constabulary, navies possess a
combination of coastal patrol craft (PC) and fast patrol craft (FAC) in varying
numbers. Although these light forces have limited coastal enforcement
capabilities, their armaments of missiles and torpedoes can be dangerous
when used effectively against larger warships.
Rank 3, or inshore territorial defense, navies use corvettes in addition to
FACs. Larger and more capable than FACs, corvettes provide a relatively
inexpensive complement to the few frigates and destroyers they may possess.
Only Ecuador currently also possesses submarines. Still, while their range
and at-sea capabilities are more extensive than FACs, the use of corvettes is
generally restricted to coastal missions.
Rank 4, or offshore territorial defense, navies do not have the depth of
higher echelon navies, but they do possess a diversified complement of
frigates, destroyers and submarines. Frigates are the logical step in price and
capability for Third-World nations expanding their navies. They possess the
147Bernard Prezelin, ed., and A. D. Baker, III, English language editor of The Naval
Institute Guide to Comba t FWrs of the World 1990/1991. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1990), pgs. 37-38.
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ability for deep-water missions and can easily be retrofitted for new weapons
systems. When complemented by destroyers, a well-trained Rank 4 navy can
pose considerable threat to larger warships. In addition, Rank 4 navies often
possess conventional submarines. These submarines are particularly difficult
to detect in the shallow waters near a coast and could create a mettlesome
problem for surface vessels intending to trespass territorial waters.
Rank 5, or adjacent force projection, navies possess enough of the major
warships and submarines necessary to effectively patrol seas adjacent to
national zones. Chile and Peru, for example, aspire to control their respective
EEZs. 148 In addition to the capabilities of lower ranked navies, Rank 5 navies
possess cruisers and a naval aviation capability. Aircraft are generally limited
to helicopters, but they provide a strong anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capability. Maritime patrol aircraft are used for reconnaissance. Combat
aircraft are a luxury which few Third-World countries can afford.
Rank 6, or regional force projection, navies are well represented in all
categories of naval and naval aviation equipment. They are outfitted with
vessels as diverse as supply ships to mine-warfare and amphibious craft. The
depth of their navies is partially supported by both licensed and indigenously
designed and produced ships, aircraft, equipment, and weapons. The size and
capability of their navies enable them to support a multi-mission role which,
although focused on territorial defense, is capable of some offshore power
projection. When compared against maritime powers, such as the United
States, however, even Rank 6 navies are at a decided disadvantage. This gap
was illustrated by the British during the Falklands War, in 1982, when they
148 Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies, p. 44.
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bottled-up most of the Argentine fleet in port. Still, the Argentines managed
to sink the British destroyer Sheffield and they forced the United Kingdom to
deploy the majority of the Royal Navy to engage in the conflict.
Table 18 exhibits the Third-World naval hierarchy. Nations are listed by
rank, region, and rank within region. In reviewing this table, the point is
quickly brought home that most Third-World nations have only a very
rudimentary naval capability. On the other hand, with the exception of the
Caribbean region, the table indicates that Latin America has a strong naval
tradition... certainly, by Third-World standards. Two of the three Rank 6
navies; two of the five Rank 5 navies; three of the ten Rank 4 navies; and
four of the twelve Rank 3 navies are from Latin America. In other words,
over one-third of the Third-World's strongest navies are of Latin American
origin. So, while the Latin American naval bloc cannot be compared to the
cooperative might of NATO's, their capabilities are significant, nevertheless,
and is the strongest of any region in the Third-World.
The Brazilian Navy is ranked as the most powerful in Latin America and
vies with the Indian Navy as the most powerful navy in the Third-World.
Argentina is ranked next, with Peru and Chile in more distant pursuit. As is
the usual case in Latin America, the Brazilian Navy is a much smaller cadre
than is their army, but the size of the national economy enables the Brazilians
to support a well-diversified maritime branch. A large shipping industry and
an expanding arms industry also enable the Brazilians a modicum of self-
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In summary, our strategic survey of Latin America has helped to flesh out
which of the nations within the hemisphere are the most powerful and also
to identify those with the greatest maritime capabilities. It comes as no real
surprise that the "ABC" countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile rank at the
top. However, Brazil, scored significantly higher than all of the rest. It is
therefore appropriate that the United States should especially endeavor to
develop stronger ties with Brazil, such as by brokering a more favorable naval
relationship. In turn, the United States would find herself building the
infrastructure to a stronger and more cooperative alliance within her own
hemisphere; one that would better complement and support the U.S. and
other existing alliances, such as NATO, against the new security challenges of
the post-Cold War era.
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IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN ARMAMENTS
COOPERATION
This study has thus far served as an indicator of where the United States
should assign greater priority regarding regional interests. Having completed
an analysis for a greater focus within our own hemisphere, with the
assessment that Brazil is the key nation to the United States in Latin America,
the discussion now moves from the conceptual dynamics of a cooperative
maritime strategy to the more narrow topic of international armaments
cooperation. In essence, the first part of this thesis has served as an
introduction to the last part by providing a bridge between the potential for a
greater cooperative military alliance between the United States and Latin
America at the operational level to the consideration of the potential for a
cooperative partnership at the more intimate level of research, development
and production. It is this author's perception that only through the
establishment of a cooperative attitude, as expressed in a revised maritime
strategy, can there be a basis for support of the intensely close relationship(s)
required for success in the arena of joint ventures and armaments
cooperation.
An overview of arms transfers and the U.S.-Latin American relationship
serves as an introduction to the topic of international arms cooperation by
emphasizing the difference between Latin America as a recipient and the
United States as a supplier. A discussion on the U.S. defense industrial base
answers the question regarding why the U.S. is interested in researching
alternatives to a total reliance on national production of armaments. We
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then commence our inquiry into the potential for armaments cooperation
between the United States and Latin America by a review of experiences and
lessons learned in U.S. transatlantic armaments cooperation with Europe. It
is interesting to note that just as our previous focus on a revised maritime
strategy began in Europe so does our topic on international armaments
cooperation.
A case study of Brazil describes the development of an indigenous Third-
World arms industry and illustrates the emergence of a new base of
armaments suppliers with which the United States needs to contend. This
discussion is intended to illustrate the leap that is required to complete a
metamorphosis from a recipient to a supplier and, ultimately, to a partner.
Our original question regarding the potential for international armaments
cooperation between the United States and Latin America can then be
answered.
A. ARMS TRANSFERS
Arms transfers represent one method by which the United States
promotes its national security interests, helps to fund research and the
development of new technologies, and enables the use of economies of scale
for the production of less expensive defense-related products. In the early
twentieth century, major armaments suppliers were traditionally European,
but two world wars caused enough disruption to the European industrial base
to change this pattern. The United States emerged as the new leader in the
production and exportation of armaments. Over the last three decades, the
primary competitor the United States faced in the arms market was the Soviet
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Union. A large gap existed in the volume of trade between the superpower
share of the arms market and that of the secondary tier of suppliers, such as
Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain. However, the dissolution of the
Soviet Union has altered the size of the former Soviet Union's share of the
market into the much smaller shares of its newly independent states and the
United States has emerged as the clear-cut leader in the world arms market.
On the other hand, competition in the market has increased over the last
decade, especially with the entrance of new Third World suppliers into the
world arms market. The proliferation of arms and suppliers has global
ramifications that will affect U.S. security planning for the future and will
certainly have long-term implications for the U.S. defense industrial base.
The United States would prefer to remain the dominant actor in the
global arms transfer arena. First, a limited number of arms suppliers implies
a smaller potential number of total weapons and weapons systems that may
be introduced into the world. As the dominant source of a limited number of
suppliers, the United States can more readily influence the dispersion of arms
in type, quantity and recipient, thereby controlling the rate of proliferation. If
the United States can control the transfer of arms, it is hoped that the
potential for conflict, and/or conflict escalation, can be reduced. Another
reason for a continued U.S. desire for domination of the arms market is that
self-sufficiency is an exceedingly expensive proposition, especially as the
sophistication and technological complexity of weapons grow. By
monopolizing the market, the United States can defray expenses through
economies of scale and through the foreign revenues that are brought in by
sales. Unlike the former Soviet Union, the United States has relied mostly
on private enterprise, in the belief that profit-motivated industries are more
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capable of producing quality goods than public concerns. Research and
development (R&D), procurement, and maintenance and service becomes
much less of a burden for the taxpayer when the unit costs are lowered by
volume sales overseas. Ironically, the U.S. desire to ease world tension by
controlling proliferation presents a dilemma if its own defense base is reliant
upon a pliant world market.
Admirable though these U.S. intentions may be, the nationalist base of
many nations has been a driving factor in their acquisition of armaments.
This does not mean that the U.S. imposition of values and requirements to
arms transfers has not had beneficial results. Indeed, the judicious
application and enforcement of U.S. arms policies, when tied to defined vital
national security goals, can make a difference. Unfortunately, one cannot
ensure that a friend today is a friend tomorrow. In addition, while selective
transfers can help stabilize arms flow to less desirable recipients, without a
monopoly on the market it is difficult to maintain control.
Indeed, an overemphasis on "U.S." values has worked against the bidding
of the United States. Defense is big business, and though the United States
has tried to shun the title of "merchant of death" by applying more
restrictions to arms transfers, others are less willing to tie foreign policy to
commercial policy by what many see as misplaced morality. The result of
U.S. restraint has sometimes had the adverse effect of forming a vacuum, a
void filled by the diversification of suppliers and indigenous production.
This can be illustrated by a brief study of the U.S.-Latin American relationship
since the 1950s.
1. US Arms Transfers Policy In Latin America
Prior to World War II, the majority of munitions and military
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resources that Latin American nations desired were obtained from European
nations, especially France, Germany and Great Britain. Latin American
militaries also received training from European military advisors. In
addition, many of the most promising Latin American military officers were
sent to schools in Europe, while others were sent to act as observers. As a
result, the military doctrines of many Latin American nations were a direct
reflection of the European military doctrine in which they had trained.
The advent of World War II precipitated a change. Wartime Europe
could no longer spare the resources it had formerly exported to places such as
Latin America. On the other hand, the increased security requirements of the
United States advocated that the U.S. obtain stronger ties with her
hemispheric neighbors. Through the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, the transfer of
arms to other nations in return for basing rights and access to strategic
materials was authorized, setting the tone for the development of a collective
security arrangement. It was not long before the United States had usurped
Europe as the major supplier of arms and military assistance to the region of
Latin America.
The basis for collective security in the Western Hemisphere was set
through the establishment of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance, or more simply, the Rio Treaty. Carrying over the cooperative
legacy of World War II, the United States continued to be the predominant
supplier of arms to Latin America in the years following the war. Clearing
her left-over World War II stockpiles, the United States sold armaments to
Latin America at a very inexpensive price or gave them away outright.
However, it was not until the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that the United
States adopted an articulate policy on arms transfers which authorized the use
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of funds for collective defense in Latin America. 149
Since the 1950s, U.S. arms transfer and security assistance policies, vis-
a-vis Latin America, have changed with the prevailing beliefs and attitudes of
each U.S. administration, funding priorities and the perceived threat.
Reviewed in light of these parameters, the consistencies, and inconsistencies,
of the U.S. relationship with Latin American nations becomes more clear.
Michael Klare contends that Latin America has been the "testing ground" for
America's arms policies ever since World War n. He attributes this to the
perceived U.S. impression of homogeneity in Latin American states and due
to their geographical proximity. 150 Although this is a rather cynical
perspective of the history of United States arms transfers to the region, it does
bear witness to a certain inconsistency of American policy and the character of
security assistance and foreign military sales to the region. These trends fall
into roughly five chronological categories that describe the phases of U.S.
arms policy in Latin America from the end of World War II until the present.
From 1951 to 1960, the United States reacted to international issues
from a bi-polar perspective. "Dulles and others considered Latin America to
be a prime target for the Soviet conspiracy because the region was of crucial
importance to the United States; George Kennan feared it was a fertile
breeding ground where the Communists could 'broadcast their seeds of
provocation and hatred and busily tend the plants which sprout in such vigor
and profusion'."151 The Mutual Security Act enabled funds to be used for
149 Michael T. Klare, Ampriran Arms Supprmarket. (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1984), p. 85.
150 Klarp. Ampriran Arms Supermarket. 77.
151 Richard H. Immerman, Thp CIA in Cuatpmala: The Foreign Policy of Intervpntion.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 10.
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collective security in Latin America - in the name of "containment." To
become eligible for these funds, Latin American nations were required to sign
the Bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Pact with the United States. In 1952,
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru became members of the pact. In
1953, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay signed on. Honduras and
Nicaragua signed in 1954; Guatemala and Haiti in 1955; and finally Bolivia
became a member of the pact in 1958. These agreements designated the
United States as the sole provider of military advisory missions. The United
States began to provide the nations the type of assistance that could best
combat the external threat, or invasion, that the United States envisioned the
Soviets might launch in Latin America. The core of U.S. equipment
transferred to Latin America was geared towards coastal defense and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). 152
"However, the successful revolution in Cuba, as well as guerrilla
insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Algeria, Colombia and Venezuela, caused
U.S. policy makers to rethink their focus on an outward looking hemispheric
defense."153 President Kennedy's administration revised the U.S. arms
export program to Latin America to counter guerrilla tactics. This shifted the
emphasis of American exports from maritime surveillance and ASW
equipment to riot control and counterinsurgency gear. Military Assistance
Program (MAP) funds were made available for grant or credit-assisted sales of
both this hardware and for training. Kennedy also believed that through
development, Communist subversion could be deterred; so the Alliance for
152 Klare, American Arms Supermarket, p. 88.
153 Paul L. Ferrari, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Raul L. Madrid, U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and
Contractors. (Washington, D.C.: Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc., 1987),163.
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Progress linked counter-insurgency to socio-economic development. Robert
McNamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, said, "Security is development,
and without development there can be no security."154
The United States tried to qualify what was considered an appropriate
level of sophistication of weapons systems for Latin America's needs. The
U.S. also tried to forestall the sale of equipment that was considered too hi-
tech, and therefore "wasteful and unnecessary," because it would divert the
already scarce resources of a developing nation. In 1965, for instance, the
United States refused to sell F5s to Peru, who wanted to replace their aging
F86's, because the U.S. did not feel that supersonic jets were either desirable or
necessary in Latin America. The Peruvians short-circuited the U.S. attempt to
direct their military imports by transacting a contract for Mirage V's with
France, on credit. Various lobbyists on Capitol Hill began to look askance at
the U.S. policy of self-restraint as a movement towards diversification of arms
suppliers developed in Latin America. Argentina and Brazil also started to
expand their indigenous arms industry. "U.S. restrictions on arms transfers
that took effect after the mid-1960's were a contributing factor to the
subsequent deterioration of U.S.-Latin American cooperation in sustaining an
inter-American security system."155
In 1968, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Military Sales Act,
restricting the sale of sophisticated weapons to most Third World nations. It
also put a $75 million annual credit cap on military aid to Latin America,
requesting that no aid be appropriated for those countries ruled by dictators.
154 Klare, American Arms Supermarket. 88.
155 David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres, "U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy and Security in
Latin America," in Arms Transfers and American Foreign Policy, ed. , Andrew J. Pierre, (New
York: New York University Press,1979), 163.
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The Nixon and Ford administrations, opposed to the limitations on arms and
assistance, made a strong effort to counter the loss of "clients," restore
goodwill, and preserve access to Latin nations by becoming more responsive
to foreign requests and abolishing or circumventing restrictive legislation. 156
Congress was still not amenable to lifting restrictions. So, "While the U.S.
unilaterally maintained restrictions on sales and credits..., the West
Europeans sold $1.3 billion of arms between 1968 and 1972. This represented
84 percent of Latin American arms purchases (excluding Cuba)."157
In 1973, Peru ordered 200 T-55 tanks from the Soviet Union, but even
this would not sway Congress to comply with the administration's requests to
lift restrictions. On 5 June 1973, Nixon invoked Section IV of the Foreign
Military Sales Act, a waiver on sophisticated weapons sales, on behalf of the
"national security of the United States," enabling him to sell F5E's to
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. By invoking Section IV
for other sales, FMS with Latin America quadrupled under Nixon. While
only $48 million in Latin American sales were recorded in 1971, total sales
had jumped to $212 million by 1974.158
The U.S. revitalization of arms transfers was short-lived as a result of
an increased U.S. focus on human rights violations which questioned the
morality of arms sales abroad, invoking responses from the U.S. Congress, the
media and the public. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976 prohibited security assistance to those countries that had
156 Ronfeldt and Sereseres, "U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin
America," 163.
157 Ferrari, et al., U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors. 164.
158 Klare.Ameriran Arms Supermarket. 91-93.
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systematically violated human rights and placed a ceiling on world-wide
sales. It also terminated, by 1977, grant assistance and military advisory
groups to many Latin American countries. 159 On 19 May 1977, President
Carter announced a new policy of arms restraint. Hence, FMS sales and
Security Assistance were banned to Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and made
Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala ineligible for Foreign Military Sales
Credits. In 1980, with only $32 million in sales, weapons deliveries dropped
to their lowest numbers since 1952.
The Carter administration's commitment to arms restraint soon
started to falter. Exceptions were made as events such as the Nicaraguan
Revolution, Cuban involvement in Angola, and European arms sales to
Latin America eroded U.S. restraint. 160 In 1979, surface-to-air missiles and
Vulcan anti-aircraft guns were sold to Ecuador and F5E fighters were sold to
Mexico in 1980. U.S. military and economic assistance to El Salvador rose
from $15 million to $55 million between 1980 and 1981. 161
Lars Schoultz states that President Carter's administration damaged
U.S. interests in Latin America as a result of its lack of consensus. The
Reagan administration realized that Carter had not maintained a coherent
policy and strove to simplify policy-making by "eliminating divergent policy
perspectives" and "permitting only one point of view to be represented
among the individuals making U.S. policy toward Latin America."162 The
159 Ronfeldt and Sereseres, "U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy and Security in Latin
America," 132.
160 Ferrari, et al., U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors. 165.
161 Klare, American Arms Supprmarket. 95.
162 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 9.
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Reagan administration did not believe that human rights should be the
centerpiece of foreign policy, but called for a more balanced and less publicly
confrontational policy on human rights. "It recommended that emphasis be
given to terrorism as inhuman repression and that human rights concerns
not be allowed to 'paralyze or unduly delay decisions on issues where human
rights concerns conflict with other vital U.S. interests'."163
Maintaining this perspective, President Reagan issued a directive in
July 1981 that countermanded Carter's 1977 restriction on arms transfers. He
declared that "the United States must, in today's world, not only strengthen
its own military capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to
strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms and other forms
of security assistance."164 Aid and equipment were thus extended to
heretofore restricted countries, often offered as a reward for improved human
rights records. The arms export ban was lifted from Argentina, sales were
made to Guatemala and even F-16's were sold to Venezuela. However, in
1985, 80% of all FMS agreements in Latin America were with Central
American nations, a derivative of the guerrilla warfare in Central America.
Emphasizing counter-insurgency hardware, the bulk of U.S. arms transfers
was sent to Central America. 165 However, the attempts by the Reagan
administration to regain the United States' primacy as supplier and regulator
of arms to Latin America, lost during the Carter years, has been slow. A
resurgence of European suppliers, along with a growing self-sufficiency of
163 Harold Molineu, U.S. Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism.
(Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, Inc. 1986), 144-145.
164 Klare, American Arms Supermarket. 97.
165 Ferrari, et al., U.S. Arms Exports: Policies and Contractors. 167.
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local powerhouses, has prevented a complete U.S. dominance of the market.
B. U.S. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
A global demand for arms and technology remains high, but the world-
wide recession has slowed sales. The U.S., Russia, France, Britain, and China
- the Big Five supplier nations - sold 44 percent less in 1991 than in 1990,
down from $41.6 billion to $24.7 billion. 166 This downward trend is also a
result of the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Total
U.S. arms transfers dropped 22 percent. 167 The recent contraction in global
arms sales is probably only as temporary as the world recession, but it has
certainly increased the competitiveness of the arms industry and increased
economic motivations for sales.
The motivations that drive arms transfers vary from supplier to supplier.
Arms transfers are both an important foreign policy tool and a commercial
tool. Along a continuum, the smaller suppliers, such as Brazil, are generally
more drawn to the commercial aspects of arms transfers while the more
developed suppliers are relatively more concerned with the foreign policy
aspects of arms transfers. Still, the developed world is increasingly drawn to
arms transfers for commercial reasons. Economic pressures motivate all
nations to sell arms. Foreign exchange earned through arms exports help to
offset balance-of-payment deficits. Arms exports also enable longer weapons
production runs, thereby relieving fixed and capital costs by reducing the
burden of expenditures, such as for research and development. Longer
166 Mark Sommer, "Closing the Arms Bazaar," Thp Christian Science Monitor. (27 August,
1992), p. 18.
16
' Sommer, "Closing the Arms Bazaar," p. 18.
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production runs reduce unit costs, too, so a nation can purchase its own
military goods at a cheaper rate if production is not terminated immediately
after national military requirements are satisfied. Thus, by reducing national
defense costs, arms exports help maintain a healthy defense industrial base.168
While it is apparent that developed nations such as France and Britain are
increasingly drawn to arms transfers for commercial reasons, U.S. motives
are less clear. Arms transfers remain an important foreign policy tool for the
United States, but because the United States relies on both public and private
industry for its defense acquisitions it is often difficult "to draw a clear-cut
distinction between the U.S. defense industrial base and the U.S. commercial
manufacturing economy... For this reason, the department [of Defense] has a
major stake in the state of the nation's competitive posture vis-a-vis
America's major trading partners."169
As a nation, we choose to acquire our military material and equipment
through a privately financed, privately managed, free and non-coercive
market system. In this system, privately owned assets are invested in the
defense industry, with the expectation of a competitive return. The use of
a for-profit industry is a deliberate choice; we believe that a free industry
will do a better job of weapons development and support than would
government or a nationalized (or regulated) industry. 170
168 Paul Y. Hammond, et al., The Reluctant Supp lier: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales.
(Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1985), p. 264.
169 Robert C. McCormack, "Bolstering Defense Industrial Competitiveness Through
International Cooperation," in Defense 89. (March /April,1989), 10-11.
170Edward Hirsch and Fred Waelchi, "Toward a Set of Guiding Principles for Defense
Acquisition Management," in Defense 89. (March/April, 1989), 3.
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In other words, factors such as research and development, marketing
techniques, quality, volume, and price, apply equally to commercial as to
defense industry needs. Therefore, the security of the United States depends
not only on the vibrancy of the U.S. economy, but on the ability of its defense
industries to compete in the international marketplace.
There are significant indications that the U.S. defense industrial base is not
as healthy as it should be to provide for the needs of the national defense.
William G. Phillips, President of the National Council for Industrial Defense,
stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee that every study taken in the
last ten years has pointed to an erosion of the U.S. defense industrial base,
especially at the second and third-tier subcontractor levels. 171 In essence,
there is concern U.S. security self-sufficiency is falling by the wayside; that the
challenges of international competition, especially from those foreign
industries that are subsidized, and a growing proclivity for the
"internationalization" of the U.S. defense industry (the manufacturing of
essential component and even end-products through subcontracting,
licensing, or jointly production overseas), is causing a de industrialization of
the United States. Additionally, even those industries that remain stateside
often suffer from obsolete equipment, antiquated, labor-intensive practices,
and poor efficiency.
1. Three Tiers of the U.S. Defense Industry
The U.S. defense industry can be broken down into three specific tiers.
The top tier consists of the primary contractors, the big name weapons
171 Statement of William G. Phillips, in the Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services of the United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session on S. 2355, as
noted in Part 7 of the Department of Defensp Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1989: Defense Industry and Technology. (March 18,29,30; April 13,14, 1988), 280-281.
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suppliers such as McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, and Hughes. The second
tier is made up of the major subcontractors that produce systems for
armaments, such as their internal computers. The third tier consists of the
component parts and materials suppliers. Within each tier, production may
be categorized by system type, such as ship, aviation, armaments. Finally, the
industry runs under either public or private ownership.
Traditionally, the U.S. government, the primary buyer of the U.S.
defense industry, has bid only with primary contractors, maintaining very
little direct contact with the second or third tier subcontractors. The
government has relied on the theory of the competitive marketplace to rally
subcontractors since, typically, 40 to 60 percent of a weapon system will be
contracted out to a subcontractor. 172 However, poor oversight, lack of
planning, misinterpretation, and even dependency, have created a situation
today that poses grave problems for the traditional system.
The United States must retain a level of corporate knowledge and
industrial capacity in "vital" areas of the defense sector that will enable the
United States to assume the burdens of production in any situation of
national emergency. This is easier said than done, unless structural changes
to the government-defense industry relationship are incorporated to stop the
erosion of the defense base and promote a revitalized industry. Erosion at the
lower tiers has been the most overtly obvious, simply because the number of
domestic sources are drying up and there is a greater reliance today on
overseas sources.
172Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense. Cambridge, MA: (The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1989), 247.
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The growth of the multinationals and the increasing amount of
overseas production and assembly of manufactured products was spurred
by a variety of reasons: Cheap labor, more convenient access to raw
materials, tax advantages, construction of more efficient production
facilities by the host government, easier penetration of foreign markets,
and for many other reasons.173
These reasons include inefficient operations which are often saddled with
excess capacity and a poor financial situation, primarily born by the cyclical
nature of defense procurement; the obsolescence of plants and equipment
(World War II vintage, in some cases); high weapons systems costs; and the
unstable nature of high risk ventures. Highly technical and stringent
Department of Defense military specifications are another source of friction.
They not only establish performance standards but often provide specific
instructions for the manufacture a product. Industry often considers these
requirements obsolete or simply can not support them with existing plants
and equipment. In the case of the semiconductor industry, for example, DOD
requirements have driven a number of U.S. semiconductor firms out of the
defense market or persuaded them "to isolate their defense businesses from
the talent and technologies of their commercial operations." 174 This has
resulted in the production of microcircuits which require longer lead times,
cost more, and provide poorer performance and product reliability than
similar commercial sector devices.
Since the defense industry is highly regulated, is dependent on the U.S.
government for the procurement of most of its wares, and has such high
entry and exit barriers, changes to the current structure of the defense
173 Phillips statement, Part 7: Defpnsp Industry and Technology. 281.
174
"Preserving the Technology and Production Base," Defense 92, (March/April, 1992), p.
39.
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industry will most assuredly need to be initiated by the government itself. As
a monopsony, the U.S. government must recognize that it can influence the
future viability of the industry by the steps it takes now.
The increasing sophistication and complexity of weapon systems
requires long research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) lead
times before production is accomplished. It is imperative that U.S. defense
industry bottlenecks, created by dated and sometimes improperly applied
regulations, be relieved through new regulatory legislation and the
promotion of incentives that will ensure adequate profit margins for defense-
related industries and suppliers at all levels.
It must be acknowledged that the defense industry is a "dual economy,"
with the upper being the large contractors and the lower being the
subcontractors and parts suppliers. Industry regulations, policies, legislation,
and procedures, as well as certain subsidies and investments, are most often
directed to promote the requirements of the large contractors. The lower
level is subjected to these same laws and guidelines, or even more stringent
ones set by the prime contractor, and therefore struggle to adapt to the
requirements that do not take into account their unique problems and
priorities that differ from the upper level.
Oftentimes, while the prime contractor may profit from a favorable
contract clause, or multi-year contracts, the prime contractor is seldom willing
to pass any portion of the benefit on to the subcontractors. The supplier may
bear extra costs and burdens for which it is not reimbursed, and receive a
smaller, or non-existent, profit margin. These are but two of a multitude of
unfair and/or unequal practices and circumstances to which lower tier
subcontractors have been subjected. It is no wonder that many businesses in
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the lower defense tiers have either gone bankrupt or chosen to market "dual
use" technologies and parts, solely on the commercial side. Now, with only a
few suppliers remaining in crucial segments of the defense industry, prime
contractors have often been relegated to foreign supplier dependence or
making parts for themselves. 175
TABLE 19
TYPICAL U.S. FOREIGN PROCUREMENTS
ITEM SHIP CLASS COUNTRY
Arresting Gear Engines CVN68 Netherlands
Propellers T-AGOS1 Japan
Quiet Ball Bearings SSN 688, SSBN 726, CG 47 Japan
Turbochargers T-AO 187 Switzerland
Diesel Generator Sets T-AO 187 Norway
VLS Strike Down Cranes CG 47, DDG 51, DD 963 Sweden
Diesel Engines, Non-mag. MCM 1, MHC 2 Italy
Air Compressors T-AO 187 Great Britain
Power Supplies CVN68 Denmark











Anchor Chain, 4 3/4 " CVN68 Sweden
Air Circuit Breakers CG47 Great Britain
Degaussing Systems MCM1 Great Britain
SOURCE: From prepared statement of VADM John
Services, House of Representatives in the Hearings on Na
4739 - 101st Congress, Second Session, (Vol 101, No. 50), p
W. Nyquist before the Committee on Armed
tional Defense Authorization Act for FY91 - HR
169.
The result of this situation is multifold, but two problems stand out.
The first is that unit costs go up and efficiency decreases if a prime contractor
175 GansIer, Affording Defense. 257-261.
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has difficulty acquiring parts and components. More importantly, the lack of
suppliers can create industry bottlenecks which may have critical implications
during periods of crisis. While peace time manufacturing has the luxury of
greater time, a national emergency that necessitates the use of defense
industry "surge" production may be stymied when the prime contractors
have the excess capacity, but lack the capability due to a dearth of critical parts
and supplies.
Up until the 1980s, the U.S. government remained largely ignorant, or
responded nonchalantly, to the deterioration of the U.S. defense base.
Government, industry, and academia are now making a much more
concerted effort to tackle the situation. The initial response to this problem
has been industry analysis and testimony, but solid legislation and
commercial inducements need to follow soon. However, while there is a
consensus on the perception that there are gaps in the long-term ability of the
United States to adequately produce all its defense needs through domestic
industry, there is a lack of consensus on the proper strategy to overcome this
problem. 176
2. Internationalization of the Market
The growing political independence of Third World nations, greater
global economic inter-dependence, and a relative decline in the influence of
the superpowers has molded a new environment that requires changes in the
U.S. approach to these dilemmas. The United States may have to reevaluate
what the concept of "self-sufficiency" actually means and demands in today's
176
It should be noted that this effort differs from a "buildup," such as was the case in the
Reagan years, which concentrates on force structure. Instead, emphasis lies in revamping the
procedures for defense acquisition and procurement and changing the structural environment in
which the U.S. defense industry currently exists.
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defense strategy. At least the U.S. government now acknowledges that key
distinctions must be drawn within the domestic defense industrial base, itself,
and that movement toward the development of a more healthy, more self-
sufficient base will entail long-term structural changes to accommodate for
the different needs and desires of a multi-dimensional industry. Indeed, it
has been noted that there is even a dearth of adequate numbers of new
graduating scientists and engineers to fill all the requirements for
technological development in the near future. Hence, the entire U.S.
education system may need revamping also.
Recognizing that the U.S. defense industry is just a sub-set of the U.S.
industrial economy, as a whole, and operates under a similar motive - profit -
it is not so surprising that the defense industry has paralleled the growth of
other businesses into the international arena. Still, it must be remembered
that despite similarities of the defense market with that of the "normal"
economic market, defense products are directly related to the security of the
nation and cannot be lumped under the same directives. Although
competition forces improvements in defense technologies and enhances
industrial efficiency, national security cannot ride solely on the whims of the
international marketplace; there needs to be a better balance. For example,
policy decisions that place U.S. restraints on foreign military sales, such as
human rights issues, may be detrimental to U.S. security if a blacklisted
country, becomes the primary source of vital components, parts, or materials.
Furthermore, in addition to questions of dependency, there is great
consternation over the potential problems of technology transfers. It is
doubtful that the trend towards the internationalization of military sales and
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defense markets will abate in the near future. Thus, solutions to the security
dilemma must accept this fact and use it to the best advantage for the United
States.
One solution, the stockpiling of specific vital items, would take foreign
suppliers out of the loop. However, even if all the necessary items could be
amassed, large stockpiles of parts and components would be extremely costly
and would still probably be incapable of supplying the nation for any duration
under surge requirements. Another solution, nationalizing defense
industries, would probably not go over well with the public, would raise
defense costs, and might well produce an inferior end-product.
A more palatable alternative to nationalization would be the creation
of larger public segments of the defense base in those specific areas where
major requirements lie, thereby ensuring that vital components and parts
always remain available. By subsidizing material readiness, a bank of
corporate knowledge on existing and new technologies would be retained that
might otherwise be lost to foreign sources. Still, this would entail increased
costs, too, because keeping an industry "warm" for the chance requirements
of national emergency is not efficient.
Considering that the issues, problems, and solutions that face prime
contractors at the upper tier are different from those that face contractors at
the lower tiers, it is difficult to create a coherent strategy that will
accommodate everyone's interests. The primary issue at the first tier is the
desire for greater "sales" of U.S. equipment overseas. The primary issue at
the lower tiers is "dependence," as a result of an increasing reliance on
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foreign-made parts and components for many U.S. weapons systems. 177
Some level of commercial compromise must be reached before a cost-
effective, efficient solution may be derived.
Since access to and development of advanced technologies will be
central to the ability of the United States to counter future threats, the U.S.
must expand its supplier base. The Department of Defense (DOD) should
pursue a civil-military integration to take advantage of the domestic U.S.
commercial technology base. "The technology goals of defense and the civil
sector are fundamentally the same. Nevertheless, defense and commercial
research has often taken place along parallel paths, without taking full
advantage of synergy."178 As the U.S. defense industrial base shrinks, the
development of dual-use technologies, including gas turbine engines, future
generation aircraft, or even enhanced computer and micro-circuitry devices,
could satisfy numerous military requirements, thus reducing the
requirement for foreign sourcing.
Still, total national defense self-sufficiency is unrealistic and some level
of foreign sourcing will be required. As the U.S. defense industrial base
contracts, alternative sources of technology and components will still be
needed to support the void left by contractors who have gone out of business
or have switched to a different product line. Also, as a drop in sales dries up
foreign exchange, the United States must seek alternative mechanisms to
help reduce national defense costs. Citing Robert McCormack:
177Gansler, Affording Defense. 268.
178
"Preserving the Technology and Production Base," Defense 92. (March/April 1992), p. 38.
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The global nature of today's international marketplace and the realities
of flattening or decreasing defense budgets dictate a more interdependent
and streamlined approach to how and what we buy, with other nations
participating in a greater share of development and production. At the
same time, DOD must do whatever is appropriate to enhance U.S.
industry's ability to sell abroad -- the revenues generated from such
transactions can provide stimulus for greater investment in the industrial
base and help lower acquisition costs. 179
An avenue that has been used more by foreign governments than by
the United States is international armaments cooperation. Accepting the
precept that the United States does not have all of the resources necessary to
meet all its national security needs, further cooperation with allies offers
several benefits. It would reduce the duplication of development efforts; it
would promote standardization and interoperability among U.S. and allied
forces; and it would help achieve more efficient, cost-effective economies of
scale in the acquisition and logistic cycles. 180 Additionally, it would enable
greater U.S. influence in the current level and direction of arms proliferation.
Greater U.S. access to developing Third World arms markets through
cooperative agreements would more effectively tie independent-minded
nations into positive, long-term relationships with the United States.
While a two-way street needs to be developed so that cooperation is in
the mutual interest of signatory parties, the United States must take the
opportunity to maximize the development and exploitation of dual-use
technologies created by other nations. In sum, the growth of indigenous arms
179McCormack, Defense 89. 11.
180 Statement of Robert B. Costello, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, in the
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, on
S.2335, as noted in Part 7 of the Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1989: Defense Industry and Technology, (March 18, 29, 30; April 13,14,1988), 187.
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industries, a diversification of suppliers, the contraction of the U.S. defense
budget and a decline in U.S. arms transfers pose vexing problems for the U. S.
defense industry. In reconciling these problems, the United States could use
international arms cooperation both as a foreign policy tool, to rekindle its
relationship with countries like Brazil, and as a commercial tool, to help
bolster the U.S. defense industrial base.
C. INTERNATIONAL ARMS COOPERATION
There is an increasing emphasis on international arms cooperation as a
means to attain bilateral and multilateral defense requirements. A number of
factors are driving the growth of international armaments cooperation, and
indications suggest that the United States, itself, will become more deeply
involved in such ventures, especially with those that may be considered a
"two-way street." To date, the United States has limited the majority of its
cooperative armaments projects to the developed nations within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the United States is now in
the process of expanding cooperative ventures beyond Western Europe, as
evidenced by negotiations with Japan over the development of the FSX
aircraft.
An area that has been given less consideration, but which may hold
promise for the near future, lies in armaments cooperation with allied
developing and newly industrialized countries. The most current example of
this kind of relationship is in the development of the FX aircraft in Korea.
Little serious consideration has been given to cooperative armaments
agreements with developing nations in the past because of large structural
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differences in capacities for research and development, testing and
evaluation, and production requirements and capabilities between the United
States and developing nations. While a quantum difference on these issues
still exists, a maturing technological and defense industrial base in key
developing countries, such as Brazil, indicates that new opportunities for
U.S. armaments cooperation exists in areas of the Third World. The purpose
of this chapter is to identify the U.S. rationale, objectives and requirements
for international armaments cooperation - as applied to the developed world
and to draw out some basic factors which seem to "condition" the probability
of whether or not a teaming arrangement will be successful. From these
conclusions, an assessment can be made about the applicability of these same
factors to the developing world.
1. Overview
What is international arms cooperation? A number of terms are used in
the arms trade and are often associated as synonymous with the concept,
including - Defense Industrial Cooperation, Reciprocal Defense Procurement,
and Multinational Coproduction - but most of these terms only describe
facets of international arms cooperation. International Arms Cooperation is
the all-encompassing title used to represent the broad collection of concepts,
initiatives, and programs which make up the cooperative trade environment.
Indeed, international arms cooperation may take a variety of forms, ranging
from the simple exchange of information through scientific and technical
visits to the complexities involved in the codevelopment of new weapon
systems. In essence, international arms cooperation is used to describe any
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cooperative agreement between governments and industry, either bilateral or
multilateral, which involves the transfer of military-related articles. 181
International arms cooperation can take a variety of forms, but
cooperative weapons development and production programs are usually
grouped under the general categories of licensed production, coproduction,
and codevelopment. Licensed production is the transfer of the production
rights and the data package(s) for a given product to a purchaser. It is usually
regarded as the cheapest method for weapons procurement, next to the
outright purchase of arms, since - for an established fee - licensed production
offers a recipient the advantage of by-passing the expensive developmental
costs normally associated with the indigenous production of a product.
Increasingly more common, coproduction is the pooling of resources by two
or more nations to produce a weapon that has already been developed by one
nation or more nations. Coproduction usually enables longer production
runs. This is an especially important advantage in the procurement of high-
cost weapons that might otherwise be unaffordable for nations with smaller
scale economies. Finally, codevelopment is the joint design and
development of a weapon system. By nature, it is far more complex and risky
than the other forms of cooperation because it requires a great deal of
compromise, both on common weapon requirements and in the distribution
of costs and benefits.
181 John R. Hickey, "Cooperative International Arms Trade—Arms Sales of the Future,"
DISAM Journal, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Spring, 1985), p. 82.
129
Robert Foxcurran has identified eight different types of international
weapons development and production systems:
Type 1 - Licensed Production to Overseas Country. This is the oldest
method of international production whereby the US, for example, licenses the
data and manufacturing technique to the purchaser. This method provides
employment, technology transfer, and industrial base benefits to the purchaser.
Type 2 - Licensing Production to Overseas Consortium. Same as Type 1,
except that rights are conveyed to a multinational consortium which has the
advantages of increased production needs and established industrial base.
Type 3 - Codevelopment and Coproduction Among Foreign Countries.
Industry joins in both the R&D and production under a multinational
management scheme. When initiated at the concept development stage, this
method shares the development costs and reduces the chances of redundancy in
development.
Type 4 - License Production in US of Foreign System. This is the reverse of
the traditional NATO country purchasing from the US. The US purchases a
foreign developed system as is, or with some modifications, thus reducing
developmental costs and shortening lead time.
Type 5 - Transatlantic Joint Development. Similar to the joint development
in Type 3 with possible follow-on joint production, this type has the same
advantages of lower R&D costs and respective national industry participation.
Type 6 - Bilateral Offsets. To help compensate the purchasing country for
acquiring a system, the seller agrees to offset a portion of the system cost with
purchases from the recipient country. These offsets can cover a wide range of
categories such as financial investments, industrial goods, or military items,
and even agricultural commodities. Direct offsets normally refer to the seller
buying components for the end items from the purchaser, while indirect offsets
refer to the seller making investments or purchases from the buyer which are
not related to the end item.
Type 7 - Transatlantic Joint Production and /or Systems Management by a US
Led Consortium. Similar to Type 2 but the consortium managing the production
is US led.
Type 8 - Family of Weapons. In this program, the requirements of a number
of countries are pooled for a family of weapons of a given type, for example,
missiles. The development of the parts of the family are allocated to different
countries or combinations of countries, thereby dividing R&D costs among
separate entities, reducing duplication in R & D, and sharing the economic
production benefits. 1^
^Robert F. Foxcurran, "Three Decades of Multinational Collaboration for Defense
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The level of arms cooperation that can be attained, or which is desirable,
between participating countries depends upon a multiple of factors that
includes the respective levels of industrial and technological development,
goals, requirements, and budgetary constraints. Each case is created out of the
unique set of factors that condition the particular cooperative endeavor. The
success of a cooperative relationship will be determined by how well the
circumstances, or conditions, within each participating entity intersect with
those of the other participants for the desired level of cooperation.
Although U.S. involvement in cooperative international arms
agreements, in one form or another, is certainly not a new development, it
has only been within recent years that the United States has begun to devote
greater attention to increasing the scope of that involvement. Certainly,
changes in U.S. policies towards arms transfers, especially regarding
cooperative ventures, are a reflection of changes in political, economic, and
military-industrial factors shaping the current international and domestic
environments that affect the United States.
2. Background
U.S. involvement in international arms cooperation has been an
evolutionary process - from an era of greater U.S. isolation, and self-
sufficiency, during the interwar period between World War I and World War
II, to the increasingly interdependent and multipolar world of today. There
is now a growing realization within the United States that as sectors of the
U.S. defense industrial base grow increasingly internationalized, industrial
Procurement Within the North Atlantic Alliance: A Business History." Unpublished Master's
Thesis, University of Washington, 1979. Types and definitions quoted as cited by John Hickey,
in "Arms Sales of the Future," DISAM Journal, pp. 84-85.
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and technological self-sufficiency, especially with regard to defense, is
unrealistic. Certainly, steps to slow the erosion of this process can, and are,
being implemented, but the bottom line rests on the economics of the dollar.
National security costs money and the extent to which the American taxpayer
is willing to foot a much larger defense bill, especially when the Cold War is
over, is questionable. Instead, investment in more efficient and cost-effective
vehicles that help provide for U.S. defense needs will become an increasingly
more popular alternative. Certainly, if the case were otherwise, the outcry
over such topics as "burdensharing" would not be so loud. Therefore, U.S.
involvement in international armaments cooperation will surely continue to
increase.
a. Early Legislation and Policies
To set U.S. involvement in international armaments cooperation in
an historical context, the stage will be arbitrarily set on 3 March 1933 when the
"Buy American Act" was passed by Congress to require that goods purchased
for American defense forces be purchased from American sources. It was
motivated by strong labor demands during the Depression and by the desire
to maintain an economically vital arms industry at home. 183 Since this law
was passed, the U.S. Congress has amended and expanded the original
legislation, as well as enacted other similarly protective legislation, essentially
requiring the U.S. military to show that goods are neither available nor easily
produced in the United States if it wishes to purchase goods from foreign
sources. This legislation is still collectively referred to as the Buy American
183 David N. Burt, "A Framework for Evaluating Foreign Developed Defense Systems for
Aquistion by the US DOD," a technical report completed for the U.S. Army at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (October, 1979), p. 5.
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Act, and continues to hamper efforts towards international arms cooperation,
today.184
A subtle change in U.S. arms acquisition policies began to take
shape in the post-World War II era resulting from the potential Soviet threat
to the weakened state of Western Europe. The signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty on April 4, 1949, was the vehicle for this change,185 by stating in the
preamble that "They [the twelve original signatories] are resolved to unite
their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and
security." Article 2 elaborates that the signatories "...will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them," and Article 3 states that the
objectives of the treaty will also be furthered by maintaining and developing
"...their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."186 Thus, the
NATO alliance set the impetus for future arms cooperation.
In 1952, the Temporary Council Committee determined that the
interest of NATO necessitated "...correlating production programs of major
end items of equipment, including aircraft, artillery, small arms, radar and
wireless sets, vehicles, ships and various types of ammunition." 187 Initial
collaboration was slow. First, no master plan for international armaments
cooperation existed within the alliance, nor within the individual countries
themselves. The United States, for example, only recently began to draw up a
184 Terrell G. Covington, Keith W. Brendley, Mary E. Chenoweth, "A Review of European
Arms Collaboration and Prospects for Its Expansion under the Independent European Program
Group," A RAND Note, N-2638-ACQD, The RAND Corporation, Quly, 1987), p. 12.
185 Burt, "A Framework," p. 5.
186Henry J. Degenhardt, Treaties and Alliances of the World, Third Edition, Longman
Group Limited, 1981, p. 166.
187NATO Information Services, Second Impression, NATO, Facts and Figures, Brussels,
Belgium, 1978, p. 131, as cited by Burt, in "A Framework," p. 6.
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U.S. master plan for international armaments cooperation, first revealing
such a plan in its draft form before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
June 1989. 188 Second, member countries had vastly different capacities for
production, different attitudes towards cooperation, and different levels of
trust. Third, a U.S.-backed NATO had a heavy industrial, economic and
military lead over the Soviet Union. Therefore a need for greater cohesion
was not recognized, so most of the NATO countries focused on their
individual priorities vice that of the alliance. Finally, as Europe rebuilt the
industrial base it lost during World War II, helped by the Marshall Plan, the
Europeans began to again provide for their independent defense needs and
reestablish their individual arms export markets.
In the 1950s, the United States supplied Europe with most of its
arms, purchased through U.S. security assistance grants, thereby helping to
ensure that some level of standardization was attained in NATO. However,
as the European nations recovered economically and militarily, the United
States shifted its emphasis from grant assistance to foreign military sales -
cash. Unable to afford some of the weapon systems they desired to buy from
the United States, several NATO governments entered into a number of
coproduction arrangements, sharing costs and facilities, with assistance
provided by the United States. This helped to expand standardization of
NATO military systems and accelerate European military production through
the transfer of technology.
Between 1957 and 1967, a dozen projects were instituted - with
different participants in each case and varied roles played by the United States.
188David Silverberg, "Defense Trade Master Plan Could Alter 'Two Way Street'," Defense
News, 19 June, 1989, p. 1.
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TABLE 20
FOREIGN CONTRACTORS' SHARE OF U.S. MILITARY
RDT&E CONTRACTS, FYs 1965-84
Fiscal Years* DOD Prime Contract Awards for RDT&E to Top 500 Contractors**
Total To Foreign Countries Foreign Contracts as a
(US $ m.) (US $ m.)*** Share of Total
(per thousand)
1965 4658 6 1.4
1966 5210 10 1.9
1967 5949 13 2.1
1968 6404
1969 5910 9 1.5
1970 5368 12 2.2
1971 5449 9 1.6
1972 5742 6 1.1
1973 6185 9 1.4
1974 5708 10 1.6
1975 6191 5 0.9
1976 6768 14 2.0
1977 7758 7 0.9
1978 8520 5 0.6
1979 8378 13 1.6
1980
1981 10225 49 4.7
1982 14611 20 1.4
1983 16014 18 1.1
1984 17958 22 1.2
*US FYs 1965-76 begin on 1 July of the previous year; FYs 1977-84 begin on 1 Oct. of the previous year.
"Department of Defense prime contract awards (excluding sub-contracts) greater than $10,000 ($25,000
starting with FY 1982) for RDT&E to top 500 contractors. The total value of these contracts represented
97.9-98.3 per cents of total DoD prime contract awards for RDT&E during the period FYs 1974-9.
***Contracts to US contractors abroad are not included.
SOURCE: 500 Contractors Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards for RDT&E.
US Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Washington, DC,
annual volumes for FYs 1965-79 and 1981-4; as cited in World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI
Yearbook 1986 . (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 284.
The projects which progressed beyond the initial definition included the
Hawk, Atlantic, Mark-44, Sidewinder, Starfighter, Seasparrow, Bullpup, M-72,
and NADGE. An important point to remember, though, is that since the
United States completed the research and development for each project, the
long term impact of this collaboration on the integration of the European
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arms industry was not as extensive as it might have been if the R&D phase
had been spread amongst all the participants. 189
Despite these projects, resentment against U.S. dominance of the
arms industry in NATO and growing indigenous capabilities had propelled
NATO, by the 1970s, into a less than efficient or mutually-supporting defense
entity. A multiplicity of weapons systems was considered a major weakness
of NATO. The essence of the problem is captured in the following statement:
...there are deployed among the NATO military forces today at least 7
basic models of tanks; 23 types of combat aircraft; over 100 types of tactical
missile systems; multiple guns of different caliber and a host of different
types of radars—36 in NATO's navies alone. Some guns of the same
caliber cannot fire the same ammunition; aircraft with diverse ordnance
and fuel requirements can only rearm or refuel at certain airfields; and
commanders have experienced difficulties in communications because
their communication equipment is not compatible. 190
b. A Reappraisal
Such profligate duplication, especially in the face of an increasingly
capable and standardized Warsaw Pact, resulted in inefficiency and higher
costs. An exponential increase in the unit cost for modern weapons
prompted those, such as Thomas A. Callaghan,191 to submit that the only real
solution to reducing defense expenditures was genuine arms cooperation.
Callaghan contended that the development of multiple similar systems and a
189Jack N. Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia: Lessons from NATO
Experience," a report prepared for the Department of State by the Office of External Research,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (August, 1971), p. 3.
190Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, PSAD-78-2,
"Standardization in NATO: Improving the Effectiveness and Economy of Mutual Defense
Efforts," 1978, p. i, as cited by Burt, in "A Framework," pp. 7-8.
191 Mr. Callaghan authored a major study on U.S. European Cooperation in Military and
Civil Technology in 1974, and produced a report for the Pentagon in 1988 entitled "Pooling
Allied and American resources to produce a credible, collective conventional deterrent."
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concomitant reduction in the output of weapons was a form of "structural
disarmament." 192 Pressures on the budget indicated that future funding
problems would only continue to intensify this situation. In response to
these growing problems, the United States made a call for greater
rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) 193 within the
NATO force structure.
Since no consensus on the value of RSI exists, accurate predictions
on the ultimate savings that might be accrued out of RSI was difficult -
especially since the political, economic and military advantages of greater
alliance cohesion and security cannot necessarily be measured in dollar terms.
Optimistic estimates for cost savings ranged from $10-15 billion. On the other
hand, skeptics estimated a maximum saving of $3 billion, with a high
probability of no savings at all, or perhaps even higher costs. 194 Offset
agreements complicated measurement.
192Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., "Structural Disarmament: A Vengeful Phenomenon," Journal
of Defense & Diplomacy, No. 9, (September, 1987), p. 28, as cited by Craig M. Brandt and Gage
A. Bleakley, "International Armamemts Codevelopment: Nunn Amendment Spurs Interest in
Collaboration on Weapons Development," DISAM Journal, Vol. II, No. Ill, (Spring, 1989), p.
106.
193 RSI was defined by DOD Directive 2010.6, Standardization and Interoperability of
Weapon Systems and Equipment within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as signed on
March 11, 1977. Rationalization is considered "any action that increases the effectiveness
of alliance forces through more efficient and effective use of defense resources committed to the
alliance." [8:5] Standardization is: "the process by which member nations achieve the
closest practicable cooperation among forces; the most efficient use of research, development,
and production resources; and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: (1)
common or compatible operational, administrative and logistics procedures: (2) common or
compatible technical procedures and criteria; (3) common, compatible or interchangeable
supplies, components, weapons or equipment; and (4) common or compatible tactical doctrine
with corresponding organizational compatibility." [8:5-6] Finally, interoperability is "the
ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems,
units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together." [8:6] As cited by Burt, "A Framework," p. 3.
194Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration, p. 13.
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However, Public Law 94-361, Section 802, commonly referred to as
the Culver-Nunn Amendment, was added by Congress to the DOD
Appropriation Authorization Act in 1977. It stated:
...it is the policy of the United States that equipment for use of
personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe
under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or at
least interoperable with the equipment of other members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 195
To ensure that the procurement of U.S. equipment met these requirements,
the act required that the Secretary of Defense report to the Congress on all
"offset" agreements entered into with NATO, and also report on all major
systems that were not standardized nor interoperable amongst the NATO
members. In addition, to encourage licensing and coproduction agreements,
this legislation explicitly provided that the Secretary of Defense could, when
in the best interests of the United States, waive the Buy American Act.
The enactment of the Culver-Nunn amendment was merely the
reinforcement of long-time NATO goals. The Secretary of Defense, for
example, actually possessed the authority to waive the Buy American Act
prior to Culver-Nunn. However, it has been suggested that this legislation
served to advertise renewed U.S. intentions to bolster the effectiveness and
efficiency of the alliance.196 In 1978, U.S. goals for greater armaments
collaboration was listed by the Defense Science Board:
195 United States Public Law 94-361, July 14, 1976, Section 802 (a) (1), as cited by Hickey in
Arms Sales of the Future," p. 83.
196Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration/' p. 14.
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* To improve NATO operational effectiveness.
* To increase efficiency in the allocation of alliance-wide
resources for research, development and acquisition.
* To strengthen NATO cohesiveness.
* To encourage a politically stable and economically strong
Western Europe and European defense industry. 197
Thus, by the late-1970s, RSI had become the central objective of the
international cooperative arms trade.
In an attempt to implement the goals noted by the 1978 Defense
Science Board with the other member states of NATO, Australia, New
Zealand and Japan, the United States followed a triad of initiatives. The first
initiative was to identify families-of-weapons and assign developmental
responsibilities to particular countries. 198 Second, general Memoranda of
Understanding, or MOUs, would be developed between the member
197Defense Science Board, 1978 Study on "Achieving Improved NATO Effectiveness
Through Armament Collaboration," Summary, p. 8, as cited by Hickey, in "Arms Sales of the
Future," p. 83.
198The family-of-weapons concept was designed to reduce duplication in research and
development, reduce incompatibility amongst weapon systems, and reduce the number of
competing weapons systems within the NATO alliance. The concept posed, and continues to
pose, several theoretical, if not practical, advantages: First, since the concept is based upon
independent development of specifically assigned weapons sets, this initial phase would avoid
the protectionist backlash that sometimes occurs in codevelopment projects when money and /or
jobs are transported abroad. Second, developed products can be put up for direct purchase by
member countries or introduced for coproduction. Requirements of member countries are delayed
until otherwise stipulated in the production phase, enabling less rigid development restrictions
and postponing controversial decisions. Third, the family-of-weapons concept allows fuller
involvement by participating members and avoids the problems associated with domination by
a single country, at least in the development stage. Disadvantages include the fact that by
delaying the controversial decision of member "requirements" until after the development stage
could make design changes prohibitively costly during the production phase. The possiblity
also exists that it might simply be impossible to accommodate drastic changes in requirements
under the original design. This implies that a high level of trust must exist between members
that the weapons developed by another country will meet their design expectations.
Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," pp. 15-17.
139
countries. 199 Third, agreements for coproduction of weapon systems already
at, or near, the development stage would then be negotiated.200
The triad of initiatives has fallen short of expected goals. This is
due largely to problems with the family-of-weapons. The major difficulty is
that the weapons considered suitable for development under the "family"
concept are limited. The only group that is actually in the development stage,
thus far, is missiles. The United States, for example, has taken the lead in
developing the medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) and a European
consortium has taken the lead in developing the short-range version
(ASRAAM). 201 Although a final verdict on the family-of-weapons concept is
yet to be made, the RAND study concludes:
In sum, although the triad of initiatives provides the framework for
such forms of collaboration as coproduction and licensed production, it
offers little guidance. Nor has it produced the hoped for results, and one
may argue that it was never fully implemented as U.S. policy.202
c. Legislation of the 1980s
Within the last few years, support for international armaments
cooperation has increased in the United States. New legislative initiatives
have expanded the prospects for greater U.S. involvement in cooperative
schemes. The passing of the Nunn-Roth-Warner Amendment to the FY-86
National Defense Authorization Bill, Public Law 99-145, (better known as the
l"MOUs are agreements between the U.S. Department of Defense and foreign
government(s) regarding a specific area of defense of reciprocal interest. A general MOU is
usually a bilateral agreement that allows broad coverage over various phases of cooperation,
such as research, development and production that would otherwise require separate MOUs.
200 Hickey, "Arms Sales of the Future," p. 83.
201 Hickey, "Arms Sales of the Future," p. 85.
202 Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," p. 16.
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Nunn Amendment), represents the bellwether legislation of the 1980s for
cooperative programs. This amendment provided that $125 million be
appropriated for cooperative development programs between the U.S. and its
NATO allies. This included a $25 million authorization for side-by-side
testing of European weapons systems to promote U.S. licensed production or
purchase of European designed military equipment. To continue these
initiatives, an additional $190 million was approved by Congress for FY-87. 203
A new requirement was established for the Department of Defense
to assess the opportunities for international cooperation for major defense
programs at each formal development milestone. The Nunn legislation was
extended to major non-NATO allies by an amendment to the FY-87 Defense
Authorization Act. This list now includes Australia, Japan, the Republic of
South Korea, Israel and Egypt, and is reviewed annually by the Department of
Defense.204
Although it does not present a detailed U.S. policy for collaboration,
the Nunn amendment was designed to increase collaboration between the
United States and its allies at the research phase.205 This legislation stands in
contrast to historical practice in the United States. An examination of U.S.
military research contracts between 1965 and 1984, for example, revealed that
less than 2 out of every 1000 dollars was awarded to foreign contractors. If
203 Public Law 99-145, Sec. 1102, Laws of the 99th Congress--lst Session, pp. 712-715, as cited
by Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," pp. 17-18.
204 py 1987 Defense Authorization Act, Section 1105, entitled: Cooperative Research and
Development with Major Non-NATO Allies, as cited by Richard Kwatnoski, "Educational
Initiatives in International Armaments Cooperation by the Defense Systems Management
College," in DISAM lournal. Vol. II, No. Ill, (Spring, 1989), p. 115.
205 David Harvey, "NATO R&D Plan Struggling," Defense Science. Vol. 8, No. 9, (October,
1989), p. 68.
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Canada is excluded from this list, the number of awards contracted abroad
dropped to less than 1 of every 1000 dollars.206 Certainly, funding provides an
additional incentive to attract program managers who might otherwise never
have considered collaborative research.
The Nunn Amendment has given impetus and visibility to U.S. efforts to
collaborate in arms development with its NATO allies and is an
unequivocal endorsement of armaments cooperation as the method of
achieving equipment modernization within NATO while providing
equitable burden sharing.207
In 1985, two other separate pieces of legislation related to the Nunn
Amendment, collectively known as the Quayle Amendment, amended the
Arms Export Control Act to foster cooperative projects - especially in the
production phase. The Quayle Amendment allows the Secretary of Defense
to waiver U.S. contracting law in favor of a NATO partner's contracting
procedures and designated subcontractors for the furtherance of a cooperative
project in proper circumstances. This amendment was also subsequently
extended to favored nations beyond NATO.208
Support for cooperative programs continues. In his Annual Report
to the Congress, former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci stated that U.S.
investment in armaments cooperation would steadily grow in an effort to
increase the affordability of research, development, production, and logistics
206 SIPRI Yearbook 1986. p. 283 and 284.
207Brandt and Bleakley, "International Armaments Codevelopment," p. 106.
208Public Law 99-83, Section 115, Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, entitled:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Projects, 1985; Public Law 99-145, Section
1102, FY 1986 DOD Authorization Act, entitled: Acquisition of Defense Equipment Under
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cooperative Projects; and , Public Law 99-661, Section
1103, FY 1987 Defense Authorization Act entitled: Cooperative Projects, as cited by Richard
Kwatnoski, "Educational Initiatives in International Armaments Cooperation by the Defense
Systems Management College," PISAM lournal. Vol. II, No. in (Spring, 1989), p. 115.
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programs. By the year 2000, the Department of Defense expects investment in
cooperative research, development, testing and evaluation to have increased
from the current 3 percent level to 25 percent. As the Report states:
International industrial teaming arrangements involving U.S. and
allied industry provide opportunities to bolster U.S. industrial
competitiveness. Given current fiscal realities, it is imperative that we
optimize the combined strengths of our industrial and technological base




Ada Project Support Environments US CA UK FR FRG NL DK NO IT
155 Autonomous Precision Guided Munition US CA FR FRG NL SP IT TU
Modular Standoff Weapon US UK FRG SP IT
Multifunctional Info Distribution System US CA UK FR FRG NO SP IT
NATO Identification System US UK FR FRG IT
Airborne Radar Demonstration System USUKFR
Adv. Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing Tech. US UK
Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability Aircraft US FRG
NATO Frigate Replacement - 1990s US CA UK FR FRG NL SP IT
Post 2000 Tactical Area Communications US CA UK FR NL IT
Hawk Mobility Enhancement USNL
NATO Anti-Air Warfare System US CA UK FRG NL SP
Battlefield Info Collection And Exploitation US UK
Agile Falcon /F-16 Upgrade US BE
LINK-11 Improvements US CA UK FR FRG NL SP IT
Surface Ship Torpedo Defense US UK
RPV Multimission Optronic Stabilized Payload US Israel
SOURCE: Report of the Secretary of Defense. Frank C. Carlucci. to the Congress on the FY 1990/199
Biennial Budget and FY 1990-94 Defense Programs. January 17, 1989), p. 70.
The potential for developing a genuine "two-way street" within NATO is
209 Report of the Secretary of Defense. Frank C. Carlucci. to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY
1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-1994 Defense Programs. January 17, 1989, p. 68.
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slowly evolving. Since the enactment of the Nunn Initiative in 1985, through
the NATO Cooperative Research and Development Program, armaments
cooperation between the United States and its major allies has expanded
greatly. The following chart indicates the breadth of this expansion by
showing seventeen of the Nunn Amendment Projects, as of January 1989,
with signed memoranda of understanding.
d. U.S. Objectives in Armaments Cooperation
The purpose of U.S. involvement in international cooperative
acquisition programs, as it has been cited most recently, is revealed in the
Secretary of Defense's FY-89 Annual Report to the Congress. The Report
states that these programs "seek to focus alliance resources effectively, in
order to yield significant gains in our combined conventional defense
posture."210 The following objectives are outlined as the goals that the United
States seeks to achieve through international arms cooperation:
*Reduce needless duplication of research and development
and prudently share the best technology among allies
^Promote commonality and interoperability among friendly
forces
^Provide incentives for allies to invest in conventional
force modernization and burdensharing
*Achieve economies of scale throughout the acquisition and
logistic cycles
210 Report of the Secretary of Defense. Frank C. Carlurd. to the Congress on the FY 1990 /FY
1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-1994 Defense Programs. January 17, 1989, p. 68.
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The success of any international armaments cooperation program may best be
measured by its effectiveness in meeting the criteria of the four cited
objectives.
In 1984, an examination of NATO armament cooperation over the
previous two decades by the Defense Science Board discovered that the ratio
of success to failure was higher than what is generally recognized, but that
failures are remembered for a long time. Failures cited as particular
disappointments include the French-German Roland air defense missile
system, the codevelopment project of the British JP 233 airfield attack system,
and the curtailment of a major U.S. production program for a European
system. On the other hand, success ranged across the spectrum of cooperative
programs, including projects involving the European production of U.S.
equipment, joint development and production programs, and the U.S.
procurement of European equipment.211
TABLE 22
SOME SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN NATO ARMS COLLABORATION
SUCCESSFUL
NATO SEA SPARROW MAG-58 CFM-56
NADGE/AEGIS MODFLIR ROLLING AIRFRAME MXL
AIM-9-L HAWK/I HAWK OTO-MELARA 76 MM GUN




MBT U.S./UK VISTOL LIFT ENGINE U.S./FRC APC
SOURCE: Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on "Industry-to-industry International
Armaments Cooperation: Phase I - NATO Europe," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research & Engineering, Washington, D.C., (June, 1983), p. 23.
211 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on "Industry-to-Industry International
Armaments Cooperation: Phase I - NATO Europe," Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research & Engineering, Washington, D.C.,0une, 1983), p. 23.
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The feasibility of increased successful armaments cooperation
between the United States and allied nations depends upon a number of
different interacting factors. The climate for armaments cooperation,
whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis, varies with the particular
political, economic, industrial, and military conditions affecting participants.
Perceptions of the greater advantage, or disadvantage, of collaboration, as
influenced by the relationship of that "condition" in which each potential
participant finds itself and in which it views its potential partner(s), helps
determine motivations for involvement in armaments cooperation.
Restrictive governmental regulations and failures in previous collaborative
ventures are factors which may act as impediments to greater successes.
D. LESSONS FROM NATO EXPERIENCE
If success in international armaments cooperation is measured in terms of
how well a project meets the objectives under which it began, one might then
ask what factors help determine the outcome of a project. Is there a set of
conditions which must exist before a project may have the opportunity for
success? Must the development of a cooperative arrangement follow a
particular format or sequence of events? Should one style of management
and operations preside? Does the size and nature of government and
industry in each participating country affect the outcome? If so, to what
extent?
These are all logical questions, but the answers are not so easily spelled
out. Since the nature of the participants and of the conditions associated with
each case change, no static formula for success exists. Projects - at all levels of
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cooperation - have succeeded under an array of different management styles
and techniques, sharing different distributions of power, production,
investment, and other related costs and benefits. A method, or formula, that
has proven particularly successful under one set of circumstances does not
necessarily equate to success under another. However, a cooperative project
is like any marriage in that creativity, flexibility, and effort are always
required, but the foundation of that relationship must be grounded in a basic
compatibility of interests if it is to survive.
Since the 1950s, there has been a good deal of experience culled in
international armaments cooperation - the majority of which has been
derived from cooperative arrangements among NATO members. Although
the family-of-weapons concept has been difficult to implement, other
methods have proven more successful. West European cooperation has
resulted in the joint development of the Tornado, Jaguar, and Alpha Jet
aircraft, and the Euromissile projects for the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles.
These ventures represent some of the best examples of truly collaborative
projects. However, as the 1986 SIPRI Yearbook points out, these are all
examples of West European joint development. 212 The record for
transatlantic cooperation, with U.S. involvement, has been more
problematic. It has seen most of its successes in coproduction programs such
as the F-16, the NATO Seasparrow, and the AIM-9L. The list for successful
codevelopment projects between the U.S. and Europe is much smaller, with
the AV-8B and the NATO Seagnat as the two more noted examples.213
212World Armaments and Disarmament . SIPRI Yearbook 1986. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 283.
213 Pauline Creasey, "Europe Defence Firms in Cooperation Agreements," in Pauline Creasey
and Simon May, eds., The European Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation. (New
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Despite the failure to create a genuine two-way arms trade street between
the U.S. and NATO Europe, inroads have been made to overcome some of
the impediments to attaining such a level of cooperation. In contrast to
earlier U.S. experiences in armaments cooperation, technology transfers have










Greater operational availability and easier
alignment
FRG Zeiss optics Improved periscope optics
Italy Mine mechanisms Counter multi-influence sweeping
Norway IR missile seeker Helicopter standoff attack capability
(SSM/ASM)
Japan Kikosan missile Learn how to produce low cost, "high tech"
weapon
SOURCE: "Briefing Book for International Cooperative Research, Development & Acquisition
Activities," U.S. Navy, OP-098F, 1986.
It is instructive to note that not only has success been reached in NATO
transatlantic cooperative projects, but that failure has also been recorded in
Europe-only projects. Success in international arms cooperation is therefore
not necessarily limited by geographic proximity nor by the relative size of the
defense industrial base of the participating states - although these factors
certainly help to define the character of a cooperative project.
York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), p. 93, as cited by Brandt and Bleakley, in "International
Armaments Codevelopment," p. 106.
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In 1971, a U.S. Department of State study to examine multi-national
consortia under NATO was concluded. The study's objective was to find
clues to how cooperative efforts might be applicable to non-military areas.
The study is appropriate to the context of this chapter because an in-depth
analysis of five early NATO co-production projects was made. In its findings,
based on an examination of the Hawk, Starfighter, Sidewinder, NADGE, and
the Seasparrow projects, the study outlined the criteria necessary for the
development of successful cooperative projects. Since many of the basic
precepts of the study's conclusions remain valid, today, it provides a
framework from whence contemporary cooperative international armaments
arrangements can be examined.
According to the man who conducted the study, Jack Behrman, the major
lesson to be learned from NATO cooperative armaments programs is that
despite intense national interests, governments can and will cooperate when
it is clearly to their benefit to do so. However, he also states that they will do
so only if that benefit is commensurate with their contribution. By trying to
dovetail national interests with economic means and demands, the central
problem of any cooperative project becomes a political one.214 It is significant
to note, therefore, that once an agreement on sharing criteria is reached,
governments will remove many of the impediments to cooperation, such as
barriers to the movement of goods or components.215
Early experience with NATO indicates that the foundation for successful
cooperation lies upon several requirements. The following prerequisites
must be fulfilled before a cooperative project will ever get off the ground: 1)
214 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p.5.
215 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p. 30.
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partners must have a knowledge of the techniques available for cooperation;
2) they must have a will to use them; and 3) they must have a sufficiently
high priority to warrant a cooperative agreement. It is this third prerequisite
which may dictate whether or not a potential partner ever reaches the
negotiating table.
Four conditions must exist if a sufficiently high priority is ever to be
developed. 1) A government must recognize a need for a defined program -
one that may be met by a cooperative project. Generally, this need is
strongest under conditions of war but weakens as the state of duress decreases
and/or nationalism and independence increases. 2) Participants must
recognize an inability to "go it alone," either for circumstances of politics or of
economics. 3) A mutuality of national interests must exist between
participants, backed by a willingness to commit adequate resources to a
sufficient degree to give the problem a priority. However, it should also be
noted that interests need not be identical, since some diversity of interest
helps in the delegation of roles within a project. 4) Since failures are as often
individual as institutional in the area of international cooperation, the
presence of talented and dedicated individuals, with strong management
capabilities, is needed to accomplish tasks and resolve conflicts. Without
these conditions, cooperative efforts are unlikely to be adopted or
successful.216
Motivations for cooperation vary considerably with the players, but are
generally precipitated by political, economic, and/or social reasons. Economic
considerations are playing an increasingly dominant role in determining
216 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," pp. 22-24.
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motivations, both in the United States and Europe, as well as in other arms
producing countries. The less arms that a government purchases for
domestic consumption, the greater the need to export in order to support the
domestic defense industrial base.
Although positions on the relative merits of U.S. involvement in
armaments cooperation may vary within the various departments and
agencies of the U.S. government that influence decision-making on arms
transfers, a general consensus does seem to exist on what U.S. objectives
should be for arms cooperation.217 The motivations of foreign governments
for international armaments cooperation have much in common with those
of the U.S. government's. These motivations include a desire for a more
efficient military alliance, higher employment opportunities, a positive
balance of trade, an improved national technology base, and a desire to ensure
the continued viability of their national defense industries.218
International arms cooperation from industry's perspective also varies
with the player, but interest is generally associated with the bottom line -
building a profit. A review of foreign industry motivations for involvement
with the U.S. indicate that they are interested in cooperation for two major
reasons. The first is that cooperation with the United States opens the doors
to a large, new market. Second, access to U.S. technology can be used to
improve the capability and quality of their goods, thereby increasing the
marketability of their products for third-country sales. U.S. industry also
recognizes some of the advantages international cooperation may provide for
217 As noted during numerous interviews with different agencies in Washington, D.C., July,
1989.
218Defense Science Board Task Force, "Phase I - NATO Europe," p. 15.
151
business, including a possible expansion of available markets, an opportunity
to further spread the costs of investments in R&D, and a method to help
overcome offset requirements. However, U.S. industry does express concern
about the long-term effects of cooperation - what will be the effect of
engendering future foreign competition through technology transfers?219
Since the nature of national security ties defense-related industries very
closely to government, international armaments cooperation cannot be
successful without the consent and the compliance of the other. This point
was made very clear in opening statements at the International Industry-to-
industry Armaments Cooperation Meeting in Brussels, on 18 October 1982.
"In Europe, cooperation of industry implies government cooperation.
Industry cannot cooperate without government."220 In elaboration, during
more informal discussions it was noted that while industry-to-industry
cooperation is essential to the achievement of government objectives for
international arms cooperation, it is insufficient by itself. Government
involvement is needed to define and harmonize requirements as well as to
provide funding. 221 The recognition of a genuine need, combined with
shared common requirements, for a clearly defined product is the key to
success in international armaments cooperation.
219 Defense Science Board Task Force, "Phase I - NATO Europe," p. 16.
220Memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense on the International
Industry-to-industry Armaments Cooperation Meeting on 18-21 October 1982 in Brussels,
Belgium. Signed by Gerald Sullivan, Executive Secretary, Defense Science Board Task Force on
Armaments Cooperation, (Washington, D.C, 8 December, 1982), p. 3.
221 Memorandum, Industry-to-industry Arms Cooperation Meeting, pp. 3-4.
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However, arriving at a well-defined product is not an easy task. First,
perceptions of a threat must be similar enough to trigger a collective response.
Second, strong agreement must be obtained upon the basic military
requirements. Unfortunately, mutual agreement is one of the most
contentious issues preceding cooperation.222 Even when there is common
agreement on the threat to be countered, the process of selecting the weapon
type and the capabilities desired for that system can still be difficult.
An inability to agree on the basic military requirements early in the
process tends to foster the growth of independent national programs.223 This
was an early experience in NATO. Co-production arrangements were
prevented because an initial alliance requirement stipulated that consensus
exist amongst all members. However, getting unanimity on common
procurement objectives between fourteen different nations was all but
impossible. It was not until after a resolution was passed enabling NATO
members to join together in smaller groups of two or more that any real
consensus could be derived.224 The lesson learned was that projects should
be limited to only those nations bearing a similar definition of the problem.
The design of the system to be produced is the next logical step in
cooperation. Simply, design defines the product. It is a function of numerous
factors, including: the definition of the problem; the technology available; the
projected cost of the technology desired; the production capability and
limitations of each participant; and the analysis and politics of cost/benefit.
222 Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," p. 9.
223 Defense Science Board Task Force, "Phase I - NATO Europe," p. 20.
224 Resolution on the peaceful settlement of disputes between NATO members. NATO
Council, Ministerial Session, Paris, Dec. 14, 1956. As cited by Behrman, "Multinational
Production Consortia," p. 8.
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Since the industrial, technological, economic, and financial makeup of each
country is different, design tends to determine who will have comparative
advantage in development and/or production of the product, who is to have
predominant control of the project, who is to gain certain benefits of the
system and how much, who will be able to bid on its production, and who
will use it.225 As a result, design also influences who participates in the joint
effort. Certain partners may decide to bow out. Obviously, changes in the
composition of the participants could alter the nature of the cooperative
arrangement. Therefore, the design chosen to fulfill a particular set of
military requirements also determines the context of a project. The type of
project and the character of participant members are likely to be the principal
determinants of the organizational and management structure of the
venture.
1. Efficiency Versus Equity
At this point it is important to briefly comment on the structure of a
cooperative arrangement. It must first be stated that there is no best
cooperative arrangement. Both structured and ad hoc cooperative
arrangements have been successful. Second, no set pattern (organizational,
financial, or otherwise), is necessarily best for any one type of cooperative
project. Third, government participation has been an essential aspect of
cooperation in the past, especially at the national level, because international
arrangements involve political and economic decisions that often impact the
national interest.
Defining the "appropriate" level of government involvement is
22
^Behrman, Multinational Production Consortia, pp. 8-9.
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contentious. In Europe, many governments value government-to-
government arrangements far more than industrial arrangements.226 The
European view of U.S.-European industry-to-industry cooperation has
generally been sceptical because of a belief that such endeavors favor U.S.
companies, noting that since U.S. companies are generally larger than
European ones, they therefore tend to dominate any partnership.227
On the other hand, the experience of the Defense Task Board is that
"cooperative programs are generally more successful if the cooperation is
defined and implemented at the industrial level and through direct industry-
to-industry arrangements."228 Government involvement may no longer
even be a requirement under certain cases. This is born out by a new type of
transatlantic arms cooperation between U.S. and European companies that
have begun teaming together in the bidding for contracts without any
government involvement.229
Defining the structure and operation of an arrangement requires
agreement in numerous areas. Resolving the problems of threat definition,
system design, and governments that will participate crosses a large hurdle
towards setting the parameters of a program, but a host of other important
factors must also be considered. With no one aspect of higher priority than
the other, a laundry list of these other considerations would include the
following: procedures for bidding and procurement, financial commitments,
impacts on balance of payments, allocation of production and sales, selection
226 Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," p. 19.
22?STPRI Yearbook 1986. p. 286.
228 Defense Science Board Task Force, "Phase I - NATO Europe," p. 17.
229SIPRT Yearbook 1986. p. 286.
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of companies to participate, pricing and costing procedures, organization and
management, transfer of technology, taxes and duties, legal aspects
(proprietary rights, termination, accession of new members, arbitration of
disputes, liquidation of the arrangement), and provisions to dovetail the
arrangement with other moves toward international integration
Decisions on the factors noted above will influence the roles each
participant will play, the burdens they will bear, as well as the benefits they
may derive. In the process of negotiation, businesses will generally seek
solutions that follow the path of maximum efficiency. On the other hand,
governments, hoping to raise national benefits and reduce national costs,
tend to seek solutions that will equitably distribute the costs and benefits of
cooperation.230 Without discussing the methods of implementation, let it
suffice to say that this objective is usually accomplished by establishing
sharing criteria that specifically stipulate the financial commitments of each
country, outline the payment impacts they are to sustain, allocate production
assignments among the participants, and select the companies to receive
technological inputs.
The simultaneous desire for both efficiency and equity creates an
interesting dilemma. If efficiency is defined in terms of finding the "least
cost" approach to cooperation, and equity is defined in terms of "sharing the
benefits" of cooperation, then efforts to incorporate greater equity in a project
will reduce the benefits that may otherwise be derived through specialization.
Thus, a reduction in efficiency increases the costs of equity(See Figure I).231
230 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p. 26.
231 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p. 2.
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EFFICIENCY SOLUTION
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FIGURE 1
DECISION-MAKING: EFFICIENCY VERSUS EQUITY
(Source: Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p. 7)
Identified as ideal types, a diagram illustrates the relative simplicity of
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decision-making in the efficiency solution as compared to the much more
complex nature of the equity solution . The same basic factors influence the
structure and operation of a project handled under either the efficiency or the
equity solution. However, in the case of "least cost" procurement, only
twenty-two separate decisions are required. Related to the system design, and
influenced by the problem definition, financial commitments, and the
technology to be used, fourteen of these decisions are made by governments.
The rest are made by the contractor and presented to the government for a
price. By contrast, the equity solution involves sixty-eight two-way
relationships in its simplest form. Governments must make a determination
over all these factors, with or without simultaneous negotiation with private
bidding consortia. 232
Under either solution, the complexity of the decision-making process
increases with the addition of each extra participant, but this is especially
obvious in the case for equity. Since each country is generally concerned
with obtaining the maximum benefits that may be derived from a
cooperative program, careful attention is given to negotiating program
guidelines. Thus, when more than two or three nations get involved in a
program the potential for difficulty increases significantly. A case in point
was the Tornado program. Extensive disagreements over its mission and
design resulted in an aircraft which has not been an export success.233
232 Behrman, "Multinational Production Consortia," p. 6.
233
J. Stewart Schwartz, "NATO Arms Cooperation, Technology Transfer, and the National
Interest." (8 December, 1988), p. 9. Unpublished working paper in files of author.
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The friction in the relationship between efficiency and equity is a real
one. While some accommodation between efficiency and equity is usually
made in most decisions, constructing a cooperative arrangement with a
propensity towards greater efficiency or towards greater equity may dictate the
relative potential for success. If one considers the inherent disparities in the
size and capability of defense bases between nations, the record suggests that
too great a focus on equity between disparate participants will foster greater
difficulties and perhaps even failure. A RAND study states that "the U.S.-
European programs that have required a fair amount of compromise, such as
those involving codevelopment, have tended to fail."234 What is significant
is that there has been a shift away from projects dominated by one
nation/company towards those with greater sharing of management
responsibilities and decision-making.
E. NATO TWO-WAY STREET
European members of NATO have long complained about an imbalance
in the flow of arms between Europe and the United States. Despite the
proclaimed benefits of RSI, by the 1970s many West Europeans viewed the
U.S. drive for standardization more as a "Buy American" advertising
campaign235 than as a legitimate U.S. concern over the high state of
inefficiency to which military procurement and operation had developed
within NATO. Indeed, the record for transatlantic trade tended to support this
234 Covington / et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," p. 21.
235 Paul Y. Hammond, David J. Louscher, Michael D. Salomone, and Norman A. Graham,
The Reluctant Supp lipr: U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Sales. (Cambridge, MA:
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc. , 1983), p. 210.
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perception. Military trade ratios between the U.S. and NATO Europe were
variously estimated at anywhere from 6:1 to 13:1 in the early 1970s. In fact, if
one only considers major procurement items, that ratio widened to 18.5:1 in
Fiscal Year 1974, even though the total "military account" financial flows
were almost equal.236
In response to this situation, President Carter pledged to make
transatlantic arms sales more of a "two-way street," on 10 May, 1977, in a
speech before the North Atlantic Council. As a two-way street, not only
would Europe continue to buy technology and arms from the United States,
but the U.S. would make a greater effort to purchase technology and arms
from Europe.237 Indeed, cooperative armaments programs, as previously
noted, were hailed as one of the primary ways to bring forth greater benefits to
both sides of the Atlantic.
U.S. military exports to NATO Europe have continued to remain higher
than its imports. In FY-1984, for example, the ratio of exports to imports was
still 3:1. Furthermore, what is not indicated by this ratio is that a large share
of the U.S. purchases from European and Canadian companies were not even
major contracts, but subcontracts, which generally do not provide the type of
long-term benefits the Europeans have desired, such as technology
development. 238 As a result, one might well conclude that transatlantic
arrangements have been more akin to a "one-way street." Apropos of this
236 President's Report to the Congress on Offsetting the Balance of Payments Deficit for
Fiscal Year 1974 Attributable to Maintaining U.S. Forces in Europe. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, May 27, 1974, as cited by Michael D. Eiland, in "The Two-Way
Street in NATO Procurement," Strategic Review. Vol. V., No. 3, (Summer, 1977), p. 60.
237Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1982), p. 34-35.
238SIPRI Yearbook 1986. p. 283.
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situation, the concept of the two-way street might better be defined as "a
downward adjustment of the ratio of U.S. sales of military equipment and
services to European NATO countries to like U.S. procurement from
Europe."239
A number of factors have been cited as barriers to the free flow of a two-
way street and the dominance of American industry over the European one.
Certainly, these obstacles include European domestic political, economic, and
industrial constraints. 240 However, Eiland has noted two conditions
pertaining to Europe which stand out. 241 First, the fragmented nature of
European industry has interfered with the realization of sufficient size to
create economies of scale. Second, the scale and efficiency of European
research and development has been outmatched by the relatively larger and
technologically superior base of the United States. This inefficient use of
resources has resulted in much higher development and production costs.
Thus, without greater political and industrial integration Europe "just cannot
match the efficiency and productivity of the integrated and relatively
competition-oriented American economy."242
1. European Defense Organizations
Within the last decade, major strides have been taken by the West
Europeans to enhance their relative position to the United States. The desire
of the Europeans to deal co-equally with the United States on security issues
239 Eiland,
"The Two-Way Street. " p. 60.
240An excellent individual analysis of the pressures and constraints on arms procurement
and transfers within France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany is provided by
Hammond, et al., in The Reluctant Supplier, pp. 213-256.
241 Eiland, "The Two-Way Street," pp. 62-63.
242 Eiland, "The Two-Way Street," p. 61.
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and the desire to avoid total domination of their defense and aerospace
industries by the U.S. resulted in the establishment of the Eurogroup and the
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). The Western European
Union (WEU) is another organization which was inspired by the desire for a
"European" solution to defense issues. It is not within the scope of this
chapter to provide an in-depth assessment of these organizations, but a short
synopsis is in order to illustrate progress made in Europe to overcome the
political, economic, and industrial fragmentation that currently hampers real
economies of scale and greater investment in research and development.
The WEU is a seven member organization based upon the revised
Brussels Treaty of 1954. Signatories are committed to providing the
maximum military assistance should any one of them be attacked.243 In 1984,
the WEU underwent a major reactivation, when for the first time in thirty
years of existence the October meeting was attended by both the foreign and
defense ministers of the member nations. They now meet every six months
to discuss defense and security issues. Of special note, the removal of the
remaining restrictions of the 1954 WEU Treaty protocols on the production of
conventional weapons within West Germany has certainly made the WEU
more attractive to the Germans.244
The Eurogroup was established in 1968 to provide a forum for joint
European discussion on defense and security issues, especially those related to
NATO defense planning. Eurogroup stresses practical cooperation between
243
"Western Defense: The European Role in NATO," (Brussels: The Eurogroup; issued by
the NATO Information Service, 1988).
244John Roper, "European Defense Cooperation," in Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Gale
A. Mattox, eds., Evolving Europpan Defense Policies. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1987), pp. 45-46.
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its twelve member countries, with technical subgroups working in the fields
of training, logistics, communications, military medicine, and operational
concepts.245 In the 1970s, Eurogroup collaboration in harmonizing tactical
and operational concepts and in equipment procurement and production,
"marked the real beginning of a European response to U.S. dominance and
the imbalance in transatlantic arms transfers."246
The IEPG was formed in Rome on February 2, 1976. It was established
"to promote European cooperation in research and development, and
production of defense equipment; to improve transatlantic armament
cooperation; and to help maintain a healthy European industrial and
technological defense base."247 It is a thirteen member organization founded
at the suggestion of the NATO Eurogroup Defense ministers who wanted a
forum that would also include strong French participation.248 In 1984, the
Defense Ministers of the member nations took control of the IEPG.
European experience with armaments cooperation had tended to be on
an ad hoc basis. Many of the products jointly produced with the United States
were mainly high-cost versions of U.S. weapons systems.249 In response to
these factors, the IEPG instituted a plan to pursue the expansion of intra-
European cooperation on a systematic and structured basis. In
November, 1988, the IEPG member ministers expressed approval of the plan,
as outlined in the European Defense Industry Study (EDIS), "Towards a
245
"Western Defense," The Eurogroup, 1988.
246
"The Eurogroup," (Brussels: Van Muysewinkel/The Eurogroup; issued by the NATO
Information Service, 1979), as cited by Hammond, et al., The Reluctant Supplier, p. 210.
247
"Western Defense," (The Eurogroup, 1988).
248Covington, et al., "A Review of European Arms Collaboration," p. v.
249Hammond, et al., The Reluctant Supp lier, p. 212.
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Stronger Europe."250 Following the outline of the EDIS study, the Action Plan
delineates three phases for the development of a European defense industrial
base. Competition is the prime feature of their procurement policy. Research
and technology is the second.251
In consonance with these goals, the opening of all-member
procurement systems to other member nations is the first stage. The
identification of components, systems, and sub-systems that can be developed
jointly in the future is the second stage of the IEPG program. The third phase
is the creation of joint programs for basic research and development. Finally,
the IEPG adopted a policy to help its less industrialized members develop
their own defense industries.252 Although the focus of these goals is
European, they are promoted within the purview of NATO since they
contribute to rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. As John
Roper points out, "if the work of the IEPG leads to a more effective use of the
resources provided by the Europeans for research and development, it may
also mean that European armaments become more attractive to the United
States, and this could improve the balance of trade between the two sides of
the Atlantic—the beginning of a two two-way street in defense sales."253
Indeed, this may already be occurring since the Europeans have also "played a
250Thomas C. Linn, "Europe 1992: Security Implications," National Defense loumaL Vol.
LXXIX, No. 451, (October, 1989), p. 24.
251 Lord Trefgarne, "European Defence Collaboration: IEPG Enters a New Phase," NATO
Review. Vol. 37, No. 4, (August, 1989), p. 18.
252 Phases described by Aviva Freudmann, "Europeanization of Weapons? EC Defense
Ministries Push Joint Programs," Atlantic Trade Report. (September 16, 1989), p. 1.
253 Roper, "European Defense Cooperation," in Evolving European Defense Policies, p. 49.
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constructive part in using the opportunities for transatlantic collaboration
created by the Nunn Amendment to the U.S. FY 86 Defense Authorization
Act."254
a. The NFR-90 Project
Case in point is the NATO Frigate Replacement for the 1990s (NFR-90)
Project. Although terminated in January, 1990, the NFR-90 project was
conceived to address the retirement of approximately 60 frigates in the navies
of the eight participating countries (United States, Canada, United Kingdom,
West Germany, France, Spain, Italy and The Netherlands) during the 1990s.
As one of the primary elements of the surface fleet of most NATO navies, a
replacement that would meet future threats was considered vital.
One of the major motivations for the project was economic.
Warships are extremely expensive to build, especially since the cost of the
design, research, development and procurement of the new weapons systems
onboard and the computer programs to run them can be so high. In addition,
documentation, crew training, logistics and life support systems also have to
be included in the total cost. By sharing the up front costs equally between the
eight participating nations, it was estimated that large savings were
achievable.
The NFR-90 was to be a state-of-the-art multi-mission frigate.
While previous frigate designs had tended to be specialized in anti-submarine
or anti-air warfare, NFR-90 was to be multi-mission capable, according to the
mission requirements of the following seven categories: surveillance;
protection of high value units; protection of shipping; area operations;
254
"Western Defense," (The Eurogroup, 1988).
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support of amphibious operation; non-combat operations; and self-defense.
"The differing mission requirements of the participating countries required
the design of a flexible platform that could be readily modified to suit a
variety of equipment and operating practices."255
Overall management of the project was by a steering committee that
consisted of a rear admiral, or civilian equivalent, from each of the eight
participating nations. An assistant steering committee consisting of captains,
or civilian equivalent, from each participating nation reported to the Steering
Committee. On-site management was performed by a mixture of naval
officer and civil servants from each nation that were trained in naval ship
and combat system design. A Supervisory Board, consisting of one executive
from each of the prime contractors, designated for the project by their
respective governments, oversaw the industrial side of the project. The
working language was English, although French was also used at formal
meetings and for documents.256
The frigate was to be built in each nation to a common basic design.
In a unique approach to naval ship design, NFR-90 was a top-down design
approach, rather than the more traditional bottom up. Major equipment,
such as the engines and the generators, would be commonly procured. The
underlying philosophy for acquisition was that non-recurring costs would be
shared. Costs would be pro-rated, based on the number of items that each
nation procured. It was intended that no nation in the project would have a
trade imbalance by participating.
255 Roger L. Schaffer, et al., "Design of the NFR-90," Naval Engineers Journal. (March,
1991), p. 40.
256 Schaffer, "Design of the NFR-90," p. 30.
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Based on eight nations, it was estimated that a maximum savings of
over 25 percent could be achieved on total acquisition cost of a largely
common ship, built in collaboration, relative to a typical purely national
project. As commonality decreased, so did the savings. However, the
recurring cost savings per ship due to commonality is less important than the
non-recurring cost savings due to collaboration.257
TABLE 24
VALUE OF COMMONALITY AND COLLABORATION
Collaboration (59 ships) No Collaboration
Identical Ships National Typical National
Configurations Project (6 Ships)
Recurring Cost 350 383 406
Non-Recurring Cost 18 32 92
Total Acquisition Cost 368 415 498
Relative Savings (%) 26 17 -
SOURCE: Roger L. Schaffer, et al., "Design of the NFR-90," Naval Engineers Journal. (March, 1991), p. 47.
After three nations dropped out of the project in 1989, the number of ships to
be produced was dropped to 35. The design team had already completed a
significant amount of work, including the establishment of the basic design of
the ship, thorough study of the combat system and full estimation of the costs
involved. Costs increased, but savings were still considered substantial.
Despite active support and involvement of the participating navies,
the project was terminated in early 1990 for non-technical reasons. If the
project had continued, it would have been the first U.S. Navy surface
combatant primarily designed by an international organization and possibly
the largest NATO project ever. Technically, the major accomplishment of the
257Schaffer, "Design of the NFR-90," p. 47.
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project was a preliminary design of a technologically advanced, highly capable
ship with a sound cost estimate that validated the advantages of
collaboration. Non-technically, the project demonstrated that international
industry can collaborate on large and complex projects. Since each former
participant nation must now bear the costs and risks of the design and
development of a new ship class on their own, it is unlikely that they will all
be able to pursue as technologically advanced a vessel as the design of NFR-
90. The advantages of an international collaboration program are real, but
the risks are high. In the end, the NFR-90 project was scrapped for political
reasons, but "if the project is constituted to achieve political and economic
objectives along with specific military objectives," the risks of collaboration
can be minimized.258
b. Models
Despite the impediments to greater cooperation, many of the
economic barriers in Europe may be removed as a result of the Single
European Act. Formally adopted and signed on February 28, 1986 by the
twelve nations participating in the European Community, the Single
European Act constitutes a dramatic step towards creating the type of unity
that may enable greater consensus on defense issues as well. Since greater
cooperation in the defense industry is seen as essential to the integration of
the European economy, by amending the Treaty of Rome, which formerly
prohibited the European Community from delving into matters of defense, it
will enable further development of the "total" European defense base.
258 Schaffer, "Design of the NFR-90," p. 49.
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While the Europeans wish to achieve a scale of defense research,
development, and production more on a par with that of the United States, it
does not necessarily mean that they should imitate all aspects of U.S. force
planning, weapon selection, defense budgeting, acquisition, or maintenance
of the U.S. defense industrial base. Indeed, a number of West European
practices are actually far more efficient and effective than those of the U.S..
Jacques Gansler has observed that, despite significant differences between the
European countries, enough similarities exist to group them into a
"European model" that can then be contrasted with the "American model."
Gansler suggests that there are six characteristics of the European system, each
with there own lessons, which the United States would do well to emulate.
They include the following:
*Strong, centralized decision-making on long-term budgets
and programs as well as on procurement policy.
"Long-term (multi-year) stability in programs and budgets.
"Specification by the services of "mission" (performance)
requirements rather than "weapon" (design) requirements.
"Early emphasis on cost as a design requirement and on long-
term affordability" of weapon systems.
"Professionalism throughout the acquisition community.
"Explicit consideration of the industrial base in acquisition decisions
and budget planning.259
259Jacques S. Gansler, Affording Defense. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), pp. 308-
310.
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Without probing each of these characteristics in depth, several
points should be noted that differentiate the European and American models.
First, a major difference between the two approaches lies in the relative roles
played by the U.S. Congress and that of the European parliaments towards the
defense process. Instead of an annual line-by-line review of the defense
budget, for example, the European parliaments focus on a multi-year defense
fiscal plan. Therefore, while they do have an annual review of the budget,
the debate is over the Nth year of the budget rather than the first. This results
in greater stability in resource planning.
A second difference between the two models is the way in which
the defense industry is viewed. Rather than follow the more "laissez-faire"
approach professed in the United States, the Europeans recognize that labor
stability, R&D funding, lower-tier support, effective profits, and even
international competitiveness must be maintained for these firms, if the
characteristics of small quantities and high specialization can be effectively
and efficiently realized in defense work. Each European country has a
government organization to provide oversight of their respective defense
industrial base and to ensure the price competitiveness of their markets.
A third major difference between the models lies in the
organization and the process of acquisition. First, instead of leaving the
entire acquisition process generally up to the desires of each military service,
such as in the United States, the Europeans use the concept of a single buying
agency that is organizationally independent from the military. This is
intended to reduce duplication and to improve long-range planning and
budgeting across all the services. While a single U.S. acquisition agency may
be unrealistic, greater centralization may be more cost-effective.
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Finally, the European test and evaluation program is based on close
cooperation between the military, the government procurement organization
and the contractor. Since a program approved by parliament is assumed to
have the full backing of the government, the goal of testing is to provide for
the military's needs and begin production as soon as possible. This contrasts
with the U.S. system wherein testing and evaluation is used as part of the
decision-making process to decide whether or not a program will continue to
receive funding.
The United States seeks to achieve maximum performance in each
weapon system, while the Europeans seek to minimize cost and risk to
achieve acceptable performance within a limited budget. A comparative
critique of U.S. and European approaches shows that both approaches achieve
the objectives that they set out to realize, but that the investment and the
time required may differ. In general, the Europeans produced lower cost,
lower performance systems than the United States.260
Advantages and disadvantages can be found with both European and
American practices, but the difference between the U.S. defense capacities and
those of the independent European states has been the multiplier providing
the United States with the edge. "In many ways the need for multi-national
programs in Europe mirrors the need for multi-service programs in the
United States."261 Therefore, it may well be that if the Europeans can
integrate their defense bases and learn to cooperate on the scale of the larger
"European" defense industrial base, as a result of EC 92 and IEPG-type
260The preceding five points of difference between the processes of the U.S. and NATO
Europe are cited by Gansler in Affording Defense, pp. 301-305.
261 Gansler, Affording Defense. (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), p. 305.
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programs, size become less of a factor and the advantages of European practice
may give Europe an edge on the United States.
2. A Review of the Lessons Learned
Thirty years of experience with collaboration in Western Europe has
manifested a number of points. First, there is no static formula for success.
However, there are some important factors which can "condition" the degree
of success in international arms cooperation. There must first be a common
perception of a threat and recognition of a genuine need for a product. That
product must be clearly defined by strong, shared agreement over the basic
military requirements for the product. Therefore, there must be a
compatibility of interests and resources between partners. Clearly, a limited
number of partners, such as in a bilateral or trilateral arrangement, is more
manageable since it becomes increasingly difficult to satisfy larger numbers of
partners, each with slightly different capabilities and requirements.
Most cooperative projects have involved two or three of the largest
defense producers in Europe: France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom. The involvement of countries with smaller defense industrial
bases can complicate an arrangement since their interests and resources often
differ from the larger countries, especially when one considers that it has
often been difficult to arrange an equitable distribution of costs and benefits
on a project-by-project basis even amongst the bigger nations. "It has proved
much more difficult to involve the smaller European countries in joint
projects, and they have—as the F-16 purchase by Belgium, Denmark, the
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Netherlands, and Norway demonstrates—frequently found it cheaper to buy
from U.S. rather than European sources."262
Since dovetailing national interests with economic means can be
difficult, the central problem of any cooperative project is a political one.
However, governments will cooperate when it is in their interest to do so.
Governments are motivated by the opportunities for an improved balance of
trade, higher employment, access to higher technology, the potential for an
improved defense industrial base, a stronger military alliance and, of course,
the need for a program which they are unable to pursue without
collaboration. Therefore, governments are generally more concerned with
the equitability of a project than its efficiency. This is manifested by the fact
that once an equitable agreement on sharing is reached, many of the barriers
to collaboration are removed. On the other hand, since strong leadership and
management is required for any project to be successful, industry must be in
consonance with government. Motivated by profit, industry tends to follow
the path of maximum efficiency. However, industry will compromise when
access to higher technology and to new markets is probable.
No set pattern or cooperative arrangement is considered best.
While design defines the product, based on military requirements, the
character of the participants and the project itself define the organizational
and management structure of a joint venture. Most arrangements have
tended to be ad hoc, although that is not always desirable. Across a range of
projects a much broader framework is required for long-term multilateral
military and industrial collaboration. In any case, close government-to-
262 Roper, "European Defense Cooperation," in Evolving European Defense Policies, p. 47.
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government ties are crucial at the decision-making stages to ensure that there
is a compatibility of interests between participant nations. Close industry-to-
industry ties are also important for the implementation of product definition.
Obviously, government and industry must cooperate at every level. It is not
an easy process, but if the military objectives can be matched with the
economic and political objectives, the rewards for international cooperation
can be high. In an increasingly international and interdependent world,
international arms cooperative programs are becoming increasingly popular,
especially as defense budgets decline. The growing internationalization of
defense industries demands that government and industry develop strong
ties world-wide. Foreign military sales, offshore sourcing, foreign direct
investment, international teaming arrangements, international cooperative
programs, foreign technology developments and offsets are becoming the
staple of the defense business.
Certainly, a strong domestic economy and indigenous defense
industrial base reduce the requirement for such activities, but even the
massive U.S. defense base is unable to support all of the needs of the U.S.
military. The U.S. Department of Defense must purchase thousands of
materials, parts, components and finished goods from foreign manufacturers.
European governments have realized that there are no major defense
equipment items they can continue to produce on a single-country basis.263
Strong cooperative programs provide the opportunity for significant cost
savings that might not otherwise be available through domestic manufacture.
263 Roper, "European Defense Cooperation," p. 47.
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Access to new markets, technology, stronger alliance ties and a host of other
benefits provide additional incentives.
Having reviewed some of the lessons of collaborative efforts in NATO,
the question still remains to be answered whether the United States can or
should pursue armaments cooperation in the Third World, or more
specifically, in Latin America. With regard to "should" the United States
pursue such arrangements in Latin America, the answer is yes, if a need for a
product of mutual interest and design exists. There is no reason that the U.S.
should limit cooperative opportunities to only one sector of the world.
However, whether the United States "can" pursue such arrangements is
more equivocal.
a. Impediments to Cooperation with the Third World
A reluctance by the armed forces of the United States to accept foreign
designs, economic protectionism, and U.S. restrictions on technology transfer
have been cited as some of the main reasons why U.S. experience with
Europe in cooperative arms endeavors has been more modest in the past.264
These same points especially apply to the Third World.
U.S. regulations and restrictions are a large impediment. The
record on memorandums of understanding (MOU) provides an example.
Since the 1950s, the United States has entered into at least 87 government-to-
government MOUs. DOD Directives 2000.9 and 5530.3 offer the principal
guidance related to cooperative international agreements. They specify the
offices that are authorized to negotiate and approve the MOUs, but are less
specific with regard to the exact criteria and procedures for this process. The
264STPRT Yparhook 1986. p. 283.
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National Disclosure Policy outlines the criteria for reviewing MOUs.265 Since
NDP-1 is the document which governs the level of classification of military
information and technology which may be legally transferred to each foreign
nation it automatically places a cap on the type and extent of cooperation
which may be extended to any particular government through an MOU.266
In an examination of MOUs, the 1989 GAO Report, Military
Coproduction, stated that reasonable review and approval procedures had
been followed in all these cases, including coordinating with the appropriate
DOD and State offices, submitting legal and fiscal memorandums with draft
agreements, delegating authority to negotiate and conclude the agreements,
providing negotiating guidance, requiring third country transfer provisions,
and ensuring that the programs were in accordance with the National
Disclosure Policy or an exception or amendment to it.267 However, NATO
members were allowed more immediate entry and more extensive access
into the transfer arena with the United States than most other countries.268
A different attitude seems to prevail for allies who are not members
of "The Club." They are often treated to a more rigorous review process. In
addition, administrative delays are especially prevalent in the United States.
This makes attempts to create arrangements with non-NATO allies, like
those in Latin America, difficult. As a result, bureaucratic and overly
protective security procedures "can thwart the best intentions to cooperate"
265 Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Military Coproduction: U.S. Management of Programs Worldwide.
GAO/NSIAD-89-117,(March 22, 1989), p. 12.
266 Personal interview with William Withers, at the Pentagon, OP-615, 20 July, 1989, on
material pertaining to technology transfers.
267GAO/NSIAD-89-117, p. 12.
268 Interview, Withers, 20 July, 1989.
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and cause time delays that make the technical exchanges required for
industrial cooperation difficult. As one international defense consultant
quipped, "its like saying 'Let me sell you this car... but first, come back in three
months so that I can do the paperwork'."269
Obviously, another area of concern is the Buy America Act and the
Arms Export Control Act. The United States will not normally set up
companies to compete economically with the U.S. Transatlantic cooperation
with Europe has been relatively vibrant because the arms industry in Europe
is long-established and the general consensus has been that the United States
was not setting up new competitors. 270 The recent development of U.S.
defense industrial ties with the Asian "tigers," such as Japan and Korea, is
largely based on U.S. attempts to gain access to new technologies that these
newly industrialized countries have developed. On the other hand, this is
not the case with Latin America, whose emerging defense industrial base still
lacks the necessary know-how to indigenously produce the end-item weapons
platforms that would compete with the hi-tech systems produced in the
United States, such as the F-18 aircraft. Therefore, the United States is
reluctant to help establish an infrastructure for such activities in Latin
America.
Although Latin American defense industries have not been able to
compete in the hi-tech market, a growing capability at the mid-grade
technology level suggests that higher technology hurdles are being mastered
269 Personal Interview with John Forster of Forster & Associates: Defense Consultants,
Arlington, Va., 19 July, 1989. Former defense contractor and a retired Navy Captain who has
worked extensively on arms transfers problems.
270persona i interview with Wayne Laskofski, a civilian expert on European arms transfers
who works in the Pentagon for the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Washington, DC,
18 July, 1989.
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in Latin America. Argentina's FAMA, for example, is one of five offshore
aircraft manufacturers who have teamed with U.S. firms to compete for the
U.S. Navy /U.S. Air Force Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS).
Matched with the U.S. firm LTV, FAMA is proposing the IA-63 Pampa as its
bid for a contract that would involve the procurement of nearly 800 aircraft
for both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force undergraduate flight training
programs.271 Another area of increasing capability is represented by Brazilian
missile technology.
Still, a dearth of hi-tech end-item production capability is especially
true of the naval arms industry in Latin America. Even Brazil, whose
indigenous arms production capabilities are the most advanced of all Latin
American states, still requires significant maturation of its latent naval arms
industry before a stage can be reached where codevelopment projects might be
genuinely feasible. To elaborate, Michael Moodie posited a 'seven-rung
ladder' which a country might pursue before it can become fully capable of
designing and manufacturing a product indigenously. These stages are noted
as follows:
Stage One is the establishment of facilities for the maintenance and
overhaul of weapons systems bought off-the-shelf from a major defense
contractor in a traditional supplier country. An example of this would be a
naval dockyard devoted to the refitting of vessels procured from a foreign
prime contractor. Obviously, some training of local personnel would need to
be undertaken by the contractor for the weapons system to the user.
Stage Two is the graduation to the assembly of weapons that are
supplied in knock-down kit form by the established producer.
Stage Three is reached when the assembly operation is
271 Clay Umbach, "JPATS - USN/USAF Joint Primary Aircraft Training System," Naval
Aviation News. (May /June 1992), pgs. 10-11.
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complemented by a modicum of fabrication, mainly confined to simple
components made under license.
Stage Four is reached when the local fabrication operation extends
to the manufacture of complete assemblies and sophisticated components,
including an entire weapons platform.
Stage Five is the basis of a new level of development. While local
manufacture at the previous levels depended on the blueprints provided by
the established foreign manufacturer, increasing familiarity with the
production process enable the design and production of sub-systems which
can be 'added-on' to the main weapons platform. Technologically
undemanding, initial indigenously-designed add-ons require little research
and development or accumulated expertise.
Stage Six is reached when incremental improvements of
indigenous design transform the original design into a new weapons system.
The more complex components are generally still off-the-shelf purchases or
built under license. It is usual in ship-building that virtual autonomy is
reached in hull design and production well in advance of an equivalent
capability in engine or electronics.
Stage Seven is attained only when a defense industrial base is
competent in all aspects of design and production of a dedicated weapons
system.
It must be noted that a country may not necessarily adhere to these 'stages' in
strict format, over-lapping stages of development and/or bypassing stages,
such as in a 'turn-key' operation where a producer is contracted to provide an
entire production complex, a package that will bring a user directly to licensed
production.272
272 Stages of indigenous arms development from Michael Moodie, Sovereignty. Security and
Arms. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), as cited by Daniel Todd in "Technology
Transfer and Naval Construction: Part I," Naval Forces: International Forum for Maritime
Power, No. V, Vol IX, (1988), pgs, 46-48.
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According to the stages that Moodie depicts, naval arms
development in Latin America is progressing, but it is slow. Argentina, for
example, has been building Meko-class frigates and TR-1700 submarines with
the Germans and Brazil has been building Niteroi/Leander-class corvettes
with the British and ME-209 submarines with the Germans. However, using
Moodies* hierarchy, a plateau has been reached at approximately the fifth or
sixth rungs. For example, while Brazil is now capable of constructing most of
its own hulls, the Brazilians must still buy many of their weapons systems
elsewhere. Unless data packages can be bought which will jump-start their
capabilities in naval development, a general lack of funds and a lack of high
technology will hinder naval production in Latin America, thereby reducing
the chance for international armaments cooperation with the United States -
at least at the high end of the technology spectrum.
An area worthy of consideration is in the lower tiers of defense
contracting. The loss of indigenous sources of sub-system parts, components,
and systems from the U.S. defense industrial base suggest that greater access to
diversified sources will make the United States less vulnerable to
dependency. Therefore, the United States stands to gain from aggressively
pursuing access to newly emerging, developing countries, such as in Latin
America, for the inexpensive production of sub-system components rather
than end items. Indeed, as the Defense Science Board has noted, "cooperation
on the subsystem level is easier and more successful than cooperation on the
larger weapon systems. Smaller efforts have lower visibility and attract less
political attention."273
273Memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense on the International
Industry-to-industry Armaments Cooperation Meeting signed by Gerald Sullivan, Executive
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According to the Defense Intelligence Agency's former senior
political-military estimator for Latin America, David Pagni, Brazil offers the
greatest potential for the cheap acquisition of manufactured parts and
components in Latin America. Although unit prices are small, the potential
for volume sales produces significant interest for their manufacturers. The
Brazilians are therefore very interested in the coproduction of second-tier
industry products and Pagni believes that the Brazilians would sign the
GSOMIA agreement if the United States is willing to pursue teaming
arrangements in this area.274
A case study on Brazil illustrates that Latin Americans excel at the
production of weapons platforms and systems at the lower-end of the
technology spectrum. Since the indigenous equipment devised by the
Brazilians is based on military requirements their military services have
established for operation in the harsh jungle and desert environments of
Latin America, it is also often the most suitable for use in the types of
environments in which future conflict may occur. Since, in all probability,
"low intensity" warfare will continue to occur sporadically throughout the
Third World, Latin American experience holds great promise for the United
States in developing rewarding cooperative arrangements in this lower-tech
sector of armaments production.
Secretary, Defense Science Board Task Force on Armaments Cooperation, (Washington, D.C., 8
December, 1982), p. 77.
274 Personal interview with David Pagni, Senior Latin American Political-Military
Estimator for the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 18 July, 1989.
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B. BRAZIL: CASE STUDY
Brazil has gained the spotlight in recent years by emerging as a Third
World leader in the international arms market. Few other nations in the
developing world have assumed the risks necessary to develop an indigenous
arms industry, let alone an export-oriented one. Selling arms on the
international market is a perilous business, generally requiring heavy
investment with no guarantees of a profit. On the other hand, arms
purchased off the shelf are relatively inexpensive. Brazil, however, has
overcome most of the barriers to successful entry into the trade by offering a
well-diversified assortment of arms with qualities that other Third World
nations find particularly attractive. In fact, some of Brazil's wares are so
attractive that sales have not been limited to the developing states, but have
also found recipients amongst the industrialized world, as well. What makes
this even more remarkable is that Brazil has managed these achievements in
a relatively short time, making its mark as one of the world's top exporters of
arms in less than two decades.
This chapter deals with the development of the Brazilian arms industry.
It is broken into two historical periods, prior to 1964, during the very early
years of setting a foundation for the Brazilian arms industry, and after 1964,
when the industry actually developed into the form in which it exists today.
Finally, a review of the Brazilian decision-making process in the sale of arms
offers a glimpse of the actors which influence the Brazilian system of arms
exports.
1. Data Availability
A problem common to all arms transfers data is that different sources
use different methods for compiling and representing data, which accounts
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for one reason why information on transfers, even over the same time frame,
may differ. It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate and reliable data on
Brazilian arms exports because the Brazilian production and transfer of arms
is generally shrouded in a veil of secrecy by the Brazilian government. Sales
are often disguised under a variety of categories which make transactions
very difficult to uncover. An armored vehicle, for example, might be
registered for export to Libya by the Carteira de Comercio Exterior (CACEX),
the foreign trade department of the Bank of Brazil, as part of "other
automotive vehicles," or as "any other part and piece for non-automotive
vehicles," or under a variety of other imaginative categories.275 This also
holds true for figures on Brazilian military expenditures since "military
spending falls under a number of budget heads beyond those of the army,
navy and air force."276
Few published figures are available on Brazilian arms exports.
Government figures are often low, while the industrialist, eager to attract
new customers, may cite inflated figures. High inflation rates compound the
difficulty in arriving at a final estimation of the value of these transactions.
Therefore, even "reliable" sources, such as the yearly Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reference, World Armaments
and Disarmament, may not be completely accurate. However, because these
sources do follow a consistent process of data collection on an annual basis,
275 Scott Tollefson, "Introduction," Brazilian Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: The Search for
Autonomy. PhD Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies, (May, 1991), p. 11.
276SIPRI Yearbook 1988, World Armaments and Disarmament. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988), p. 151.
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they are reliable for indicating relative trends in Brazilian exports. So, with
this caveat, tables and figures in this essay are presented at face value.
2. The Development of an Arms Industry
The overriding characteristic that separates the Brazilian arms industry
from other Third World producers is "partnership with, and not
monopolization by, the state."277 The relationship between industry and the
state finds its roots in early twentieth-century Brazilian history, when it was
recognized that a strong industrial base was a prerequisite for developing and
maintaining a viable defense industry. An alliance was formed between the
state, industry, and the military. The military acts as the liaison between the
state and industry, as a partner and representative of both entities. The
military consciously exerts its influence on both industry and the state to
ensure that the needs of Brazilian national security are served. Thus, it is the
military which has guided the scope and direction of the Brazilian arms
industry. Today, the economic reality of finances inspires both the state and
the military to follow a pragmatic approach to commerce by giving industry
relatively free reign to export. So, instead of forcing the production of arms
only on the military wish list, Brazilian defense firms receive the political
and financial support necessary to develop products which cater to
international demand, too.278
277Patrice Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership:' Lessons From the Brazilian Arms
Industry," Tournal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (Winter 87-88; Vol. 29, No. 4), p.
46.
27
°Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership," p. 41.
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a. The Early Years
The Brazilian motivation for the development of an autonomous
arms industry is rooted in events that took place over a century ago. They
stem from perceptions of vulnerability and lack of control over their own
destiny because of an inadequate defense posture. These perceptions were
first realized in the mid-nineteenth century when Brazil suffered setbacks at
the hands of Paraguay. During the Paraguayan War, fought between 1864
and 1870, the small state of Paraguay was able to successfully defend itself
against the tripartite coalition of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The poor
showing of the alliance surprised Brazilians and cast real doubt on Brazil's
ability to secure its own borders. Furthermore, a historic rivalry between
Brazil and Argentina convinced the Brazilian military that the possibilities
for future conflict were not remote. The Paraguayan War thus served as a
catalyst for the creation of the first powder and cartridge factories in Brazil in
the 1870s.279
Brazil, however, was an agricultural nation. The Brazilian military
recognized at an early stage that effective military strength and the further
development of an arms industry would be contingent upon developing an
independent industrial base if such a goal was to be supported. It would take
well over half a century before such an infrastructure could be created.
The Brazilian philosophy of Seguranca e Desenvolvimento, that view
of national security which postulates that economic growth is a
prerequisite for national security, stipulated that simply developing an
armaments industry separate from the larger industrial process was
folly.280
279Clovis Brigagao, "The Brazilian Arms Industry," Journal of International Affairs. Vol.
40, No. 1 (Summer, 1986), p. 104.
280patrjce Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership:" Lessons From the Brazilian Arms
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Between the tail end of the nineteenth century and 1930, Brazil
began a very tentative process of transforming from an agricultural economy
into an economy with a more diversified base. Foreign capital, especially
from Britain, was a critical factor in the development of light industry and the
expansion of business enterprises at the turn of the century. Growing
urbanization also helped to foster the development of light industry. In 1907,
for example, 57% of industrial output was based on the production of textiles,
clothing, shoes, and food processing.281 An increase in the consumption of
cement and steel, as well as an increase in the importation of capital goods,
indicated that the basis for heavy industry was slowly developing.
The Brazilian economy, however, continued to rely primarily on
cash crops - especially coffee - for foreign exchange. In 1910, half of the
nation's exports and one third of the federal resources were provided by one
region, Sao Paulo, from coffee cultivation.282 With coffee the core of
Brazilian foreign exchange, the political elites were averse to change. So, with
little attempt at real structural reform, a mono-crop economy subjected Brazil
to the cyclic disruptions caused by changing international demand.
"The absence of a domestic industrial base meant that the armed
forces were locked into dependence on foreign suppliers."283 Problems
Industry, " Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. (Winter 87-88; Vol. 29, No. 4),
p. 47.
281 Richard F. Nyrop, ed., Brazil: A Country Study, 4th ed., (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 6.
282 Robert G. Wesson and David V. Fleischer, eds., Brazil in Transition. (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 9.
283 Stanley E. Hilton, "The Armed Forces and Industrialist in Modern Brazil: The Drive for
Military Autonomy," Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 62, No. 4, (November, 1982),
p. 632.
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associated with dependence on foreign suppliers of arms included the
purchase of inferior items that were either badly damaged or unusable; the
purchase of items that deteriorated in the Brazilian climate; and the purchase
of items that were incompatible with other weapons and ammunition in the
Brazilian inventory. In addition, the delay between the purchase and the
arrival of goods was not only an irritant, but could prove hazardous during a
crisis.
The unpredictability of foreign suppliers was underscored by the
onset of World War I when Brazil's access to her major source of arms -
Germany - was cut off by the war. By the end of World War I, there was
universal discontent within the Brazilian officer corps in regard to the
material plight of the military. Brazil sought to purchase arms from France,
the United States, Britain and Italy but could ill-afford to purchase their costly
hardware. Thus, in the presidential address to Congress of 1919, Brazilian
President Moreira da Costa Ribeiro stated that the development of an
indigenous arms industry was to be a primary national security objective of
Brazil, with the purpose of gradually freeing Brazil from foreign
dependence. 284
A major question arose concerning the kind of relationship that
should be established between the private and the public sector in industry.
As early as 1908, one Brazilian minister of war, General Hermes da Fonseca,
had openly argued that "the state, as an industrialist, should undertake no
action except to fill gaps left by private industry; [and] never to compete with
28
* Frank D. McCann, "The Formative Period of Twentieth-Century Brazilian Army
Though, 1900-1922," Hispanic American Historical Review. Vol. 64, No. 4, (November, 1984),
p. 762.
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it "285 Consensus amongst the military elite corroborated this assessment,
believing that the profit-incentives of the private sector would ensure the
more efficient production of superior products.
The need to balance both economic and commercial imperatives in the
Brazilian defense industry finds its roots in Brazil's development
philosophy and its vision of the role of the state in the process of
modernization. 286
In concert with this thinking the military targeted the metallurgical
industries for development. Since only a very few small steel mills existed in
Brazil in the early 1900s, self-sufficiency in steel was a necessary goal if the
foundation of an arms industry was to be created. The Wenceslau Bras Law
was enacted, in 1918, as authorization for governmental loans to encourage
private production of steel. In 1923, this law was revised to guarantee profit
incentives for cooperating firms.
b. Setting the Foundation
1930 is a crucial turning point in Brazilian history. Using broad
executive powers, President Getulio Vargas (1930-1945; 1950-1955), began to
institute vast structural changes in Brazil. A critical proponent for
"progressive nationalism," Vargas used his long tenure to implement large-
scale industrial reform, the bedrock that was to enable the rapid growth of the
Brazilian arms industry in the 1960s.
In a virtual dictatorship, from 1937 to 1945, Vargas encouraged the
development of heavy industry through policies aimed at import-
substitution industrialization. Protective tariffs were raised to help nurture
285 Hilton, "Industrialist," p. 643.
^^Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership," p. 47.
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infant industries and the use of domestically acquired resources and products
was increased. As a result, iron, steel, and cement production expanded
tremendously. Between 1930 and 1940, the number of industrial plants in
Brazil tripled and the annual rate of industrial production grew at 11%
annually. 287 Industrialization also spawned new services and technologies,
including communications, road, and railroad networks.
Vargas forged a careful alliance with the military, using them as an
agency of national reconstruction. In many ways, both the military's self-
image and its view of the nation were interwoven.288 (As a result of long
experience with dependence on foreign arms suppliers, it had become the
mission of the Brazilian military to wage a campaign for an autonomous
arms industry). In a repeat of World War I, the start of World War II
reemphasized the importance of independence. The British blockade of
Europe terminated the delivery of arms which Brazil had purchased from
Germany, forcing Brazil to seek arms elsewhere. The United States offered
military assistance if Brazil would sign Lend-Lease. In compliance, Brazil
joined the war against its former trading partner, sending a 25,000 troop
expeditionary force to fight in Italy - even though Brazil considered
Argentina, and not the Axis powers, its primary threat.289
Definitive strides were taken to develop the military-industrial
autonomy of Brazil in the 1940s. The list of civilian industries collaborating
with the Brazilian military was growing. Certainly the circumstances of
287Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development. 2nd ed, (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 15.
288McCann, "1900-1922," p. 738.
289 Hilton, "Industrialist," p. 651.
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World War II served as a catalyst for propelling the development of defense-
related industries. The founding of a broad alliance between the state and
private industry promoted the production of military products - especially
since the state offered industry special incentives, such as exemptions and
guaranteed profits, to "turn defense."
The Ministry of War worked to ease the barriers to infant
companies by insuring the provision of military technical assistance,
licensing, and various forms of financial backing. Research and development
labs, a weapons testing lab, technical schools, and even defense oversight
agencies were founded to create the necessary defense research and
development infrastructure. Additionally, the procurement and use of
domestically produced goods became dictum. If local procurement was not
possible, then all attempts would be made to ensure that technology transfers
were written into contracts.
By the 1950s, industry was expanding at a rate of 8% a year, with an
average annual increase in the Gross Domestic Product of 6.8%. Brazil basked
in a "special relationship" with the United States, who was inundating Brazil
with American dollars and surplus military equipment. For the first time in
Brazil's history, "internal demand rather than external factors provided the
stimulus for economic growth."290 In 1952, Brazil signed a defense
agreement with the United States, joining the U.S. Military Assistance
Program (MAP) and ensuring the flow of aid. Ironically, the Brazilian
defense program slowed during this period,291 perhaps as a result of greater
290 Nyrop, Country Study, 20.
291 This can be contrasted with the effect of becoming a pariah state, such as South Africa,
whose arms industries developed specifically because of being boycotted.
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reliance on U.S. paternalism, but Brazil had finally developed the industrial
capacity to support an indigenous arms industry.
c. From Net Importer to Net Exporter
In 1964, a military coup in Brazil signaled a new era. The military
would remain in power for twenty-one years. It was during this time that the
Brazilian arms industry mushroomed and entered into the export market.
Three distinct periods have been identified by Clovis Brigagao in the
development of the modern Brazilian arms industry: 1964-1967; 1967-1978;
and 1978 to the present.
The first phase coincides with the military administration of
General Castello Branco. By the early 1960s the Brazilian economy had begun
to lag. Brazil fell short on its foreign debt payments. In an effort to revitalize
the economy, the military government instituted the Plan of Industrial
Mobilization. Excess capacity in such industries as steel, automobile,
aeronautics, and electronics, were harnessed to help modernize the aging
American military surplus in the Brazilian inventory. Increasing U.S.
involvement in Vietnam helped spur these efforts as restrictions on the U.S.
MAP program and dwindling American military surplus stemmed the flow
of military aid to Brazil. The Brazilian government began to subsidize greater
expansion of the civilian industrial base into the production of defense
equipment, such as trucks, jeeps, and communications gear. The aim of the
military government was to make the infant defense industry the most
modern sector of the Brazilian industrial economy.292
Alexandre de Barros points out that the military was one of the few
292 Brigagao, "Brazilian Arms Industry," p. 106.
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institutions that had been able to think of the development of the arms
industry as a long term investment.293 Indeed, since the 1930s and 1940s, the
military had been training specialists in steel technology,
telecommunications, and engineering-related fields. Some officers were sent
abroad to study technical fields, others pursued degrees at the Brazilian
Military Institute of Engineering. In the mid-1950s, the Air Force started the
Aeronautic Institute of Technology (ITA) in the town of Sao Jose dos Campos
for college-level training. Also located in this same complex was the
Aerospace Technical Center (CTA), which had originally been established for
research purposes in 1945. In 1961, a privately-owned research and design
facility to produce rockets, the Brazilian Aerospace Industry, Inc. (Avibras),
was also founded in Sao Jose dos Campos in order that it could collaborate
with CTA.294 This town represents the embryo of the Brazilian arms
industry.
The second phase of development of the modern Brazilian arms
industry coincided with the Brazilian "economic miracle" (1967-1974), a
period of phenomenal economic growth and activity. In the mid-1960s,
Branco had instituted a "gradual" approach to reviving the economy from
the recession of the early 1960s. The initial lack of confidence in the new
military government by foreign and domestic investors had changed by the
beginning of the second military administration. Under General Artur da
Costa e Silva, one of the more authoritarian of the Brazilian military
presidents, the economy began to flourish. Annual real growth of the GDP
293 Alexandre de S.C. Barros, "Brazil," in Arms Production in Developing Countries: An
Analysis of Decision-Making , ed. James Everett Katz, (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and
Company, 1984), p. 75.
294 Barros, "Brazil," p. 76.
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surged to an average of 11.3 %, with industry finally emerging as the leading
sector.295 An expansionary government policy, merged with the attempt to
harness the idle industrial capacity from the previous administration,
sparked an economic boom period. Combining this with a new favorable
international environment, Brazilian exports increased an average rate of
27% a year.2%
A specific import substitution policy was aimed at the defense
sector. U.S. decisions to limit military technology transfers, such as when the
United States terminated MAP grant aid to Brazil in 1968 because of an arms
control dispute, accelerated Brazilian initiatives to develop their domestic
military production. While previous government initiatives to stimulate
private industry's involvement in the defense sector had met with some
success, they were hampered by the relatively low level of manufacturing
technology available in Brazil. However, by the late 1960s the Brazilians were
making rapid advances in the sophistication of their production processing.
In 1968, for example, a privately-owned engineering firm in Sao Paulo,
Specialized Engineers, Inc. (Engesa), produced the prototypes for its first
armored and amphibious vehicles, the Cascavel and the Urutu, using
completely indigenous Brazilian technology. These prototypes met the
Brazilian Army's specifications for durable, domestically-produced cross-
country vehicles to replace their aging U.S. military trucks. Then, in 1969, a
semi-public firm was established, the Brazilian Aeronautics Company
(Embraer), to manufacture and market civilian and military aircraft. This
company was designated by the Brazilian government to be the organ for
295 Baer, Brazilian Economy, p. 98.
296 Baer, Brazilian Economy, p. 104.
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managing all future government aircraft manufacturing programs.297
In 1973, the quadrupling of world oil prices, combined with a
relatively low total of government defense requisitions, created a financial
crisis for the nascent defense industry. Obviously, in an industry that relies
on expensive research and development, the costs can be enormous. This
problem was solved in three ways. First, was the encouragement of
coproduction ventures with European firms - to be established in Brazil
under the approval of the Brazilian military. Second, the government
dramatically increased borrowing of foreign capital to help fuel post-1974
economic growth. The military was then able to use the power of a nonpublic
governmental directive (secret decree) to increase the military share of the
federal budget so that greater funds could be allocated to military research and
defense-related firms could be assisted through "credits."298 Third, Brazil
started to switch from import substitution to export promotion of its military
hardware. Since Brazil was unable to sustain the production runs required to
make the defense industry cost-effective based on internal demand from the
military, a new emphasis on penetrating foreign markets and entering joint
ventures became the key to continued growth and development of the
Brazilian arms industry.
The first major Brazilian international arms sales were delivered by
Engesa, in 1974, to Libya and Bolivia. The sales total was $65 million. By
contrast, the sum total of Brazilian arms export sales between 1954 and 1973
297Rexford A. Hudson, "Brazil's Foreign Military Sales Program," Department of Defense
intelligence document, Defense Intelligence Agency, (31 January 1985), p. 3.
29
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was $14.1 million.299
The Brazilian War Materiel Company (Imbel) was created, in 1975,
under the direct control of the army to help mobilize investment and
commercialization of the export/import needs of the Brazilian defense
industry. Imbel's policy for foreign companies that wanted to set up shop in
Brazil requires that they "bring capital, technology and, most important, the
addresses of international customers."300 In 1982 the chairmanship of Imbel
was switched from military to civilian hands to encourage greater efficiency,
but it is still a mixed enterprise that has representatives from the state and the
military.301
In response to harassment by the Carter administration over
reported Brazilian human rights violations, in 1977, the military government
of General Geisel formally renounced the 1952 defense pact with the United
States. By severing military assistance ties with the United States, Brazil
entered into a new phase of indigenous armaments development. Brazilian
arms exports were soon to rival the exports of more traditional crops such as
coffee and sugar.
By the 1980s, Brazil was transformed from being a net importer of
arms, to being a net exporter. Over 80% of the equipment used by the
Brazilian armed forces was indigenously manufactured.302 As an example of
the growing strength of this industry, between 1982 and 1986, Embraer's
^Hudson, "Foreign Military Sales," p. 4.
300 Brigagao, "Brazilian Arms Industry," p. 108.
301 90% of Imbel is now private, although 51% of the voting stock is controlled by the
government. Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership," p. 32.
302 Alan Riding, "Brazil's Burgeoning Arms Industry," The New York Times. (3 November,
1985), p. 4 F.
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exports increased from $95.1 million to $375 million per year. Three
production aircraft, the Bandeirante, the Brasilia, and the Tucano, have all
witnessed strong international sales. In 1987, Embraer earned approximately
$380 million in export revenues. Embraer is now the largest aircraft
manufacturer in the Third World, and it is focusing a greater proportion of its
sales towards the developed world. On the other hand, Engesa is now
recognized as the largest exporter of armored, wheeled vehicles in the
world.303 Engesa and Avibras are concentrating sales in the developing
world.
In 1985, the military finally returned to the barracks. Curiously, during
the military's tenure in government, much of the their hardware was aging
U.S. surplus. The military was averse to increasing military outlays for their
own benefit whilst they retained the power of government. Alfred Stepan
quotes Admiral Maria do Amaral Oliveira, then-commandant of the
Brazilian Superior War College (ESG), in 1981:
We have been restricting ourselves in weapons requests in order to get a
good image as a government. It is hard to ask a military government for
this support because we are government. It will be easier for the military
to advance our legitimate claims against a government led by a
civilian."30*
303 Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership," p. 58.
304 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 57.
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3. Brazilian Arms Industry Today
Brazil has become one of the ten largest exporters of arms in the
world,305 and is arguably the largest in the Third World.306 Brazil exports
between 85-90 percent of the arms which it produces, and SIPRI contends that
Brazil is the Third World country with the greatest potential for growth in
arms production.307 In the 1980s, Brazil has been variably listed as ranking
between fifth and eighth in the value of its arms exports, depending on the
particular year and the particular source. Although there is a quantum
difference in the level of sophistication and total arms production and exports
of Brazil compared to the front-running developed nations, such as the
United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, Brazil has
developed a reputation as a reliable source for simple, durable, and
operationally effective weapons systems.
Three factors help influence Brazilian sales contracts. First, Brazilian
prices are generally very reasonable - an important consideration for resource
constrained Third World nations; second, Brazil entertains payment in
various forms, including barter; and third, Brazilian transactions are not
normally complicated by overly political entanglements, such as "end-use"
restrictions. Only two nations are currently known to be black-listed as
recipients of Brazilian arms exports - South Africa and Cuba.
305 Michael Brozoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World. (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 112.
306 Michael Kepp, "Brazil Now Largest Supplier of Arms to Third World," San Diego
Union, 28 February, 1988, p. 21.
307Herbert Wulf, "Arms Production in the Third World," in World Armaments and
Disarmament : SIPRT Yearbook 1985. (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 332 as cited by Scott
Tollefson, "Introduction," p. 1.
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a. The Brazilian Arms Process
The following section will examine the general decision-making
process that is followed in the transaction of a sale - including the major
actors and their roles in the Brazilian arms industry.
(1) Policy. There are few formal laws that govern the sale of
Brazilian arms, but rather a set of diplomatic, security and commercial
formalities. However, Brazilian arms sales are guided by a policy known as
the National Policy for the Export of Military-Use Material (PNEMEM).
Developed in the 1970s, the PNEMEM provides a framework for
coordinating arms sales decision-making procedures. While the initial sales
process was laborious and time-consuming, with one report stating that 700
signatures were required for the approval of a sale, this process has been
streamlined in the intervening years to cut down on bureaucratic delays.308
Rather than using armaments as a political tool, the government
encourages the companies to treat their products as economic goods, to be
traded commercially just so long as such sales do not come into direct
conflict with, or undermine the foreign policy objectives of the
government. 309
The PNEMEM states that only government-to-government sales
are allowed. The Brazilians are very strict about this rule. Prospective sales
must withstand the test of government approval, on a case-by-case basis.
However, several of the other stated policies are not necessarily adhered to as
closely, but are weighed on a pragmatic, cost-benefit basis. To enumerate on
only a few, it has been variously stated that Brazil will not sell to belligerents,
•^Tollefson, Part II, Chapter 4, "Brazilian Arms Sales: The Policy, In Principle and in
Practice," p. 159.
309 Franko-Jones, "Public Private Partnership," p. 60.
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nor will they sell to regions that may be destabilized by such a sale. While the
Brazilians may usually follow this maxim, this has certainly not always been
the case. Iraq, for example, was a Brazilian customer during the Iran-Iraq
War,310 and it has also been reported that Iran may have been as well. The
Brazilians also claim no requirement for the signature of an "end users
certificate," a restriction that limits the resale of purchased armaments
without prior approval of the original supplier nation. While this is
normally true, there are occasions when sales have been restricted because of
political embarrassments that a recipients re-transfer may have caused.
Tollefson cites the suspension of Brazilian arms sales to Libya in 1983 as a
result of reports that the Libyans had transferred Libyan rockets to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization.311
(2) Process. The approval of arms sales is a highly centralized
process in Brazil. Members of the Brazilian government and military appear
to be involved in all aspects of the foreign military sales process. Since each
case is different, the actual process of approval may vary, but final approval
will rest in the hands of a few major actors.
If a prospective sale exists, Brazilian manufacturers must usually
receive official government approval to deal with the client country prior to
holding negotiations of any kind. Requests for arms purchases are passed by
the Brazilian military attache in the prospective client country to the
National Security Council (CSN), Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Relations),
or the respective company. A foreign request is often made through one of
310 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World. 1971-85.
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987), Appendix 1, p. 191.
311 Tollefson, Part II, Chapter 4, p. 163.
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the major Brazilian arms companies, which must then apply for an export
license through the Brazilian government. Subsequent negotiations with the
client country are handled "in-country" by the respective Brazilian military
attache, often in coordination with a representative from the Brazilian
defense firm involved.312
Authorization for the sale is a closely handled process by which
prospective arms sales are first presented to the CSN for approval. The CSN
is the major decision-making forum in which Brazilian arms sales are
authorized. The CSN is headed by the president of Brazil, and also includes
the vice president, the civilian cabinet ministers, the chief of the military
cabinet (who doubles as the general secretary of the CSN), the ministers of the
three military services, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
(EMFA), and the chief of the National Intelligence Service (SNI).
Although consensus on a sale is not required, there is an
elaborate consultation process within the CSN. The actual process is often
decided by the particular style of the presiding secretary general, who is the
most prominent actor in the implementation of the sales authorization
process. Consultation often begins with Itamaraty because it is the formulator
of Brazilian foreign policy and the major representative of civilian interests
in the CSN.313 Itamaraty has the power to veto any sale that may impact
Brazilian foreign interests on a negative basis. However, Itamaraty also
actively promotes arms sales that may help develop other diplomatic and
312 Hudson, "Foreign Military Sales," p. 16.




Once Itamaraty renders an opinion, it will then pass the sales
proposal to the relevant military ministries for their opinions. Before
reaching a decision, the CSN will consider the political, diplomatic, military,
and economic aspects of a sale by contacting other appropriate representatives
for consultation. Questions regarding finance and export information, for
example, are directed to finance and trade officials from CACEX and the
Ministry of Finance. These bodies have no real influence in the process itself.
If differences in opinion between the military and Itamaraty prevent a
decision, disputes are resolved through reconciliation with the general
secretary. Once the CSN approves a sale, the general secretary presents the
document to the president for final authorization. A presidential veto can
not be overruled.315
Although Itamaraty and the military are the major elites in the
sales authorization process, there is also close cooperation with other actors
out of the formal framework of PNEMEM. These include the manufacturers,
the Congress, the press, public opinion, and interest groups. By far the most
significant of these informal actors are the manufacturers. Their pro-sales
lobby is very strong, and may actually equal the influence of the formal actors
in some cases. The manufacturers also enjoy a close relationship with the
military. The press can also indirectly wield influence, especially if it can
disclose embarrassing information. Still, the press is usually noted for being
positive towards the arms industry. Finally, Congress, public opinion, and
314 Brazil is one of only a couple of countries which distributes a national merchandise
catalog of weapons for sale.
315Tollefson, Part II, Chapter 5, "Brazilian Arms Sales: The Decision-Makers," pp. 175-
193.
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other interest groups are generally marginalized and have little influence in
the overall decision-making process of an arms sale.316
b. Governmental Research Support
Embraer, Imbel, and Emgepron are the three official entities through
which the Brazilian government coordinates assistance for the aviation,
ordnance, and naval industries. Embraer serves as the organ for the
management of all government-related manufacturing programs. Imbel
regulates the ordnance sector, and Emgepron coordinates the naval sector.
Embraer and Imbel's roles have been briefly described before.
Emgepron was created in 1982, uniting the Navy Yard, the munitions center
and the artillery factory. Emgepron promotes new arms industries in the
naval field, offers the necessary technical and financial assistance for research
and development of new projects, and it also provides expertise and
assistance in handling contractual negotiations.
Research and development of weapons systems involves
cooperation of the state (for technical and financial support), the military, and
private companies. The military directly controls the research activities of the
major Brazilian defense firms, who often collaborate with weapons
development projects through the military research institutes. The Army
Technological Institute (CTE) works on the development of ordnance
technology which can then be used by the private sector for direct production.
The Aerospace Technical Center (CTA) oversees five research institutes that
help design, develop, and test different products that then leave the
experimental stage to a company for production. Even the National
316 Tollefson, Part II, Chapter 5. pp. 193-224.
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Intelligence School (ESN) has a research center for the security field (CEPESQ).
The Bureau of Naval Engineering (AEN) and the Navy Research Institute
(IPM), within their respective fields, perform similar functions as the other
service research institutes. The Navy also utilizes multinational
corporations, as well as private nationals, to aid in shipbuilding.317
c. The Elements of the Brazilian Arms Industry
The Brazilian arms industry may be broken down into three elements
of manufacture - land, sea, and air - each of which is closely associated with
its respective military service. The army-related sector is the largest, in
consonance with the traditional role of dominance the army plays in
Brazilian politics and military affairs in relation to the other services.
Understanding that annual percentages will vary, army-related exports make
up between 53 to 87 percent of all Brazilian arms exports. The air force sector
is next in size. The non-civilian sector of aeronautical products exported
under air force administration accounts for between 13 to 47 percent of total
arms exports. Finally, the navy plays the smallest role in arms exports, with
perhaps only 5 percent of the total Brazilian arms exports.318 The service
responsible for the weapon of manufacture represents the military in the
arms sales process. It should also be noted that the military jurisdiction over
different companies sometimes overlaps, such as in missiles, since military
applications of certain products are not necessarily claimed by only one
service.
^l^Hudson, "Foreign Military Sales," p. 6.
"^Variances between the first and second percentages of army and air force-related export
figures were tabulated for 1984 and 1987, respectively. Tollefson, Part II, Chapter 5, "Brazilian
Arms Sales: The Decision-Makers," Thp Search for Autonomy, pp. 198-199.
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Within each sector, industry usually cooperates with the military in
the development and manufacture of arms. The military generally
encourages the production of weapons which the military requires before the
production of export models. The infrastructure of the Brazilian arms
industry consists of both private and public concerns. In both cases, whether
operated by the state or private individual, arms-related companies receive
state subsidies, tax incentives and exemptions, and research and development
support. This support has been crucial to the growth of these industries. The
most oft-cited figures state that there are approximately 100,000 persons
currently employed in about 350 individual firms involved in the arms
industry in Brazil. Three of the largest and best known companies are Engesa,
Avibras, and Embraer.
(1) Land. The development, production, and sale of arms by Engesa
and Avibras are generally overseen by the Brazilian Army. Engesa is a
company that has traditionally been considered the industry pacesetter. The
company is led by Jose Luiz Whitaker Ribeiro who is the personification of
the Brazilian armaments industry. Engesa's reputation has been staked on the
production of extremely reliable and durable armored vehicles, such as the
EE-9 Cascavel, the EE-1 Urutu, and the latest, the EE-T1 Osorio - a 40-ton tank
that represents the culmination of technological advances in Brazil. 319
Avibras is a private company that manufactures a variety of artillery rocket
systems, incendiaries and bombs. The Astros E rocket family are their most
well-known and exported product. Another firm, Imbel, is state run and
3^However, it may also be noted that the Osorio may be bankrupting the company. This
new tank is much more expensive than its predecessors and sales are very sluggish in the late
1980s - especially since the termination of the Iran-Iraq war.
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manufactures ordnance and small arms. It is a combination of former state
arsenals and other state enterprises in munitions.
(2) Air. The Brazilian Air Force is generally responsible for the
oversight of Embraer. Embraer is a mix of private and state ownership, and
has a strong international reputation for aeronautical products. It
manufactures a wide-range of light to medium civilian aircraft as well as
military aircraft. The EMB-312 Tucano trainer is being bought by both
developing and developed countries alike. In collaboration with the Italian
companies of Aeritalia and Aermacchi, Embraer has also been contracting for
the co-production of the AMX, a sub-sonic tactical jet.
(3) Sea. An indigenous naval industry is still emerging in Brazil. The
least developed of the arms industry sectors in Brazil, the Brazilian Navy lags
behind its military counterparts in domestic arms production. Purchasing
most of its equipment from abroad, the Brazilian Navy produces relatively
little indigenously.320 Until recently, most of the ships and weapons systems
the Brazilians have owned were procured from the United States. Indeed,
having recorded a long relationship with the United States Navy, even the
tactics and strategic concepts the Brazilian navy employs are of U.S. origin.
The Brazilian navy is the most pro-U.S. of all the Brazilian services.321
Partly due to the expense of naval shipbuilding but mainly because of
the high technology required for naval vessels and naval weapons systems,
Brazilian naval arms production is the least developed sector of the Brazilian
arms industry. Naval construction has been limited mostly to smaller craft,
320 Master's Thesis by Sandra Nichols Ellis, "Naval Technology Transfer and Arms Trade:
The Brazilian Connection," (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June, 1988), p. 3.
321 Personal interview with Meredith Harpine, Brazilian Analyst with the South
American Branch of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 18 July 1989.
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such as patrol boats, although larger naval ships such as the British Niteroi-
class ASW frigates are now being constructed under foreign partnership. 322
Naval exports have been confined to regional sales of a limited number of
patrol boats. Out of the ninety-eight Brazilian military export agreements
reported by Louscher and Salomone, for example only seven were navy
related and, of these, none was totally indigenous.323 Still, since the second
largest shipyard in the world, next to Japan, is in Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilians
certainly have the capacity to build more complex naval vessels if they can
acquire the necessary technology.
(a) Technology Transfers. The National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI) is the Brazilian agency in charge of technology transfer. It
establishes the rules and policies for using patents and regulates the transfer
of technology. Technology transfer agreements are divided into five
categories: patent license agreements; trademark license agreements;
industrial technology license agreements; technological and industrial
cooperation agreements; and technical service agreements.324 Welcoming the
import of new technology, such as that which originates in the United States,
Japan and the Netherlands, Brazil adapts it for domestic consumption, but
then vigorously promotes the adaptation of this technology to products for
export.
Still, the more sensitive naval technologies that Brazil
322Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Production in the Third World. (London:
Taylor & Francis, 1986), p. 82.
323 David Louscher and M. Salomone, Marketing and Security Assistance. (Lexington: D.C.
Heath and Company, 1987), pgs. 118-119, as cited by Ellis in "Naval Technology Transfer and
Arms Trade," p. 32.
324World Bank, Brazil. Industrial Policies and Manufactured Exports. Washington, D.C,
1983, p. 100, as cited by Ellis in "Naval Technology Transfer and Arms Trade," pgs. 20-21.
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desires are difficult to acquire, especially from the United States. Brazil has
not signed the U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement
(GSOMIA), the bilateral government-to-government agreement that protects
U.S. military technology transferred to a signatory country, so Brazil is limited
by the U.S. National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1) to a lower category of
technology than it might otherwise receive from the United States.325 It is
true that the Brazilian Navy and civilian industry are tightly bound in the
naval shipbuilding industry, but unlike the other services, few active duty
naval officers currently serve in defense companies. As a result, the problems
of technology transfer to third parties may be mitigated. Indeed, one analyst
has stated that the Brazilian Navy will not sell to pariah countries.326 If this
is the case, naval export sales would remain in-line with U.S. requirements.
Of course, it may just be that the expense of military hardware restricts the
availability of clients. On the other hand, if civilian industry can not be
coerced to follow the lead of the Brazilian Navy, technology 'leaks' would
probably occur. In any case, until Brazil signs GSOMIA, the point is moot and
naval technology transfers from the United States will remain limited.
Brazil continues to pursue a higher level of self-sufficiency
in its nascent naval arms industry, but without U.S. technology, Brazil is
forced to rely on European suppliers. It is a process which has generally
followed the following format: 1) The purchase of second-hand vessels; 2)
The purchase of new vessels; 3) The licensed building of new vessels; 4) The
redesign of foreign vessels; and 5) The production of an original domestic
325persona [ interview with Bill Withers, OP-615, Technology Transfers, Pentagon,
Washington, D.C., 20 July,1989.
326personai interview with Meredith Harpine, DIA, Washington, D.C., 18 July, 1989.
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design.327 It is a process of stages requiring both time and money.
(b) Budget Cuts. Military budget cuts are a significant problem
since they affect the Brazilian Navy disproportionately as a result of the
growing obsolescence of their fleet. Because of the current budget crunch in
Brazil, the scheduled updating and refit of many of the older Brazilian naval
vessels has been postponed. The cancellation of programs such as the
Barracuda anti-ship missile and the Avibras SSA-N-1 surface-to-air missile
programs have certainly been a blow to Brazilian attempts for self-sufficiency,
as well. Still, the recent transfer of four decommissioned Garcia-class ships
from the United States to Brazil and the acquisition of other vessels, such as
four ex-U.S. Charles F. Adams-class missile destroyers,328 is a positive
indicator for the Brazilian Navy.
(c) Threat. Changes in threat perceptions have motivated the
military to invest more heavily in the naval sector. Although the Brazilian
navy has been traditionally accorded a lower priority in the Brazilian military
hierarchy, the Navy is currently the only service in Brazil that has an external
focus. It is also the only service with force projection capabilities. The
growing importance of trade has increased awareness and concern over
control of the sea lines of communication in the South Atlantic. This has
provided the Navy a small advantage over its sister services in the battle of
the budget.
Indeed, while the Brazilian Army has experienced
tremendous cuts, forcing the cancellation of Ground Forces 1990, a major
327Farooq Hussain and Robert van Tol, "Naval Exports: Problems of Technology Transfer,"
Naval Forces: International Forum for Maritime Pnwpr. No.II, Vol VII, (1986), p. 20.
328Norman Friedman, "World Navies in 1992," Proceedings, (March,1992), p. 133.
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build-up program for the Army, support for specific Navy programs, such as
their conventional and nuclear submarine programs, have become a
priority.329 Germany's Howaldtswerke has already delivered the first of four
Type-1400 class submarines to Brazil, and the other three are being built
under an indigenous design schedule in Brazil.330 And while it is estimated
that the earliest possibility that a Brazilian nuclear submarine will enter
service is in the year 2010, the Brazilians already have a primary circuit and
zero-power reactor in operation.331
4. Summary of Findings of Brazilian Arms Industry
Brazil offers the most opportunities for cooperative programs with the
United States in Latin America. With arms export sales going to as many as
forty nations of the world in the mid-1980s, the Brazilians developed a solid
reputation as a reliable supplier of durable, relatively inexpensive weapons
which met the needs of their recipients. By the late 1980s, the Brazilians were
making over $1 billion a year in transfers. Indeed, by making money off of
low to mid-technology arms exports, Brazil ranked as one of the world's top
ten exporters of arms. However, the 1990s have not been good for the
Brazilian arms industry. The global recession, the end of the Iran-Iraq War
and continuing economic problems in Brazil which severely impact the
budget available for the military has hamstrung the Brazilian arms industry.
Now entering into the development of more sophisticated weapons systems,
329 Personal interview with LTCOL David A. Pagni, USA, the Senior Political-Military
Estimator for Latin America at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., 18 July
1989.
330 Robert L. Scheina, "Regional Reviews: Latin American Navies," Proceedings. (March,
1989), p. 128.
^Scheina, "Latin American Navies," Proceedings. (March, 1989), p. 128.
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both for export and for domestic use, several problems loom on the horizon
that Brazil will need to face as it forays beyond the niche that it has developed
in the world arms market.
First is the problem of finance. While Brazil has now become a strong
actor in the international economy, with a 1990 gross domestic product of
$326 billion - a larger GDP than all the rest of South and Central America
combined,332 Brazil is also hampered by debt. Brazil owes $118 billion in
foreign debt alone. Debt servicing quickly cuts into any surplus and reduces
the net. A change in interest rates, such as the sharp increase of about three
percentage points in international interest rates between the first quarter of
1988 and the first quarter of 1989,333 adds to the burden of Brazil's debt
servicing. The Brazilian federal budget has been squeezed. Higher levels of
weapons sophistication require more expensive outlays for research,
development, and production. Federal funds for such projects may not be
available without greater foreign capital. Advanced tactical fighters, nuclear
submarines, and large warships are risky investments for a nation whose
financial solvency may be at the whim of creditors. Indeed, the financial
difficulties of the Brazilian arms industry are symbolized by the recent
bankruptcy of Engesa, the former industry pacesetter, which had racked up a
$400 million by 1992. As a result of the lack of hope for profitability, Engesa is
now being turned into a state enterprise.334
332 Source is the Inter-American Development Bank, as cited in The Christian Science
Monitor. (18 March 1992), p.10.
333John T. Norman, "Latin Nations' Export Earnings Are Up, But Problems Offset Gains,
IADB Says," The Wall Street Journal. (11 September, 1989), p. A-15B.
334 Eliana Simonetti, "Com Dinheiro do povo," Veja. 8 April 1992, 78-80, as cited by Scott
D. Tollefson, Assistant Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, in "U.S. Brazilian Security Relations: Implications for
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Second, is a lack of high levels of technology. It is doubtful Brazil can
conquer the technological barriers for developing more sophisticated
weapons systems without access to the higher technology of the United States
or other traditional developed suppliers. While coproduction and technology
transfers have been an important factor in the Brazilian acquisition of higher
levels of technology, these have been carefully orchestrated efforts to wean
Brazil from dependence on foreign sources. Brazil may have to accept the
consequences of greater foreign influence if it desires to obtain the higher
technologies of such systems as supersonic jet engines.
Third, Brazil has staked its reputation on marketing lower tech exports.
The niche carved by Brazil had been relatively lucrative and was not crowded
by the level of competition faced in the high tech export market. If Brazil
attempts to break into the hi-tech market alone they can expect great difficulty
earning a profit in a market which volume sales are generally lower. In
addition, many of Brazil's traditional recipients may not be able to afford the
new weapons, and other nations may prefer to buy weapons at the more
advanced end of the spectrum from the U.S., the Europeans or Russia.
Ultimately, Brazil must address its lack of end-use restrictions. If Brazil
desires higher levels of technology transfers, it will have to greater
accommodate the wishes of the supplier. Brazil has been very aggressive in
pursuing technology transfers from the United States, but the United States is
hesitant to increase its present relationship with Brazil without a greater
show of responsibility and accountability on the part of Brazil. The potential
Civil-Military Dynamics in Brazil," a paper presented at the XV Encontro da Associacao
Nacional de Posgraduacao e Pesquisa em Ciencias Sociais (ANPOCS); Grupo de Trabalho
Forcas Armadas, Estado e Sociedade; Caxambu, Minas Gerais; 15-18 October 1992, p 21.
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increase in the intensity and lethality of conflict that more sophisticated
weapons present requires an increase in the concern towards the final
destination of exported arms. At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, for
example, approximately 500 Brazilians representing privately-owned
Brazilian arms firms were in these two countries. One of these firms, HOP,
headed by retired Brazilian Air Force General Hugo de Oliveira Piva,
apparently employed a group of engineers from various countries to help Iraq
develop its missile program. Since these were not government employees,
they could not be ordered to cease their cooperation with Iraq.335 As both
counselor and decision-maker in the authorization and sale of Brazilian
arms, changes in the attitude of the Brazilian military towards observing a
more rigorous screening of potential clients may be the ticket towards greater
accountability within the entire Brazilian arms sales process. Certainly, such
a change would be met with a greater willingness by the United States to
invest in cooperative projects with Brazil. At the present, however, this
seems unlikely. A strong sense of nationalism continues to linger amongst
the Brazilian elite which will likely prevent any significant technology
transfers with the United States.
On a positive note, Brazil, along with Argentina and Chile, has finally
pledged to ratify the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, after the pact was amended to
ensure the safeguarding of industrial secrets. Already ratified by 24 other
Latin American countries, the treaty prohibits the production, stockpiling and
use of nuclear weapons in Latin America.336 However, although it is a step
335 Robert L. Scheina, "Regional Naval Reviews: Latin America," Proceedings. (March,
1991)j?. 89.
33
°"Latin America: 3 Nations to Join Latin Nuclear Treaty," The San Francisco Chronicle.
(27 August 1992), p. A-15.
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in the right direction, the United States will not transfer hi-technology data to
Brazil until they have signed the U.S. General Security of Military
Information Agreement. Itamaraty, and especially the military-industrial
alliance, continue to place higher priority on independence in the
commercial trade of arms than towards a more "responsible" approach to
arms sales. Therefore, prospects for U.S.-Brazilian armaments cooperation, if
any, will remain limited to lower level technologies.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The thesis argues that U.S. naval strategy needs revision. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the relative importance of the Third World to
U.S. security is increasing, as evidenced by recent events, such as Desert Storm
and the crises in Somalia and former Yugoslavia.
The thesis makes a case for a greater focus of the U.S. maritime strategy on
Latin America. Latin America is no longer a backwater region. As a region
that offers both threat and opportunity, the United States must attempt to
control the threats and harness the opportunities. Latin American threats to
U.S. security include political instability, debt, drugs, insurgency, terrorism,
illegal immigration, and threats to the environment. Opportunities range
from trade to military security. These points suggest that the U.S. must better
address its relationship with Latin America as the region becomes
increasingly important to the United States, thereby serving as an
introduction to a new maritime strategy.
The thesis also argues that if the United States seeks to open greater
avenues to international armaments cooperation, such as in Latin America, a
building block process is required that would allow such a complex venture to
be accomplished. In other words, the pursuit of such a venture requires that
it first be viewed as appropriate in the national interest. Once a strategy that
emphasizes the integration of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere
gains support, the potential increases for a Third World nation to become a
viable partner of the United States in the research, development and
production of armaments.
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Successful armaments cooperation requires that the parties involved are
mutually interested and in agreement over the particulars of such an
endeavor. Politics can play a very large part in this process. The thesis argues
that military interests between nations are in greater alignment when they
coincide with national interests. Hence, it is important to outline a
cooperative maritime strategy that will help induce a mutuality of national
interests before undertaking military-industrial cooperation.
The thesis makes the case that Brazil has the greatest potential of any
Latin American nation to become a viable partner of the United States in both
naval maritime pursuits and in armaments cooperation. With the world's
eighth largest economy, 150 million people and a broad industrial base, Brazil
is the dominant actor in the region. Brazil also boasts the most powerful
naval force in Latin America and maintains the most capable and well-
diversified indigenous arms industry in Latin America.
So, what is the potential for a U.S. Brazilian partnership in this endeavor?
Limited . The following reasons define the nature of the problem from the
U.S. perspective:
The problem is primarily a political one. Brazilian foreign policy is
nationalistic, aggressively pursuing Brazilian interests. Sovereignty issues
and Brazil's goal of leading the developing world tend to alienate the United
States.
*Although Brazil has made strides in controlling the transfer of sensitive
technologies, it still does not observe the stringency of standards that the
United States would like Brazil to enforce. Instead, Brazil has been cited for
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exporting weapons to nations whom the United States has banned from sales,
such as Iraq. The United States is loathe to transfer sensitive technologies to
Brazil unless it is felt that Brazil will live up to a higher standard of conduct
in the international arena.
•Brazilian foreign relations have become more diversified, as exhibited in
the process of its regional integration with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay,
and in developing closer relations with Europe and with the Far East.
'President Collor de Mello's resignation in December 1992 and his
succession by Itamar Franco suggest political instability in Brazil. The
military may be regaining some of their previously lost-prerogatives.
*Brazil stems also faces economic constrains. High debt, high inflation
and a budget squeeze have severely restricted Brazilian investment into the
defense industrial and military infrastructure. Indeed, the Brazilian arms
industry is on the verge of collapse. Operational commitments have also
been restricted, allowing Brazil's naval fleet less sea time.
*While Brazilian naval capabilities are significant, particularly by Third
World standards, there is a quantum difference in the level of their maritime
power projection capabilities than those of Great Britain or France. Budget
problems have precluded greater investment into the training and
equipment that would enable the navy to pursue a fuller range of capabilities.
However, the presence of Brazil's navy in the region of the Atlantic Narrows
and a capability to perform coastal patrol, anti-submarine warfare, convoy
escort duties and some measure of force projection could provide the United
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States with the additional assets needed to become force multipliers during a
time of war.
*Economic concerns in the United States also play a role. Although the
U.S. Department of Defense is seeking alternative sources for parts,
components and even larger ticket items, the Buy America Act, labor unions
and unemployed workers will argue that jobs and money should not be
squandered overseas but used instead to counter the loss of domestic defense
industry firms. U.S. shipyards, for example, are functioning well below
capacity.
The following reasons define the nature of the problem from the
Brazilian perspective:
*Brazilians are sensitive to the presence of the United States in the region.
They are concerned with U.S. desires to expand influence in Latin America.
*Brazilians are reticent to give up their independent foreign policy
agenda, especially for the sake of the United States.
*Brazilians are highly critical of U.S. restrictions on technology transfers
and question the fairness of U.S. arms transfers policy.
*Brazil is concerned with equity in armaments cooperation. The lessons
from the NATO experience in international armaments cooperation
illustrate that U.S. involvement often means U.S. leadership and control.
217
The bottom-line is that the potential for a U.S.-Brazilian partnership is
low. Operationally, the outlook for the future of the Brazilian navy is that it
will continue to function at their current rate. Little expansion of the
Brazilian fleet is expected and Brazil will probably have difficulty in replacing,
let alone updating, its aging fleet. Still, the active participation of Brazil in
bilateral and multilateral activities with the United States helps to improve
both navy-to-navy and country-to-country relations.
The potential for U.S.-Brazilian armaments cooperation is also low. Any
possible endeavors will probably be limited to the mid-to-low technology
spectrum. While Brazil has actively engaged the United States and Europe
for technology transfers, Brazil does not yet have ready access to the higher
levels of technology which it seeks in order to break into the upper end of the
arms market. Under the current circumstances, it is doubtful that the United
States will make such access available to Brazil unless the United States
perceives a significant change in Brazilian foreign policy. However, the U.S.
does require greater access to part and component support for its defense base,
much of which is at the low and mid-technology range of development -
exactly the arena in which the Brazilians have excelled. In addition, by
supporting the U.S. maritime strategy Brazil would not only improve mutual
security but would increase the potential for armaments cooperation with the
United States.
Further study needs to be conducted into the types of parts, components
and equipment which the United States desires and which the Brazilian firms
might be willing to coproduce. Additionally, study into the capabilities of the
other maritime nations of Latin America may reveal a niche market within
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